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Chapter 1
Introduction
Integration of the global economy and trade liberalization in the ongoing
process of European integration strike both countries and firms. Within this
process Germany and Austria are the countries most affected by the east-
ern enlargement: owing to the increasing competition and new opportunities
concerning mobility and attraction of human capital, firms reorganize their
structure (Marin 2008). That is, trade policy changes the firm’s environment,
amongst others, in terms of greater competition (Melitz 2003) and improved
access to foreign technology (Grossman and Helpman 1991). It incentivizes
further firm investments, international relocation of production, intra-firm
trade as well as exporting activities which in turn lead to performance im-
provements in the corporation.1
As most recently stated by the German Federal Statistical Office (2008a),
82 percent of German firms that relocated domestic activities to foreign coun-
tries argued that the primary motivations for their relocation are market ac-
cess and cost reduction owing to labor costs.2 The report states that product
development, foreign knowledge access or a follow-your-customer strategy are
1 See Holmes and Schmitz 2001, Kunst and Marin 1989, Wagner 2002, Wagner 2007.
2 Considered period between 2001 and 2006. See German Federal Statistical Office
(2008a).
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less important. Furthermore, the German Federal Statistical Office (2008a)
points out that firms with 100 or more employees experienced a positive im-
pact on their competitiveness (73 percent) as well as reduced labor costs (67
percent).3 In addition, between 2001 and 2006 almost 60 percent of the con-
sidered German firms moved into a country of the new European member
states (German Federal Statistical Office 2008a, pp.3).4 Therefore, the main
drivers of the firm performance within the globalization process, especially
owing to eastern enlargement, are trade liberalization and the international
division of firm activities.5
The firm’s decision to go abroad is determined, amongst others, by cost
saving aspects due to low market wages, off-peak periods, and economies
of scale (Abraham and Taylor 1996, p.396ff). Moreover, improved access
to higher quality inputs (Grossman and Helpman 1991) as well as ensuring
property rights through better protection of intangible assets (Blomstro¨m
and Sjo¨holm 1999) play also a significant role. That is, trade liberalization
and the international organization of the firm provide additional resources
which can be used for further investments increasing the firm’s productivity
and profitability, respectively. As shown by Glass and Saggi (2001) inter-
national outsourcing lowers costs in terms of decreased relative wages and
therefore frees resources and increases profits. In addition, the organiza-
tional structure itself is influenced by the technology intensity of the firm
(Acemoglu et al. 2004). The corporation’s innovative endowment due to in-
tellectual property rights determines the ownership structure regarding to an
international production within or outside the firm boundaries. Therefore,
there exists a link between the organizational structure and firm performance.
Moreover, owing to greater competition, enhanced input access, and higher
3 See German Federal Statistical Office (2008a), p.2ff. For further details see also the
German Federal Statistical Office (2008b).
4 The main driver of this result is the manufacturing industry with 61.9 percent relo-
cating to new EU countries. See the German Federal Statistical Office (2008b), p.7ff.
5 See, amongst others, Amiti and Konings (2007) and Glass and Saggi (2001).
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export values, trade liberalization has a positive impact on productivity.6
These channels complete the in this thesis compiled relationship between the
firm’s organization, trade liberalization, and firm-level productivity.
The contribution of my thesis is, on the one hand, to study the association
between innovation and the organizational structure and, on the other hand,
to analyze the relationship between firm-level productivity and trade liberal-
ization. In more detail, the first analysis tries to answer whether an increasing
pool of innovations on the firm level suppresses outsourcing activities owing
to hold-up risks. I aim to assess whether German firms relocate their activ-
ities within or outside their firm boundaries along with the ongoing process
of Eastern European integration. It deals with the following question: How
does innovation influence the firm’s national and international organizational
structure? Second, regarding to the increasing importance of international
trade through a rise in intra-firm trade and raising trade openness with new
member states (Marin 2008), I consider the impact of tariff reductions on
German and Austrian firm-level productivity. Does an improved intra-firm
trade environment and therefore easier access to intermediates boost firm-
level performance or does competition force the less efficient firms to leave the
market?7 How is firm-level productivity affected by trade liberalization and
offshoring? Existing studies show that output and input tariff cuts increase
productivity (Amiti and Konings 2007). I analyze whether this also holds
true for Austrian and German firms offshoring to Eastern Europe. Third
and closely related to this, I focus on the association between German and
Austrian firm exports and the underlying performance of the corporation.
The analysis shows whether exporting behavior leads to a raise in firm-level
productivity and/or whether the productive firms self-select themselves into
6 See Amiti and Konings 2007, De Loecker 2007b, Grossman and Helpman 1991, Melitz
2003, Wagner 2007.
7 See Melitz (2003).
3
Introduction
the export market.8 In detail, I answer the question whether participation in
the export market of German and Austrian firms causes a rise in productivity
growth.
Chapter 2 studies the impact of innovation on the national and interna-
tional ownership structure of German firms considering their pool of inno-
vations. Following the framework by Acemoglu et al. (2004) the theoretical
part develops a model of the firm’s decision to offshore or outsource regarding
to territorial protected knowledge. The contribution of this analysis is given
by the following factors and findings: It links the ownership of patents, in-
vestment incentives and the outcome of the organizational structure between
German and Eastern European firms in the national and international con-
text, respectively.9 As a first result and in line with Acemoglu et al. (2004),
a larger pool of knowledge on the producer level increases the likelihood of
integration; an increasing pool of knowledge on the supplier level raises the
probability of non-integration. However, extending the model to an interna-
tional context where knowledge protection is absent, affects the firm’s deci-
sion in favor of outsourcing. The chapter shows that non-integration holds
longer along with an increasing pool of parental knowledge compared with
the national case. That is, outsourcing is more likely to maintain the suppli-
ers’ active participation in order to increase the relationship’s surplus. Using
a unique data matching for 2005 on German investment projects in home
and in Eastern European countries allows (i) to distinguish between different
innovation measures and to study their impact on international outsourcing,
(ii) to compare these results with the territorially protected national case,
(iii) to test theoretical predictions how the size of the parties’ outside op-
tions affect the organizational choice, and (iv) to provide robustness for the
results.
8 See Bernard and Jensen (1999).
9 See also Acemoglu et al. (2004).
4
Introduction
Chapter 3 investigates the impact of trade liberalization on firm-level pro-
ductivity. For this reason I consider the importance of German and Austrian
trade openness concerning the pre-eastern enlargement period from 1994 to
2003. Focusing on different types of tariff cuts related to intra-firm trade,
this chapter provides, besides a broad overview of related studies, empirical
evidence for the micro-impact on total factor productivity (TFP). The data
allow a detailed descriptive overview about the mentioned relationship, dif-
ferent kinds of productivity measures as well as a prediction to what extent
German and Austrian firm productivity gain owing to cuts in the different
types of tariffs. In addition, I determine the channel of decreasing tariffs
via intra-firm imports on productivity. Moreover, the data allow to analyze
several other parameters and the results’ robustness concerning offshoring to
Eastern Europe.
Chapter 4 shifts the focus from imports to German and Austrian ex-
port behavior. I analyze the association between exporting and firm per-
formance. Using micro-level data from 1994 to 2003 the chapter highlights
the main differences between exporters and non-exporters. In detail, I in-
vestigate whether exporting firms are more productive compared with their
non-exporting counterparts. In addition, I present empirical results revealing
that exporting raises the annual average productivity growth.10 The contri-
bution of this chapter is the following: First, it gives a detailed descriptive
analysis about the firm’s export intensities and their firm-level performance.
Second, it econometrically studies the link between exports and different pro-
ductivity measures using German and Austrian firm data. Third, it provides
robustness for the existing interdependency.
Finally, Chapter 5 concludes this thesis by summarizing the main findings.
10 The procedure follows Bernard and Jensen (1999).
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Innovation and the
International Firm Structure:
Theory and Evidence from
German Firm-Level Data
6
Innovation and the International Firm Structure
2.1 Introduction
In a global economy, the international make-or-buy decision offers firms the
option to relocate its activities within its firm environment or outside its firm
boundaries, either at home (national integration versus outsourcing) and/or
abroad (offshoring versus international outsourcing).1 Especially due to cor-
porate knowledge and its related risks, this raises the question of whether it is
more interesting to outsource or to in-source. On the one hand, outsourcing
frees resources and saves labor costs (Glass and Saggi 2001). On the other
hand, integration reduces the classical hold-up problem as argued within the
“transaction cost economies” (Williamson 1975). Therefore, integration is
preferred over outsourcing (non-integration) in order to circumvent the firm-
specific hold-up problem. That is, theory creates a link between transaction
costs and uncertainty arguing to reduce the ex-post hold-up problem via
vertical integration that arises from ex-ante investments and opportunism
(Williamson 1975, 1985).2
This chapter studies the determinants of the national and international
ownership structure of German firms considering their innovational capaci-
ties. More precisely, it addresses the following question: How does a pool
of knowledge, in particular a pool of patents belonging to the parent firm,
influence the organizational relationship within a national as well as inter-
national context? Following Acemoglu et al. (2004), the theoretical part
develops a relationship between innovation and the organizational structure.
It argues that the decision to integrate or not depends on the parties’ pool of
knowledge and its related territorial environment. Comparing costs and ben-
efits, vertical integration strengthens the position of the firm’s owner whereas
outsourcing is more likely to maintain the suppliers’ active participation.3 It
1 See Marin (2006).
2 See Acemoglu et al. (2004).
3 The intuition is provided by the “property rights theory” (Grossman and Hart 1986
and Hart and Moore 1990). See also Acemoglu et al. (2004) and Brusoni, Prencipe, and
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allows to develop a combination of the parent’s and affiliates’ innovation pool
with the decision for an organizational structure between the two parties for
each geographical breakdown.
Against the traditional perception that innovative firms want to protect
their knowledge within integration, even highly innovative enterprises are in-
terested in cost savings and therefore non-integrational relationships. Thus,
the following Section 2.2 presents a literature review on knowledge in terms
of research and development (R&D) and patents. It starts with a broader
size of theoretical literature discussing two controversial directions of the in-
fluence of innovation on outsourcing. It addresses mainly an contra intuitive
empirical finding that a higher R&D intensity is related to more outsourcing
(Mol 2005, p.581). The section gives also an short overview about the under-
standing of inventiveness and innovation and presents the German position
within international innovation activities. Section 2.3 develops the general
framework beginning in a national context. The underlying model follows
Acemoglu et al. (2004), also describing in this section the authors’ frame-
work in more detail. It shows that a larger pool of knowledge on the producer
level increases the likelihood of integration. The opposite holds if the sub-
sidiaries’ pool of innovations increases. Against Acemoglu et al. (2004),
the model is also extended to the international context. It is assumed that
patent applications granted domestically do not hold in the foreign envi-
ronment. Despite this characteristic, to a certain threshold the outcome of
non-integration is more likely with an increasing pool of knowledge compared
with the national case. That is, the changeover from the closed to the open
territorially unprotected case delays the probability of integration with an
increasing producer’s innovation pool. Beside that, the larger the supplier’s
outside option and the larger the fraction the producer can keep in a po-
tential ex-post break-up, the more likely is non-integration. This holds in
Pavitt (2001) considering aircraft engine manufacturers.
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both cases. Section 2.4 describes the underlying data, summary statistic of
the employed variables and the basic estimation equation. It presents the
empirical results using data on German investment projects in home and in
Central and Eastern Europe in 2005. It is based on a unique data matching
of the pan-European micro database Amadeus provided by the Bureau von
Dijk and firm-specific patent data provided by the German Patent and Trade
Mark Office.4 The findings are in line with the theoretical predictions. A
German parent firm and its corresponding partner are more likely to be in-
tegrated when the German downstream firm (DSF) is highly innovative and
the domestic or foreign upstream firm (USF) is less innovative. This holds
for the national as well as the international case and for different measures of
innovativeness. Moreover, the difference between Home and Foreign shows
a deduction in the likelihood of integration. Intuitively, owing to additional
investment incentives outsourcing holds longer in the international context
than the national case.5 The following subsection discusses the robustness of
the empirical findings. Finally, Section 2.5 concludes and encourages future
work in this field of investigation.
2.2 Innovation and the Firm Structure
2.2.1 A Literature Survey
The existing literature yields two controversial aspects of innovation and its
association with the organizational relationship between a parent firm and its
affiliate.6 The “traditional view” (Mol 2005, p.572) states that a larger pool
4 See Bureau von Dijk (2005) and GPTO (2008a, 2008b, 2008c).
5 The empirical framework is motivated by Acemoglu et al. (2004), McLaren (2000),
Antras and Helpman (2004), Marin (2006), and Nunn and Trefler (2007). It is closely
related to a wide strand of literature concerning vertical structure, international trade,
and growth: Aghion and Tirole (1997), Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti (2002), Grossman
and Helpman (2002, 2003, and 2004), and Bartel, Lach, and Sicherman (2005).
6 See Mol (2005).
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of innovations increases the likelihood of integration. Contrary, innovation
also has the potential to increase the likelihood of outsourcing.
The perspective that innovation and knowledge reflect a negative extent
of outsourcing is discussed by a huge amount of literature. Stigler (1951)
applies it to vertical integration by considering economies of scale. Due to
large fixed costs, highly innovative firms decide in favor of integration to ex-
ploit economies of scale that can be more easily recuperated by large firms.
Moreover, integration raises essential knowledge, makes entry by new firms
less likely, and helps to enforce price discrimination (Stigler 1951, p.191).
Considering complementary assets, Teece (1986) argues that integration is
an important strategic instrument for highly innovative firms. He argues that
integration is preferable for obtaining additional assets. The greater the im-
portance of these complementary assets to the innovator and the more critical
these assets to the firm’s success in terms of time and budget, the more likely
integration is from an innovator’s perspective.7 In the chapter’s context, the
innovator integrates to protect the original innovation as well as to enhance
the value of the existing knowledge.8 Antras and Helpman (2004) present a
north-south model of international trade in which final good-producing firms
located in the north may decide to keep the input production within their
boundaries or to outsource it to an independent supplier. Beside the interme-
diate good to create the final good, the producer needs headquarter services,
which are solely produced by the final-good producer itself at home (north).
Because investments and output are neither verifiable nor contractible, the
outside options determine the organizational structure via ex-post bargain-
ing. As already mentioned, investment incentives are larger for the supplier
under non-integration than vertical integration. In contrast, in the case of
integration, incentives to invest are larger for the producer because of the in-
7 See Teece (1986, p.290) calling this outcome “integrating into specialized and cospe-
cialized assets”.
8 See also Mol (2005), p.574.
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creased outside option. Hence, the outcome of the organizational structure is
defined by the investment incentives of the more important party within the
relationship. In the headquarter-intensive sector, Antras and Helpman (2004)
show that only the most productive firms choose integration over outsourcing
domestically as well as abroad. Following Antras and Helpman (2004), the
empirical studies by Marin (2006) and Nunn and Trefler (2007) estimate the
determinants of the organizational structure. Both find empirical evidence
that knowledge has a positive influence on integration. Marin (2006) finds a
significant negative coefficient of the capital-to-labor ratio and a significant
positive impact of R&D expenditures on intra-firm imports from Eastern Eu-
rope to Germany. That is, her data on German and Austrian firms investing
in Eastern Europe suggest that the larger the headquarter intensity and the
larger the R&D expenditures, the more likely is integration. Concerning
R&D expenditures, the results also hold in probit estimations differing be-
tween outsourcing and offshoring in terms of the ownership share. Nunn
and Trefler (2007) show that the share of U.S. imports’ capital intensity has
a positive influence on intra-firm imports. Moreover, patent citations over
total value added as a proxy for knowledge have a positive but insignificant
impact on integration. Hence, the data affirm the theoretical predictions
arguing that a pool of knowledge reduces the likelihood of outsourcing.
The number of empirical analyses presenting a negative impact of in-
novation on outsourcing is large. Louri, Loufir, and Papanastassiou (2002)
report a negative correlation between R&D intensity and the likelihood of
outsourcing. For Greek data on 216 multinational firms, the authors show
a positive influence of R&D intensity on fully owned affiliates. Distinguish-
ing between an integrated or non-integrated relationship, Monteverde (1995)
runs a probit estimation in the semiconductor industry on patents. The
number of patents held by each firm is positively correlated with integration.
This is in line with the theory’s predictions. However, the impact is not
11
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significant. Increasing costs of monitoring as well as technology spillovers
are risks that have to be taken into account.9 From an innovator’s perspec-
tive, this suggests preferring integration over non-integration. Mugele and
Schnitzer (2006) find that technology is the determining variable that in-
creases the investors’ ownership share. The authors distinguish between a
production-intensive, a technology-intensive, as well as a marketing-intensive
sector, whereas the technology-intensive sector is more likely to integrate.
As briefly mentioned at the beginning of this section, there are also ar-
guments in favor of non-integration with an increasing pool of knowledge.
A study by Mol (2005) analyzing the impact of R&D intensity on vertical
integration within the Dutch manufacturing sector shows that the negative
extent of outsourcing at the beginning of the 1990s seems to have shifted.
He shows that R&D intensity has a positive impact on changes in the ris-
ing external sourcing structure. In more detail, the results refer to interna-
tional outsourcing, suggesting that the “traditional view” (Mol 2005, p.572)
where R&D intensity discourages outsourcing may no longer hold. Mol (2005,
p.579) argues that the increasing technological requirements force the firm
to outsource. The corporation is not able to develop and implement all the
necessary technologies by itself. Moreover, the positive extent of outsourcing
is intensified in an environment characterized by rapid technological change
(Harrigan 1984, 1985, Balakrishnan and Wernerfelt 1986, Bartel, Lach, and
Sicherman, 2005). When a firm has to act in such a frequently changing
environment, innovators prefer outsourcing over integration to circumvent
perseverative adaptation costs.10 Bartel et al. (2005) develop a framework
that describes the pace of technological change and its impact on the or-
ganizational structure. Within their model, a faster pace of technological
developments results in more outsourcing to reduce the adaptation costs of
9 See also Louri et al. (2002), p.33.
10 For a more detailed discussion of the IT sector, see Bartel et al. (2005).
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producing in-house. Therefore, the final good-producing firm can always use
the latest technology without incurring additional fixed costs (Bartel et al.
2005, p.12). Within the empirical study, the authors show that, in the case of
a great sectoral IT dependency, purchasing services outside is more likely.11
Hence, outsourcing is a possibility to circumvent fixed costs, avail lower fac-
tor prices, and, beside that, to use a potential network offering innovativeness
and therefore the chance to follow the technological advance at lower costs.12
Thus, outsourcing offers the chance to stay up to date with both the
firm’s competitive surroundings and the innovative environment. Empey
(1988) analyzes that outsourcing of services by manufacturing industries in-
creases faster in sectors where technological change and productivity play a
decisive role. Involving the costs of the well-known hold-up problem seems
to weigh less than reduced labor costs, costs of technological spillovers, and
decreasing supplier’s investment incentives. Moreover, Mol et al. (2004) find
that product innovation has a positive impact on the scope of international
outsourcing and Maskell et al. (2005) argue that even innovative processes
are outsourced..13
2.2.2 Invention and Innovation
The existing literature reveals different definitions of innovation. As defined
in the Oslo Manual by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and De-
velopment (OECD 2005, p.46), innovation is “the implementation of a new or
significantly improved product (good or service), or process, a new market-
ing method, or a new organizational method in business practices, workplace
organization or external relations”. Thompson (1965, p.2) defines innova-
tion as “[...] the generation, acceptance, and implementation of new ideas,
11 See Atallah (2002) for a very similar discussion on the IT sector.
12 See also Quinn (2000).
13 In contrast, Mol et al. (2005) also argue that innovation is negatively associated with
the depth of international outsourcing. However, there is no empirical evidence for this.
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processes, products, or services. [...] it implies the capacity to change or
adapt.” By the Commission of the European Communities (1991), innova-
tion is defined by new products and processes. Damanpour (1991) uses the
development and adaption of ideas whereas Drazin and Schoonhoven (1996)
define it as a competitive advantage. Moreover, innovation has to be sep-
arated from invention. That is, invention in terms of new ideas precedes
innovation that turns those ideas into new products and processes (Baddeley
and Barrowclough 2009).
Innovation is often measured as R&D expenditures. Becker and Dietz
(2002) use the in-house R&D expenditures-to-sales ratio of German corpora-
tions for the firm’s intensity in inventiveness and developing new products.
Their results suggest that R&D cooperation is a significant explanatory fac-
tor of innovation in the German manufacturing industry. Marin, Lorentow-
icz, and Raubold (2003) present R&D expenditures as a percentage of parent
sales of German firms during the 1990s to measure technology and innovative
activity. They conclude that the highly innovative German segment invests
in Eastern Europe to exploit lower wages via foreign direct investment (FDI).
Greeve (2003) studies the Japanese shipbuilding industry. Within his study,
he employs R&D expenditures as a measure of innovative search activities.
Zhang et al. (2005) investigate the link between a firm’s knowledge base and
its tendency towards collaboration. Using R&D intensity between 1993 and
2002, the authors give evidence for international biotechnology alliances and
find, inter alia, that firms with intensive technological knowledge are less
likely to enter alliances.14
R&D covers knowledge and is commonly used as an empirical proxy for
innovation input. It is an essential element in the innovative process (Bad-
deley and Barrowclough 2009). However, R&D is a source or the input of
innovation but it does not represent the output of the innovative activity
14 See also Mol (2005) for a similar discussion.
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(OECD 2005). Especially when considering the innovative output, that is
new processes, products and upcoming market launches, R&D expenditures
are unsatisfying. Therefore, patents are much more suitable for represent-
ing fundamental knowledge and inventiveness in terms of evident novelty.
Patents form the interface between R&D expenditures and innovations. In
addition to that, intellectual property rights determine the corporation’s
market and technological position (Fattore 1997). Empirical studies like
those of Blau and McKinley (1979), Hausman, Hall, and Griliches (1984),
Griliches (1990), Crepon, Duguet, and Mairesse (1998), Blind et al. (2003),
and Branstetter, Fisman, and Foley (2005) study the number of patents and
patent applications to consider the development and impact of inventiveness
and knowledge. For instance, Griliches (1990) argues in favor of patents as
an economic and innovative indicator. In his overview, he states the impor-
tance of patentees considering the value of a firm, its competitiveness, and
the technological change.15
In general, the objective of a patent is to protect knowledge in terms of
new products and processes. It covers for a certain time the ownership of an
exclusive right to an invention that can be held by the inventor or assigned
by the inventor to his corporation (German Patent and Trade Mark Office
(GPTO) 2008a).16 An efficient patent system gives incentives for further in-
vestments and innovations within a protected economic environment (Jaffe
and Lerner 2004). In more detail, Fattore (1997) argues that patents encour-
age inventiveness, allow novelties to be exchanged, offer information on the
strength of competitors, and are fundamental to protection and commercial-
ization. Intellectual property rights in terms of patents are one category of a
firm’s pool of intangible assets ensuring costs and revenues (Greenhalgh and
Rogers 2007). Beside that, the European Patent Office (2007a, 2007b) states
15 See also Baddeley and Barrowclough (2009, p.137ff) discussing underlying problems
related to the patent variable in measuring innovative output.
16 See GPTO (2008a), p.4ff.
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the economic importance of patents to an economic area: a larger number of
patents is positively correlated with a higher level of innovations.17 That is, a
patent-friendly environment in terms of low and efficient application and pro-
cess costs incentivizes additional investments. Hence, especially in Germany,
innovation has developed to one of the key topics. The Federal Republic
engages in a national strategy encouraging innovation policy, called “High-
tech Strategy for Germany” (Federal Ministry of Education and Research
2006). Based on the Lisbon Strategy, the objective is a further increase in
domestic productivity and inventiveness.18 Within this program, the patent
system will become more efficient, especially concerning translation costs in
the international context.19
As stated by Baddeley and Barrowclough (2009, p.133) “innovation is
essential for economic growth and development [...].” However, beside the
benefits on the macro-economy level, there are also impacts on the firms’
level as well as to individual people owing to investing in human capital
(Baddeley and Barrowclough 2009). Irrespective of their legal form, corpora-
tions have the option to protect their invention, increase their market value,
and generate additional revenue via patent licensing (Fattore 1997). But,
the owner’s rights are territorially restricted (GPTO 2008a, 2008b). These
characteristics as well as the importance on micro-level justify the study of
patents as a output measure of the innovative activities and their impact
on the organizational structure in the national as well as the international
context. Considering the relationship between a producer and his supplier,
the innovator has the exclusive rights over his knowledge and decides solely
over its innovative output. This secured environment could lead to the firm’s
decision to favor outsourcing over integration and therewith benefit from a
17 See also http://www.epo.org [September, 9th, 2009].
18 The Lisbon Strategy is a European program adopted in 2000 by the European
members with the objective to raise competitiveness of a knowledge society.
19 See Federal Ministry of Education and Research (2006) and Federal Ministry of
Economics and Technology (2007).
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reduced cost environment. Therefore, a larger pool of knowledge could result
in a positive tenor towards outsourcing. Antras and Helpman (2004) argue
that a rise in productivity favors outsourcing abroad over domestic integra-
tion. However, only the most productive integrate in foreign countries. As
a result, the protection of intellectual rights may induce more outsourcing.
20 The more patents a firm has and the better it is protected by its legal
environment, the lower is the innovator’s hold-up risk that results in verti-
cal disintegration (Merges 1997, Arora and Fosfuri 1998, Hall and Ziedonis
2001). In contrast, the larger the number of patents and therefore the larger
the pool of knowledge, the more unpredictable is the risk of losses and un-
wanted spillovers. Baye (2006) argues that a firm’s position is much improved
by stretching out the time of acquiring a patent. During that period, none
of the innovation’s background is public and therefore the risk of copying
or stealing is reduced.21 The mentioned risks increase through the liability
of publishing the patents’ content.22 This in turn raises the probability of
integration. Moreover, it is crucial whether the producer’s or supplier’s in-
vestment activities are more important to the outcome of the relationship
(Acemoglu et al. 2004). Acemoglu et al. (2004) argue that the larger the
producer’s technological intensity, the more likely is integration. In this con-
text, the risk of a supplier’s ex-post break-up suggests a negative extent to
outsourcing and, hence, integration is more likely to sustain the producer’s
investment incentives. The authors’ empirical study shows that the pro-
ducer’s R&D intensity has a positive impact on vertical integration. Hence,
the intuition goes in both directions. On the one hand, the larger the pool
of knowledge, the more likely is outsourcing because of cost-saving aspects,
a protected environment, and the chance of trading novelties. On the other
20 See also Branstetter et al. (2005) for a detailed discussion about the impact of
intellectual property rights on innovation.
21 See Baye (2006), p.164, based on a study by Richard Levin (1988).
22 See also Branstetter et al. (2005), p.4ff.
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hand, a larger pool of knowledge in the parent firm boosts its importance
and sustains investment incentives via integration (Acemoglu et al. 2004).
2.2.3 German and Eastern European Innovation Per-
formance
Within the European Union Germany is one of the most innovative countries:
it is far ahead the European average and, in a global context, ahead of
the US (PRO INNO Europe 2008). This is shown by PRO INNO Europe
(PIE), an initiative induced by the Directorate-General for Enterprise and
Industry (European Comission). According to their Summary Innovation
Index 2007 (SII) Germany is part of the group of the “innovation leaders”
(PIE 2008, p.7).23 For the last five years this result has been relatively stable
with a slightly raising German performance (PIE 2008, p.12). Moreover,
calculations of years to fall down to the average of the European Union
(EU) are greater than 100 years (PIE 2008). In addition, a subgroup of
the performance indicator is “Intellectual property” measuring innovation
output in terms of patents and trademarks per million population (PIE 2008,
p.35). The indicator shows that the Switzerland and Germany are the best
performers within this dimension (PIE 2008, p.9). Both countries are the
most efficient in transforming innovative inputs into intellectual property
(PIE 2008, p.23). In contrast, the Eastern European countries perform worse
compared to the EU average. These countries are part of the “moderate
innovators” or “catching-up countries” (PIE 2008, p.11ff). However, some
of these countries, namely Estonia, Czech Republic, and Lithuania, catch up
the EU average in the short run, more precisely in roughly ten years and
Slovenia is estimated to catch up in about 15 years (PIE 2008, p.12ff). The
23 The observed countries are classified into the following four groups: “innovation
leaders”, “innovation followers”, “moderate innovators”, and “catching-up countries”.
For the definition of these groups and for further details of the index construction see the
European Innovation Scoreboard 2007 report and its appendix (PIE 2008, p.43ff).
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Figure 2.1: Summary Innovation Index 2007
report argues that all convergence processes of the other considered Eastern
countries will take more than 20 years (PIE 2008, p.13). Figure 2.1 presents
the overview of the SII countries for 2007.24
Blind et al. (2003) present a conspicuous trend in both German R&D ac-
tivities and patent applications. Their results show that R&D expenditures
of German firms increased slightly in the 1990s. However, patent applica-
tions doubled during this time. Using data of the European Patent Office
(EPO) from 1991 to 1999, the authors study an average rise of German patent
applications by 8 percent per year. Moreover, the steady growth of patent
filings by residents and non-residents in Germany suggests the prevailing im-
portance due to a rise in the use of the patent system. From 1995 to 2004,
24 As stated in the report the data are mainly given for the years 2004, 2005 and 2006
(PIE 2008, p.7).
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applications by residents to the German patent offices increased by 27 percent
and applications by non-residents increased by 35 percent (World Intellec-
tual Property Organization (WIPO) 2006). Concerning filings by residents,
the German growth rate is larger than e.g. France (15 percent), Japan (10
percent), or the United Kingdom (3 percent). The WIPO (2006) also reports
larger German growth rates by non-residents than e.g. the United Kingdom
with 21 percent. These numbers indicate 2 important findings. First, the
German patent system developed an increasing strength and a high impor-
tance in the protection of knowledge. Germany is one of the top 6 patent
locations, led by Japan and the United States with more than 350,000 and
150,000 applications in 2004 (WIPO 2006). Second, this importance holds
for domestic as well as foreign innovators. It reflects that protection is sought
not only domestically but also in foreign countries (WIPO 2006).25
Figure 2.2 shows the trend of German patent applications published at
the GPTO and worldwide from 1996 to 2007. Applications by residents in-
creased from 42,322 in 1996 to 47,853 in 2007. Also total patent applications
at the GPTO raised from 51,833 to 60,922. Therefore, despite the drop of ap-
plications in 2001 and 2002, these numbers show the continuing importance
of German intellectual property rights. Moreover, German patent applica-
tions worldwide also increased from 85,008 in 1996 to 130,168 in 2007. This
suggests that international protection becomes more important. In addition,
German R&D expenditures also raised from 30,447 to 44,410 million euros
between 1996 and 2003.26 Therefore, German patent applications as innova-
tive output closely follow the input R&D expenditures. The WIPO (2006)
reports that the ratio of patent applications per million euros of R&D expen-
ditures decreased slightly from 1.39 in 1996 to 1.07 in 2003. However, the
25 The finding is provided by the WIPO’s (2006) calculation of the worldwide ratio of
non-resident to resident applications: the ratio increased from 1995 to 2001, followed by
a stable outcome until 2004.
26 Source is the Stifterbund (2003/2004)
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global ratio also decreased with a final ratio of 0.81 compared with the Ger-
man ratio of 0.92 in 2004 (WIPO 2006, p.l7ff).27 As stated by PRO INNO
Europe (2008, p.24ff), this indicates also that Germany is innovation leader
due to generating intellectual property.
Moreover, Greenhalgh and Rogers (2007) point out the importance of
Germany concerning intellectual property rights. Within their study of
patent applications by domestic residents, Japan and the United States have
the earliest rise and the largest total values of applications, followed, partic-
ularly in the 1990s, only by Germany with rapid rise in patenting. Figure
F2.1 in the Appendix shows the graph by Greenhalgh and Rogers (2007,
p.542). In addition to that, the WIPO (2006) reports that, with 587 resident
patent filings per million population, Germany was the fourth most impor-
tant country in 2004 after Japan (2,884), the Republic of Korea (2,189), and
the United States (654).
To summarize, the given numbers as well as both figures suggest that
Germany is a country that maintains a high level of innovative investments
and a significant growth of the protected knowledge pool.
In addition to the raise of German patent applications owing to domes-
tic protection with an annual average growth of 1.2 percent from 1996 to
2007, global protection seeking also increased. The numbers in Figure 2.2
suggest an annual average growth of 6.4 percent from 1996 to 2007. Due to
the WIPO Patentreport (2006) 80 percent of all Patent Cooperation Treaty
(PCT) applications are designated to the international context.28
From a residents’ as well as a non-residents’ perspective, (German) patents
are one of the most important rights to achieve returns on innovative activ-
ities. This comes from the fact that in Germany residents at their home
27 Sources for the calculations are the GPTO (2008b, 2008c), WIPO (2006), and the
Stifterbund (2003/2004).
28 Sources for the author’s calculations are the GPTO (2006) Annual Reports 2002-2006
and WIPO (2006, 2008).
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Figure 2.2: Patent applications
office are the biggest group of filers of patent applications (WIPO 2006).
However, due to the fact that filings from foreign applicants as well as Ger-
man applications in foreign countries have also increased, it suggests that
firms are strengthening their search for a global protection. This in turn
may also influence investment incentives and the decision about the organi-
zational structure both at home and abroad. Thus, the existence of a pool
of knowledge increases the owner’s importance as well as the opportunity of
enhancing profits within a competitive environment, i.e. with low variation
in costs and profits (Aghion and Griffith 2005, Greenhalgh and Rogers 2007).
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2.3 Intellectual Property Rights and the Or-
ganizational Structure
2.3.1 Theoretical Background
The changing landscape from a labor-based to a knowledge-based economy is
a main driver of seeking protection for inventiveness. As mentioned, Gross-
man and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) argue that ownership keeps
residual rights and, from a producer’s perspective, reduces a potential hold-
up raised by declining suppliers’ incentives.29 Therefore, the Property Rights
Theory employs the link between a firm’s decision to integrate or to outsource
a part of its production concerning an existing pool of innovations.
Following Grossman and Hart (1986), Acemoglu et al. (2004) develop a
theoretical framework combining technology and the organizational structure
between a producer (he) and supplier (she). The authors distinguish between
three organizational forms: backward vertical integration, VIB, where the
producer employs the supplier. In the case of an ex-post break-up, the pro-
ducer owns all the assets; forward vertical integration, VIF, which describes
the inverse relationship between both parties; and non-integration, NI, where
each of the participants is independent. Acemoglu et al. (2004) argue that
the relationship between the two parties depends on their individual level of
technology. A rise in the producer’s technological intensity makes integra-
tion more likely. It incentivizes the producer’s investments and emphasizes
his importance for a higher overall surplus within the relationship. When the
supplier is the technology-intensive part in the relationship, non-integration
is more likely. If there is an ex-post break-up, her outside option is larger.
This increases her incentives to invest, which also results in a larger surplus
due to her higher importance within the relationship. Therefore, the greater
29 See Acemoglu et al. (2004) and Rasmussen (2004).
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the technological importance of the producer and supplier, respectively, the
more important their corresponding incentives to invest for a higher over-
all outcome. Summarizing, Acemoglu et al. (2004) propose opposite effects
of the producer’s and supplier’s technology intensity on the probability of
vertical integration. The empirical study on British manufacturing plants
provides evidence for the theoretical predictions.
The model establishes the fundament for the following theoretical frame-
work, considering a national and international context in the decision about
the organizational structure. Employing patents as a pool of knowledge, the
model highlights the existence of a threshold between integration and non-
integration. The larger the owner’s pool of knowledge, the more likely is the
owner’s preferred parent-affiliate relationship to maximize outcome; more-
over, the more likely the supplier is to find an alternative partner the larger
is the supplier’s outside option and the more likely is non-integration. This
follows the predictions by Acemoglu et al. (2004) and McLaren (2000). It
holds in the closed as well as the open economy case. However, switching from
a national to an international context may reduce the owner’s influence on his
inventions, e.g. via reduced territorial rights. Intuitively, in both cases, inte-
gration becomes more likely with an increase in the parent’s pool of patents.
However, for a given producer-to-supplier ratio of knowledge, non-integration
holds longer in the open economy case than in the national consideration.
That is, the framework results in a gap between the national and interna-
tional changeover where the probability of international outsourcing rises by
enlarged investment possibilities for the independent supplier. The empirical
study on German and Eastern European affiliates provides evidence for the
theoretical findings.
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2.3.2 The Basic Model in a Closed Economy
Following Acemoglu et al. (2004), the framework consists of a one-period
relationship between a risk-neutral producer P (parent firm) and a corre-
sponding risk-neutral supplier S (affiliate). The output and investments are
non-verifiable and therefore contracts are incomplete. The timing of incidents
is given as follows. The producer offers an ownership structure z, which, in
the case of the supplier’s acceptance, is followed by the producer’s specific
investments E and the supplier’s specific investments e.30 Two different orga-
nizational forms, namely integration and non-integration, may emerge. This
is motivated by the empirical part of the chapter where the German parent
firm decides how to invest in Eastern Europe. Integration (IN) means that
the producer and supplier are an organizational entity. In the case of an
ex-post break-up, the parent firm owns all the assets. Non-integration (NI)
means that each of the participants is independent. In the case of an ex-post
break-up, each party keeps its own investments with certain deductions due
to territorial rights.31 The revenue is split between the two parties according
to symmetric Nash bargaining concerning a given ownership structure z. If
there is no agreement between the producer and supplier, the outcome is as
in the case of NI. The production function is represented by the following
equation:
F (xS, E, e) = λ(
n∑
i=1
sie−
m∑
j=1
pjE + 1)xS + (1− λ)(
m∑
j=1
pjE + 1). (2.1)
λ refers to the supplier’s fraction in the production function. The larger the
value of λ, the more important is the input good. It is assumed that the
parent firm’s innovation is essential to the output whereas the supplier’s im-
30 See also Acemoglu et al. (2004), p.6.
31 In the case of an ex post break up Acemoglu et al. (2004) impose transfer payments
TP (z) and TS(z) depending on the organizational structure z where TP (z) + TS(z) = 0.
This is also assumed here.
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portance is restricted.32 Moreover, due to an increasing rate of technological
change, the parent firm does not invest in the affiliate’s pool of knowledge.33
xS describes the supplier’s input in the production, which can be 0 (not sup-
plied) or 1 (supplied). In its most simple form, it is provided at no cost
by the supplier.34
∑n
i=1 si indicates the supplier’s capacity for innovation.
The larger the pool and value of knowledge, the larger the outcome of in-
vestments e. Beyond the standardized input xS, the supplier S becomes
more important. j ∈ [1;m] defines the producer’s pool of knowledge. The
greater his inventiveness, hence the larger
∑m
j=1 pj, the greater is the output
of the producer’s investments E.35 However, the producer’s pool of knowl-
edge also restricts the supplier in terms of additional knowledge. Intuitively,
each invention of P poses a challenge for S to generate additional surplus
beyond her standardized input. That is, equivalent innovations do not raise
the relationship’s surplus.
In terms of patents as a category of intangible assets, the inventions are
protected but published and openly visible (GPTO 2008a, 2008b). Here, it
is assumed that P has a pool of innovations protected territorially in the
closed economy. That is, within integration, the supplier as a part of the
corporation also invests within the protected knowledge according to her
incentives. Outside the firm boundaries, a non-integrated supplier either
invests within the licensed territory and her own pool of knowledge or she
invests within the whole pool of innovations, imitating the ideas outside of
their territorial claims. Due to the fact that each party contributes its share,
neither of them is able to undertake the other’s investment.36 Additional
32 The supplier’s importance is restricted as follows: λ ∈ (0; 12]. Acemoglu et al. (2004,
p.7) define this ratio as share of costs.
33 This is also consistent with the assumption that the innovator offers the organiza-
tional structure.
34 This assumption is for simplicity. See also Acemoglu et al. (2004, p.7).
35 The inventions are ranked from 1 to k ∈ {n;m} where 1 is a simple invention and k
a highly innovative idea.
36 See also the tacit knowledge assumption by Acemoglu et al. (2004, p.6).
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surplus from the supplier’s investments is given by her own inventiveness i ∈
[m;n] via xs.
37 Therefore, the protected capacity of innovation generates no
additional revenue for the supplier in a restricted national context. Moreover,
if the specialized input is sold outside of the originally intended relationship,
the output suffers from a deduction (1 − δ) where δ is exogenous given and
δ ∈ (0; 1).38 The cost function for party i ∈ {P ;S} and the corresponding
investment activity h ∈ {E; e} is given as follows:39
Ci =
1
2
m∑
j=1
pjh
2. (2.2)
The utility for each party i, the optimal investment level, as well as the
total surplus in each ownership z depend on the individual relationship-
specific outside options Ozi . Following Acemoglu et al. (2004, p.9), this links
investment incentives and the organizational structure. Due to a potential
ex-post break-up, there are four different outside options. In the case of NI,
an ex-post break-up keeps each party independent. That is, the producer
does not obtain the supplier’s input xS = 0 and therefore the outside option
is
ONIP = (
m∑
j=1
pjE + 1)(1− λ). (2.3)
The supplier sells her specialized input outside the original relationship
with a deduction of (1−δ) where δ ∈ (0; 1]. Additionally, she is also restricted
to the existing territorial protection of the producer’s innovations j = 1...m.
Therefore, within her pool of knowledge, the remaining outside option in the
case of an ex-post break-up under NI is
37 It exactly addresses the question of interest: How does the parent’s pool of knowledge
influence the organizational form.
38 See Acemoglu et al. (2004) and McLaren (2000).
39 The form is mainly for mathematical reasons.
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ONIS = δ(
n∑
i=m
sie+ 1)λ. (2.4)
In the case of an ex-post break-up under integration, the producer keeps
all the assets. In more detail, P holds a ratio α with α ∈ [0; 1] of the supplier’s
input investment. An intuition for this might be that P is not able to use
the supplier’s innovations as efficiently as S herself can do.40 The producer
benefits due to the ownership of the input good xS that allows him to sell
the innovation more profitably. Hence,
OINP = (α
n∑
i=1
sie−
m∑
i=1
pjE + 1)(λ) + (
m∑
i=1
pjE + 1)(1− λ). (2.5)
The supplier’s outside option under IN , OINS , is assumed to be equal to
0. Because S has no influence on the producer’s part of the production, the
remaining investments also do not bring the supplier additional value.
Given an ownership structure z, the utility functions U zP and U
z
S where
z ∈ {NI; IN} are defined as:41
U zi (yi(E, e)) = y
z
i (E, e)− Ci + Ti(z), (2.6)
where (yi(E, e)) is given by
(yi(E, e)) = O
z
i (E, e) +
1
2
[F (xs = 1, E, e)−OzP (E, e)−OzS(E, e)]. (2.7)
At least each party i ∈ {P ;S} generates its own outside option plus one
half of the remaining surplus of the production function. It is certain that
40 Acemoglu et al. (2004, p. 8) argue that the supplier would not undertake the last
effective investment in the case of an ex-post break-up. Here, it might also be an alternative
interpretation that S is not able to protect all her knowledge, e.g. because of lower funds.
41 Following Acemoglu et al. (2004), p.9, according to Nash bargaining for individual
revenues.
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the larger the outside option of party i, the larger the bargaining position
and hence the larger the output yi (Acemoglu et al. 2004, p. 9). Maximizing
the utility functions’ output minus costs with respect to the investments for
each organizational structure results in
E∗ = 1− 3
2
λ, e∗ =
1
2
λ(1 + δ) (2.8)
and
E∗ = 1− 2λ, e∗ = 1
2
λ(1− α) (2.9)
for integration and non-integration, respectively. In both integration and
non-integration, E∗ depends negatively on λ. The more important the sup-
plier, the less important the producer’s incentives to invest.42 Compared
with IN , the total amount of the producer’s optimal investments is greater
in the case of NI. Intuitively, integration allows the parent firm to partici-
pate in the supplier’s whole range of knowledge and investments. Moreover,
larger technological investments increase adaptation costs. This reduces fur-
ther investments. In the case of non-integration, the producer is left to his
own resources. Due to domestic protected knowledge, the prevailing hold-up
problem is reduced. Hence, it allows inefficient low investments by the parent
firm under NI due to territorial protection to be circumvented.43 Regarding
the supplier’s optimal level of investments in the case of non-integration, e∗
is increasing in λ and δ. The larger the outside market and the greater the
importance of the supplier, the higher her investments. This is consistent
with the existing literature, such as McLaren (2000). Under IN , e∗ is re-
duced by α. The larger α, the larger is the amount of inventiveness P can
keep and the greater the supplier’s ex-post break-up losses.
The sum of the utility functions results in the total surplus for each
42 See Acemoglu et al. (2004), p.7.
43 Contrary, Acemoglu et al. (2004, p.10) shows that E∗ is largest under IN and e∗ is
largest under NI.
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organizational structure:44
Sz = F (xS = 1, E∗(z), e∗(z)− CP (E∗)− CS(e∗)), (2.10)
where Sz consists of the value function F , the optimal investment levels minus
each cost function CP (E∗) and CS(e∗). Therefore, the emerging surpluses SNI
and SIN allow me to compare the ownership structures for given capacities
of innovation:
SIN − SNI ≥ 0. (2.11)
From a social planner’s perspective, if the margin is positive, IN generates a
larger surplus than NI and it is the preferred relationship. Suppose equation
2.11 is set to 0. It enables me to find a threshold that defines the likelihood
of the organizational structure depending on the pool of patents. Computing
the threshold it results in a knowledge ratio
∑m
j=1 pj∑n
i=m si
as follows:45
∑m
j=1 pj∑n
i=m si
=
1
4
α + 1
8
α2 + 1
4
δ − 1
8
δ
1
2
− 1
4
α− 1
8
α2
≡ Θ. (2.12)
If the pool of knowledge ratio is larger than the given threshold Θ, integration
is the equilibrium. That is, the larger the parent firm’s pool of knowledge -
compared with the supplier - the more likely is IN . In more detail, the larger
the producer’s pool of knowledge, the more important is the producer. Also,
the input provided is more effective within this relationship. Therefore, inte-
gration raises the producer’s outside option, provides additional protection
for his pool of knowledge, and allows the producer to participate in the sup-
plier’s capacity for innovation. In contrast, the larger the value and number
of the supplier’s inventiveness, the less likely is IN . Her increased outside
option raises investments and the value of her (protected) knowledge.
44 See Acemoglu et al. (2004), p.9ff.
45 See Acemoglu et al. (2004, p.27) for the same procedure.
30
Innovation and the International Firm Structure
Moreover, equation 2.12 suggests that the derivative of Θ with respect
to α is positive. The more P is able to keep of S’s innovations due to the
input, the less likely is IN . Intuitively, the affiliate’s incentives to invest are
too low in the case of integration due to a bad outside option. The overall
surplus rises via reducing the parent firm’s outside option by simultaneously
increasing the supplier’s incentives via NI. Hence, non-integration is more
likely. Computing ∂Θ
∂δ
> 0 suggests that a larger number of prospective
partners decreases the need for the supplier to integrate. Therefore, a higher
number of P ’s competitors also boosts the probability of non-integration.
2.3.3 The Open Economy Case
In terms of knowledge protection, the open economy case compared with
the closed economy framework differs in the patents’ sphere of control. The
assumption is that the protection of knowledge is a territorial right limited
to national borders. That is, within this framework, the parent firm applies
for patents within its national borders. In the international context, it is
assumed that the producer’s knowledge is protected within domestic bor-
ders. However, out of this area, the protection no longer holds. Therefore,
the model addresses differences in the outside options and organizational
structure between a domestic and foreign relationship.
Two countries, Home H and Foreign F , equal in size, are considered.
However, they differ from each other in the innovations’ territorial protection.
FS is defined as a foreign supplier located in the foreign country F . Due to
legal protection of the producer’s knowledge in H, the foreign supplier has
the option to imitate and invest within an existing pool of knowledge. FS
is able to increase her individual surplus by selling the input xs provided
by ideas originally belonging to P outside of the protected environment.
This affects particularly the NI mode. In contrast to the first case, FS is
now by definition allowed to invest within the whole range of ideas i where
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i ∈ [1;n]. Additionally, the number of potential partners may change in the
new context. Hence, δ
′
defines the new exogenous given probability for the
foreign supplier to find an alternative partner. Due to the fact that, within
the producer’s pool of innovations, FS and P are potential competitors in
the foreign market, their outside options are defined as the following:
ONIFS = δ
′
(
n∑
i=1
sie−
m∑
j=1
pjE + 1)(λ), (2.13)
ONIP = (
m∑
j=1
pjE + 1)(1− λ). (2.14)
Maximizing each individual utility of party i ∈ {P ;FS} results in the
following optimal investment levels: E∗ = 1− 3
2
λ+ 1
2
λδ
′
and e∗ = 1
2
λ(1 + δ
′
).
Especially the result for the producer - P invests more compared with the
non-integration mode in the closed economy context - is affected by two
aspects: on the one hand, the loss of territorial protection increases the hold-
up problem and therefore decreases the investment incentives. On the other
hand, increasing the technological frontier and exploiting the existing pool
of knowledge with additional investments allows the producer to boil down
the supplier’s outside option. The new environment results in inefficient
high investments by the producer seeking additional protection. This result
affirms the importance as well as the efficiency of a patent protected area. In
the international context, e∗ differs from the national one in δ
′
. Even though
there is a broader range for FS to invest via an increased i ∈ [1;n], the
investment level e∗ depends on the number of potential recipients settled or
active in F . For instance, if δ
′
> δ, there is no need for integration because
of an increased bargaining power.
In the open economy, OINFS is the same as in the national context. Input
good xs is assumed to be equal to 0. xS goes over to P . Therefore, the pro-
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ducer’s production (1− λ) plus a deduction (1−α′) of the foreign supplier’s
investments define the outside option,
OINP = (α
′
n∑
i=1
sie−
m∑
i=1
pjE + 1)λ+ (
m∑
i=1
pjE + 1)(1− λ). (2.15)
It is assumed that, in an ex-post break-up, P quits the supplier and sells
the whole output. Following the procedure as given in the national case
allows me to calculate the knowledge ratio for the new environment:46∑m
j=1 pj∑n
i=m si
=
1
4
α
′
+ 1
8
α
′2 + 1
4
δ
′ − 1
8
δ
′2
1
8
+ 1
4
δ′2 − 1
4
α′ − 1
8
α′2
≡ Θ′ (2.16)
Comparing the new ratio Θ
′
with Θ suggests that again a larger number
of domestic patents of P makes international integration more likely. The
larger the producer’s pool of knowledge, the more important is the producer
for the overall surplus. It is important to raise his outside option to ensure
that he obtains the input.47 The reverse intuition holds due to the supplier’s
importance of investment activity, that is, the more likely is NI. Because of
being in a non-restricted environment, the supplier’s investments count more
in the NI mode compared with IN .48
Again, the derivative of Θ
′
with respect to α
′
is positive. An increasing α
results in a need for additional incentives for S via non-integration to boost
the total surplus. It also holds that a thicker outside market for the supplier
raises the probability of non-integration.49
46 The optimal investment levels E∗ = (1− 2λ) and e∗ = 12λ(1− α) are unaffected.
47 This follows from ∂S
IN−SNI
∂
∑m
j=1 pj
> 0.
48 Increasing the supplier’s space for investment from the national to the international
context does not necessarily increase his investment incentives. The supplier’s outside
option under non-integration ONIFS is limited by the producer’s innovation pool brought to
the market.
49 The intuition concerning δ in the international context is twofold. It means if δ
′
is above a critical value δTR the threshold between integration and non-integration is
decreasing with respect to an increasing outside market δ
′
. In this case P would not
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To sum up, the value of domestic patents has the same impact on the
organizational structure in both contexts. The greater P ’s inventiveness,
the more likely is IN . The reverse effect holds for the affiliate’s pool of
innovations. The larger α
′
, the more P can keep, and the more likely is
outsourcing in the international context according to the national mode. For
certain values for α, the outside market δ has a positive impact on non-
integration. If δ increases, the effect turns over to incentivize the producer’s
pool of knowledge. Moreover, further assumptions on the level of the outside
parameters allow me to compare both thresholds Θ and Θ
′
. Assuming δ = δ
′
and α = α
′
results in a counterintuitive outcome against the traditional
view.50 The following Section 2.3.4 suggests both outcomes, the traditional
as well as the the new view where an increasing amount of innovation favors
outsourcing.51
2.3.4 Implications
For simplification, it is assumed that δ = δ
′
and α = α
′
. This allows me
to compare the derived thresholds in the protected and unprotected con-
texts. Due to δ
′
, the comparison of the two ratios shows that the interna-
tional threshold is always larger than the national one. This results from
the difference between Home and Foreign that is given by 1
8
+ 1
4
δ
′
< 1
2
.52 It
suggests that more patents lead to a greater probability of IN . However,
within a certain range, the result also affirms the existence of the opposed
outcome. Compared with the national context, despite an increasing pool of
the producer’s knowledge within this range, non-integration is the dominant
relationship. Figure 2.3 shows the result for both cases.
invest anything, which is in terms of an existing pool of innovations, inefficient. The
Appendix to Chapter 2 shows the proof.
50 See Mol (2005), p.572ff.
51 See Mol (2005), p.572ff and p.575ff, for the description of the two perspectives.
52 Both ratios show the same nominator Ω as well as the expression  = 14α
′
+ 18α
′2.
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Figure 2.3: Domestic vs. foreign relationship
Intuitively, less protection and a larger pool of the parent firm’s innovation
result in integration. This holds in the national as well as the international
context. However, the gap between the two cases shows that non-integration
holds longer in the unprotected context. The reason is that, in the inter-
national context, the supplier is always able to invest within the producer’s
existing pool of knowledge independently of the organizational structure. For
the parent firm as well as the total surplus, it is efficient to use the additional
incentives for the supplier’s investment to obtain a greater surplus. This
holds up to a certain point where the producer’s pool of knowledge becomes
too important and counteracting investments of the producer are too costly.
The equilibrium turns over into integration. That is, the producer is able
to exploit the difference between the territorial protection modes. Moreover,
the more the parent firm can keep from the affiliate, the lower her incentives
to invest. Hence, an increase in a expands the gap between the changeover
from non-integration to integration in both cases.53
53 Holding δ = δ
′
constant, an increase in α
′
with (α < α
′
) results in a rise between Θ
and Θ
′
. A rise in δ
′
incentivizes the supplier via outsourcing. However, if α
′
is sufficiently
large, an increase in δ
′
results in a total surplus of non-integration below the integrative
surplus. In this case Θ
′
< Θ suggests that in the national context the outsourcing mode
holds longer than in the international framework.
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2.4 Empirical Analysis
2.4.1 Dataset
The empirical analysis relies on a data matching for 14,322 Eastern Euro-
pean investment projects of 929 German firms. Data are provided by the
pan-European micro database Amadeus released by the Bureau van Dijk
(Bureau van Dijk, Electronic Publishing 2005). The underlying version cov-
ers data for 1.5 million companies in 38 European countries. Beside consol-
idated and unconsolidated data concerning firm-level information for up to
13 years, it contains the direct ownership share between a parent firm and
her subsidiary for 2005. The data do not cover financial institutions and
insurance companies. Information on the ownership structure is limited to
2005. All other variables on firm-specific characteristics are available from
1993 to 2005. More precisely, the underlying data cover unconsolidated infor-
mation on German firms and their corresponding direct affiliates located in
Germany and Eastern Europe. Each firm is matched with information about
its patent activity. These data are obtained from the German Patent and
Trade Mark Office. The unique database is constructed by adjusting all the
firm-specific information consisting of the firm name, firm address, founding
year, and firm history (like ownership, industry, and products). That is,
the data cover a cross-sectional study on the number of patent applications
granted of each German parent firm investing in Germany and Eastern Eu-
rope.54 Beside the information about granted patent applications, the data
are also matched with information about the severity of imitating the parent
firm’s products. This addresses the problem of catching a firm’s innovation.55
The data on imitation are provided by a unique survey of the Chair for In-
54 Eastern Europe covers Central Eastern Europe, Southern Eastern Europe, the Baltic
States, and the Former Soviet Union. For the whole list of countries, see Table T2.1 in
the Appendix.
55 See also Belenzon and Berkovitz (2007).
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ternational Economics, University of Munich, about German firms investing
in Eastern Europe.56
2.4.2 Descriptives and Estimation Methodology
To study the impact of inventiveness on the organizational structure, the
dummy variable IN defines the ownership share within each parent-affiliate
pair. The variable is equal to 1 if the ownership share is larger than 50
percent, otherwise it is 0. To find a more proper answer to whether par-
ent companies favor integration over outsourcing due to an increasing pool
of innovations (i.e. in terms of reflecting a transaction inside the firm (off-
shoring) versus an arm’s-length transaction (outsourcing)), an alternative
measure is constructed that defines the threshold at the 35 percent level.57
As already mentioned in the literature survey, Antras and Helpman (2004,
p.575) argued that only the most productive firms within the headquarter-
intensive sectors favor integration over outsourcing. Therefore, the parent
firm’s working capital-to-labor ratio K/L is included as well as the firm’s
labor productivity deviation ˙Y/L compared with the sample average produc-
tivity. Following the theoretical predictions by Antras and Helpman (2004),
for both variables a positive coefficient is expected. AffRat measures the
number of affiliates in the corresponding investment country over the total
number of affiliates in the rest of the world.58 The variable is motivated by
Mol (2005). It suggests that a larger number of foreign subsidiaries makes
non-integration more likely. On the one hand, parent firms, already having
invested in a foreign partner country, are more familiar with potential local
suppliers and therefore non-integration is more likely due to lower searching
costs.59 On the other hand, relocating activities outside the firm boundaries
56 I would like to thank Dalia Marin for providing me these data.
57 The ownership share in the underlying dataset ranges from 0.01 to 100 percent. See
Marin (2006) for a further discussion on the threshold.
58 The ownership share is at least larger than 25 percent.
59 See Mol (2005), p.577.
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is driven inter alia by costs savings related to fixed costs. These are also
obtained via outsourcing. The pool of knowledge is measured by intangi-
bles per worker, namely Intangibles, and patent applications (granted after
2004) per worker, namely Patents. Intangibles can be understood as an
objective variable measuring insubstantial values in a firm. The patent vari-
able is closer related with innovations in terms of intellectual property rights.
However, contrary to intangibles, it does not measure the real value of in-
novations in a firm. Therefore, this yields the baseline specification, which is
described by the following equation:
INmodeijk = β0 + β1(K/L)ik + β2(Y/L)ik + β3AffRatik
+β4log(L)ik + β5IPRik + ϑik + uik
(2.17)
where IN depends on the definition of the 50 or 35 percent modus given for
each firm pair between parent company i and the corresponding affiliate j
for each investment project k. The variable IPR is replaced by the parent
firm’s pool of patents and intangibles, respectively. In this context, the null
hypothesis βIPR = 0 means that innovation has no influence on the owner-
ship structure decision. Against the null hypothesis, if βIPR 6= 0 significantly
holds, there is an influence on the left-hand side variable explaining the dif-
ference between outsourcing and offshoring. The theoretical model predicts a
positive impact of the parent firm’s pool on integration. Moreover, depend-
ing on the regression specification, parent and affiliate firm characteristics
are also included (e.g. number of employees, affiliate’s outside option). Un-
observed country- and firm-specific factors are controlled for by including a
vector ϑik representing a set of legal form distinctions, country-specific, and
industry-specific dummies, where the industry component is included at a
NACE Rev.l 2-digit classification. In the Appendix, Table T2.2 presents the
definitions and sample statistics for the underlying investment projects.
The sample statistics shows that the patent variable has a maximum of 8
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patents per employee and a standard deviation of 0.2. Excluding firms with-
out any granted inventions shows an average value of 0.03 and a standard
deviation of 0.3. The slight increase suggests that the variables’ informa-
tion is reliable without increasing their variance dramatically. This is also
confirmed by the average patent application compared with Belenzon and
Berkovitz (2007). They find a mean of 4.17 patents per firm whereas the
underlying German patents in this study show an average of 7.4 per firm.60
Table 2.1 delivers a first insight into the relationship between patents and
integration. For different samples, namely investments to Eastern Europe,
investments to Germany, and overall investments, a larger pool of inventive-
ness is related to integration. That is, a larger mean of patent applications
over all the investment projects in each sample is related to a larger ownership
share between parent and affiliate.
Table 2.1: Patent applications and integration
Sample Non-integration Integration
CEE 37 (250) 53 (1172)
Germany 73 (1492) 77 (4687)
Total 68 (1742) 72 (5859)
Notes: Mean of German patent applications (granted) over all
available firm pairs. Sample sizes are in parentheses. Integration
means a ownership share larger than 50 percent.
Sources: Amadeus (Bureau van Dijk 2005), GPTO (2008b,
2008c), and Chair for International Economics, University of Mu-
nich. Author’s calculations.
Using the whole information on the parent’s ownership share instead of
the binary variable on integration also suggests that an increasing pool of
patents in 2004 boosts the probability of a larger ownership share level. Fig-
ure 2.4 presents the finding in each case. For both German affiliates and
Eastern European affiliates, it holds that an increasing pool of knowledge
60 Belenzon and Berkovitz (2007, p.3) study a total of 50,000 patents held by 12,000
European firms.
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raises the direct ownership share. However, a pool larger than 30 patents
lowers the relational share. Intuitively, each patent category shows a greater
probability for integration in the foreign context compared with the domestic
context.
The result also holds when the data are separated into small and medium-
sized firms (SME) with a number of employees smaller than or equal to 500
and firms with an employee number of more than 500 (large firms). Both
SMEs as well as large firms are more integrative if they have a higher number
of granted patent applications. The distribution of the firm size suggests that
the results are driven by both the innovative German SMEs as well as large
firms: 55 percent of the parent firms show a size smaller than 500 employees
and 45 percent a size larger than 500 employees.
2.4.3 Empirical Results
Equation 2.17 is estimated cross-sectionally with fixed effects to control for
omitted variables. Due to the limited dependent variable, regressions are
run by the nonlinear method of maximum likelihood estimation. The non-
linear regression model (probit) allows me to study the impact of inventive-
ness on the organizational structure. The sub-samples differentiate between
Germany and Eastern Europe to verify the theoretical predictions about do-
mestic and foreign outsourcing. To produce valid statistical inferences, the
errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity. Whereas the dependent variable
is given for 2005, the independent variables are given for the period t-1.
Table 2.2 presents the results for investments in Germany. The decision
to integrate, where the binary variable is equal to 1, is regressed on the
parent’s pool of intangible-to-employee ratio. Moreover, the affiliate ratio
as well as the productivity measure and the firm size are included as con-
trols. Column (1) shows that an increase in the pool of intangibles raises
the probability of integration. The coefficient is highly significant and in line
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Source:  Amadeus (2005), GPTO (2008), University of Munich. Author's calculations.
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Figure 2.4: Domestic vs. foreign affiliates
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with the theoretical predictions. The capital-to-labor ratio is insignificant,
which gives no evidence about the relationship between headquarter inten-
sity and offshoring. However, the most productive choose integration over
outsourcing (Antras 2003). This results from the positive and highly signifi-
cant coefficient on (Y/L)ik. Additionally, the larger the number of domestic
affiliates and the larger the firm size, the more likely is non-integration. This
is suggested by columns (2) to (4). Both coefficients AffRat and log(L) are
highly significant at the 1 percent level. The results also hold when industry-
and firm-specific dummies are included.
Table 2.2: Organizational structure in Germany
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(K/L)P -0.082 -0.251 0.308 0.133
[0.271] [0.768] [0.819] [0.336]
(Y/L)P 0.009*** 0.019*** 0.005 0.013**
[3.382] [4.898] [1.333] [1.943]
AffRat -0.111 -0.158** -0.214*** -0.235***
[1.565] [1.981] [2.774] [2.938]
Log (L)P -0.063*** -0.05***
[3.834] [2.807]
(Intang)P 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.006***
[7.417] [6.408] [4.937] [4.276]
Fixed effects no no yes yes
Observations 3210 3210 3197 3197
Pseudo R2 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.06
Dependent variable: Integration
Notes: Probit estimation with a constant (not shown), robust z statistic in brackets.
The dependent variable is equal to one if the direct ownership share is larger than 35
percent, otherwise zero. For a detailed definition of the variables, see the descriptive
chapter. Fixed effects are defined as a set of industry- and firm-specific dummies. *,
**, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, 1 percent level, respectively.
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If an increasing producer’s pool of knowledge raises the probability of
integration, I expect similar results for the more specific patent variable.
For the same set of observations, Table 2.3 presents the results for replacing
intangible assets with the firm’s pool of patents. Columns (1) and (2) suggest
that the positive sign of the coefficient is as expected. Unfortunately, the
coefficients on PatP are insignificant. The negative sign on the capital-to-
labor ratio (K/L)P is contrary to the expectations. However, in the following
more reliable specifications (3) and (4), the coefficient turns its sign and
becomes insignificant. The negative sign on the affiliate ratio suggests that
an increase in the number of domestic affiliates is accompanied by a fall
in the probability of the integrative outcome. The same holds for the firm
size, which is intuitive due to cost-saving aspects. Both variables are highly
significant. Including fixed effects, column (3) shows a significant coefficient
on patents. Again, it has the predicted sign and confirms the theoretical
predictions.61
61 All the presented results also hold in the case of a dependent variable differing at a
50 percent threshold instead of a 35 percent threshold.
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Table 2.3: Patents and the organizational structure in Germany
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(K/L)P -0.5354* -0.5579* 0.1329 0.0629
[1.670] [1.717] [0.340] [0.159]
(Y/L)P 0.0198*** 0.0187*** 0.0134*** 0.0130***
[5.256] [4.977] [2.674] [2.587]
AffRat -0.1558** -0.2152***
[2.073] [2.824]
Log (L)P -0.0857*** -0.0916*** -0.0626*** -0.0675***
[5.620] [5.707] [3.732] [3.930]
(Pat)P 0.4259 0.1534 1.0269 0.8189
[0.539] [0.194] [1.281] [1.026]
Fixed effects no no yes yes
Observations 3228 3228 3215 3215
Pseudo R2 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.05
Dependent variable: Integration
Notes: Probit estimation with a constant (not shown), robust z statistic in brackets.
The dependent variable is equal to one if the direct ownership share is larger than 35
percent, otherwise zero. For a detailed definition of the variables, see the descriptive
Section 2.4.2. Fixed effects are defined as a set of industry- and firm-specific dummies.
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, 1 percent level, respectively.
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In order to check the theoretical predictions in the international context,
Table 2.4 present the familiar set-up for investments in Eastern Europe con-
sidering intangibles as a measure of the pool knowledge. Beside the firm and
industry dummies, affiliate country dummies are also included. Through-
out all the specifications, the coefficient on IntangP suggests that offshoring
is more likely than international outsourcing with an increasing pool of in-
tangibles. The fact that the coefficient on the affiliate ratio is now positive
suggests that the more familiar the producer is with the foreign environ-
ment, the more likely is an integrated relationship. Therefore, the firm may
prefer an employment’s relocation to a country where the hold-up risk is
high (Marin 2006). In terms of a potential knowledge spillover, the larger
the danger of losses to countries with weak property rights, the more likely
is integration (Nunn and Trefler 2007). Moreover, AffRat could also repre-
sent the parent firm’s outside option. That is, the larger his outside option,
the more likely is his preferred relationship (Acemoglu et al. 2004). The
coefficient is significant throughout all the specifications. Although the co-
efficient on Y/LP is only significant in specification (3), the direction of the
impact is as expected. The capital-to-labor ratio is negative, which suggests
a capital-intensive producer is more likely to favor international outsourcing
over offshoring.62
Turning to the regression results with the pool of patents instead of in-
tangibles affirms the results already given. In the first two sets of spec-
ifications, PatP is positive but insignificant. Column (3) shows a larger
z-statistic whereas the coefficient in column (4) is statistically significant at
the 5 percent level. Moreover, the impact of the other variables is as given
before. K/LP suggests that the extent of reducing labor costs via offshoring
is higher than in the risky case of outsourcing. The firm’s productivity mea-
62 All the presented results also hold in the case of a dependent variable equal to 1
if the ownership share is larger than 35 percent and equal to 0 if the ownership share is
below 35 percent. The coefficients are slightly less significant.
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Table 2.4: Organizational structure with Eastern European countries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(K/L)P -0.9364** -0.8884* -0.3886 -0.3463
[1.994] [1.917] [0.678] [0.601]
(Y/L)P 0.0296 0.0158 0.0748** 0.0637
[1.174] [0.492] [2.202] [1.440]
AffRat 0.8536** 0.9163** 0.7694* 0.8212*
[1.998] [2.059] [1.668] [1.686]
Log (L)P 0.0229 0.0185
[0.623] [0.398]
(Intang)P 0.0053** 0.0051** 0.0127*** 0.0125***
[2.165] [2.172] [3.098] [3.206]
Fixed effects no no yes yes
Observations 579 579 560 560
Pseudo R2 0.03 0.03 0.12 0.12
Dependent variable: Integration
Notes: Probit estimation with a constant (not shown), robust z statistic in brackets.
The dependent variable is equal to one if the direct ownership share is larger than 50
percent, otherwise zero. For a detailed definition of the variables, see the descriptive
Section 2.4.2. Fixed effects are defined as a set of industry- and firm-specific dummies
as well as dummies controlling for the Eastern European countries. *, **, *** indicate
significance at the 10, 5, 1 percent level, respectively.
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sure has the expected coefficient but is insignificant, which results in further
specifications without this variable. Again, AffRat is positive and significant.
Log(L)P is also positive and significant in the last specification. Marin (2006)
argues that labor costs can be reduced most effectively by choosing integra-
tion rather than non-integration. Therefore, a labor-intensive firm chooses
integration over non-integration. The intuition is given by a typical hold-up
risk that increases along with weak property rights the costs of organizing
the activity outside the firm boundaries. To obtain an idea of the importance
of the affiliates’ outside option, columns (3) and (4) also include the variable
OoA. The coefficient shows a negative sign, which affirms the theoretical pre-
dictions by McLaren (2000). The larger the number of similar producers in
the Eastern European country and, therefore, the larger the supplier’s out-
side option, the less her hold-up risk in non-integration and the more likely is
an arm’s-length relationship between the two parties. Moreover, it increases
the supplier’s incentives to invest (Acemoglu et al. 2004).
The larger the pool of the parent firm’s intellectual property rights, the
more likely is integration. This result also holds across the whole sample
of domestic and foreign German investments. Table 2.6 presents the results
using probit and OLS to analyze the marginal effect of innovation on off-
shoring.
The first two columns in Table 2.6 present a significant coefficient of
PatP . It indicates that, over all the investments, a larger pool of parental
knowledge favors integration. The linear probability model in column (2)
suggests that an additional patent increases the probability of integration by
37 percent. Including the affiliate ratio, columns (3) and (4) show a reduced
impact of knowledge on the organizational structure. The marginal effect is
positive and about 30 percent. The significance is equal or close to the 10
percent level. Following Amemiya (1981) and Camron and Trivedi (2005),
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Table 2.5: Patents and organizational structure in Eastern Europe
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(K/L)P -0.9294** -0.8853* -0.7195 -0.2029
[1.993] [1.933] [1.607] [0.388]
(Y/L)P 0.0221 0.0059
[0.881] [0.187]
AffRat 0.8653** 0.9369** 0.6757* 0.548
[2.025] [2.112] [1.774] [1.357]
Log (L)P 0.0267 0.03 0.0604*
[0.756] [1.190] [1.905]
(Oo)A -0.0005** -0.0009**
[1.966] [2.022]
(Pat)P 6.9617 6.4598 3.2887 6.2284**
[1.506] [1.519] [1.642] [2.007]
Fixed effects no no no yes
Observations 582 582 670 658
Pseudo R2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.11
Dependent variable: Integration
Notes: Probit estimation with a constant (not shown), robust z statistic in brackets.
The dependent variable is equal to one if the direct ownership share is larger than 35
percent, otherwise zero. For a detailed definition of the variables, see the descriptive
Section 2.4.2. Fixed effects are defined as a set of industry- and firm-specific dummies
as well as dummies controlling for the corresponding Eastern European countries. *,
**, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, 1 percent level, respectively.
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Table 2.6: Organizational structure: Probit vs. OLS
Probit OLS Probit OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(K/L)P 0.2265 0.0731 0.1801 0.0586
[0.797] [0.874] [0.629] [0.692]
(Y/L)P 0.0098** 0.0029** 0.0092** 0.0028**
[2.433] [2.535] [2.300] [2.414]
AffRat -0.2006*** -0.0681**
[2.644] [2.550]
Log (L)P -0.0473*** -0.0138*** -0.0515*** -0.0154***
[3.508] [3.635] [3.760] [3.975]
(Pat)P 1.2676* 0.3704** 1.0866 0.3167*
[1.778] [2.048] [1.536] [1.745]
Fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Observations 3770 3783 3770 3783
Adj./Pseudo R2 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
Dependent variable: Integration
Notes: Probit (OLS) estimation with a constant (not shown), robust z (t) statistic
in brackets. The dependent variable is equal to one if the direct ownership share
is larger than 50 percent, otherwise zero. For a detailed definition of the variables,
see the descriptive Section 2.4.2. Fixed effects are defined as a set of industry- and
firm-specific dummies (including the firm’s legal form as additional control). Country
dummies controlling for the corresponding German and Eastern European countries are
also included. Similar results are obtained by the 35 percent definition of integration.
Here, the patent variable is less significant, equal or close to the 10 percent level. *,
**, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, 1 percent level, respectively.
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the variance between OLS and probit is an effect of values with a probability
below 0.1 as well as above 0.9. Additionally, all the other variables suggest
the expected intuition. Therefore, the presented results affirm the reliability
of the estimated coefficients as well as the theoretical predictions as outlined
in Section 2.3.63
The theoretical part predicts that the changeover from non-integration to
integration takes longer when the parent firm invests abroad compared with
the changeover in purely domestic investments. In order to control for this
difference, the starting point is presented by column (1) in Table 2.7. Using
a linear probability model, as presented in Table 2.6, the positive sign of
the coefficient on the productivity measure suggests that only the most pro-
ductive integrate (Antras 2003). Considering log(L)P , the larger the firm’s
endowment of employees, the more likely is outsourcing. Moreover, when
investing abroad, the loss of the territorial protection and therefore the in-
creased hold-up risk boosts the probability of integration between the parent
firm and the supplier. This is suggested by the included country dummy,
which is equal to 1 if the German parent firm invests in Eastern Europe and
equal to 0 if the firm invests in the domestic market. All the mentioned vari-
ables are significant at the 1 percent level. To test the theoretical prediction
of an increased likelihood of non-integration in CEE compared with invest-
ments in Germany, column (2) includes an interaction between the country
dummy and the pool of parental knowledge. All the coefficients show the
expected signs. Unfortunately, the coefficient on PatP and the interaction
term is not significant. However, the negative sign of the coefficient on the
interaction term suggests that the theoretical framework is correct in pre-
dicting a longer tendency towards non-integration when the inventive parent
63 Using the 35 percent definition of the integration measure suggests the same impact
of each variable. Only the significance of PatP is slightly below the given values in Table
2.6.
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firm goes abroad. Due to the fact that the impact could be driven by the
firm size, column (3) presents the same specification set for the sub-sample
of SMEs. This method takes account of the highly inventive medium-sized
enterprises, especially in Germany. Whereas the employment measure be-
comes insignificant, the negative and significant sign of the coefficient on
the interaction term gives empirical evidence for the theoretical prediction
as outlined in Section 2.3. First, the larger the capacity for innovation, the
more likely is offshoring. Second, international outsourcing holds longer for
a given knowledge ratio when SMEs are investing abroad. Intuitively, due
to a limited endowment, SMEs prefer outsourcing to incentivize the supplier
additionally to invest within the whole range of innovations. It brings addi-
tional surplus that is not available in the national context. However, in the
international context, it is also true that a rising knowledge pool increases
the producer’s hold-up risk and therefore shifts the emphasis to the producer
and his need to obtain (a part of) the input.
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Table 2.7: Gap in the organizational structure
SME
(1) (2) (3)
(K/L)P 0.0089 0.0122 -0.0063
[0.117] [0.148] [0.066]
(Y/L)P 0.0029*** 0.0029*** -0.2322
[3.072] [3.071] [1.608]
Log (L)P -0.0108*** -0.0108*** -0.0003
[3.411] [3.408] [0.023]
(Pat)P 0.2359 0.246 0.8081***
[1.531] [1.422] [2.672]
Country 0.1235*** 0.1239*** 0.064
[8.641] [8.548] [1.572]
(Pat)P * country -0.0893 -0.7252*
[0.370] [1.938]
Fixed effects yes yes yes
Observations 3821 3821 916
Adjusted R2 0.04 0.04 0.06
Dependent variable: Integration
all firms
Notes: Linear probability estimation with a constant (not shown), robust
t-statistic in brackets. The dependent variable is equal to one if the direct
ownership share is larger than 35 percent, otherwise zero. For a detailed
definition of the variables, see the descriptive Section 2.4.2. The country
dummy is equal to one when the parent firm invests in Eastern Europe
and it is equal to zero when the firm invests in Germany. Fixed effects are
defined as a set of industry- and firm-specific dummies. Fixed effects also
include affiliate country dummies controlling for the corresponding Eastern
European countries. Similar results are obtained by the 50 percent defini-
tion of integration. In the 50 percent set-up, the variables present a even
higher significance level. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, 1
percent levels, respectively.
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2.4.4 Robustness
This section discusses the robustness of the empirical findings. To address
the potential problem of endogeneity, the following tables report a number
of alternative measures and methods. The results affirm the theoretical pre-
dictions as well as the empirical findings.
Table 2.8 starts with a probit estimation in the German sub-sample. In-
stead of dividing the innovation measure by the number of employees, it
reports the results for the coefficient on the knowledge variable per firm’s
value added. Column (1) presents the results for the firm’s intangible assets
IntangV A. The coefficient is as expected and significant at the 1 percent
level. The larger the ratio of the assets, the greater is the pool of intangibles
within the parent firm’s added value. Therefore, as the theoretical framework
predicts, the more likely is integration. Columns (2) to (4) also suggest that
this holds for both the patent measure as well as for the decision about the
organizational structure in Eastern Europe. Moreover, all the other variables
present the expected coefficients, which suggests that the results are not sen-
sitive to the inclusion of value added. Again, the sign of the coefficient on
productivity is positive, suggesting that only the most productive choose off-
shoring over outsourcing. Columns (5) and (6) show the results using probit
and OLS over all the investments, respectively. Both coefficients on PatV AP
are significant and positive: the larger the pool of knowledge within the value
added, the more likely is integration.
Running the same specifications including the interaction term between
foreign investments and knowledge presents the predicted impact. However,
the coefficients are less significant. Additionally, the same set of specifications
is run on firms with a value of patents larger than 0. Again, the coefficients
show the predicted signs but they are less significant (below the 15 percent
level). In order to control for the fact that a parent firm owns an existing
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pool of innovations, the patent measure’s information is reduced to a binary
variable. It is equal to 1 if the firm owns at least one filled patent and 0
otherwise. The regressions are run for probit and OLS as well as for the
sub-sample of SMEs. Throughout all the specifications, the patent dummy
is positive and significant at least at the 5 percent level. There is only weak
empirical evidence for the theoretical prediction that outsourcing holds longer
in the international context. The coefficient on the interaction term is, close
to the 15 percent level, not significant. Moreover, the dependent variable is
also changed from a binary to a continuous variable ranging between 0 and
100 percent. Despite low significance in the Eastern European sub-sample,
all the variables show the right impact and an underlying significance as
presented before.
In the literature, it is argued that innovation is influenced by various
determinants.64 Additionally, it is possible that the organizational structure
has an influence on inventive activities. Moreover, freed resources could also
be useful for further investments in costly patent proceedings. It could be the
case that outsourcing frees resources and these in turn are used for further
innovation (Glass and Saggi 2001). This would imply that the knowledge
variable is correlated with the error term. Therefore, the coefficient on the
knowledge variable is biased due to simultaneous causality. The following
results take account of this problem.
The patent variable is instrumented by a measurement of the possibility
to imitate the parent firm’s products. The variable copy ranges from 1, which
means that the products can be easily imitated, to 3, which means that ex-
traordinary efforts are necessary for imitation. The variable is reconstructed
by a binary code that is equal to 0 if imitation is easy and 1 otherwise, hence
large or extraordinary efforts are necessary.65 To obtain reliable results, a
64 See Griliches (1990, 1992), who gives a survey of the empirical literature addressing
innovation.
65 The variable comes out of a unique data survey of 660 global corporations in Austria
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valid instrument must be correlated with the problematic patent variable and
must be exogenous, that is, uncorrelated with the error term. The instru-
ment’s relevance can be tested in the first stage of the instrumental variables
regression:
PatP = β0 + β1copyik + β2(K/L)ik + β3(Y/L)ik
+β4AffRatik + β5log(L)ik + ϑik + vik,
(2.18)
where the binary patent variable is regressed on the instrument copyik. Ta-
ble 2.9 reports the first-stage results. The sign of the coefficient on copyik
is negative and significant. Intuitively, the easier the possibility to imitate
(costly) products, the more likely is seeking patent protection. If it is dif-
ficult to imitate the product, it is protected by itself and the less likely is
territorial protection. From this perspective, copy appears to be a relevant
instrument. Because equation 2.18 is exactly identified, exogeneity cannot be
tested. From an intuitive perspective, the decision about the organizational
structure has no influence on the existing pool of knowledge of the parent
firm. The variable measures the active evaluation of the possibility to imitate
an existing product before the decision about patenting investments is made.
Therefore, the assumption of exogeneity is fulfilled. Table 2.9 presents the
results.
Columns (1) and (2) suggest that an increasing pool of knowledge boosts
the probability of integration. The coefficient is significant for both thresh-
olds. Moreover, the capital-to-labor ratio is also positive and significant in
column (1). Unfortunately, the sign of the coefficient on productivity turns.
Contrary to the previous results, the impact is negative. However, it becomes
insignificant in column (2). It is noticeable that the number of observations
falls by more than 50 percent. This is induced by the limited availability of
the variable copy. Columns (3) and (4) study the effect of the second theoret-
and Germany, University of Munich. For further information see Marin et al. (2003).
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Table 2.9: 2SLS regressions: organizational structure
50% 
threshold
35% 
threshold
50% 
threshold
35% 
threshold
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(K/L)P 0.3268** 0.1363 0.2523* 0.1273
[1.97] [0.95] [1.759] [0.935]
(Y/L)P -0.0083** -0.004 -0.0095*** -0.0060***
[2.09] [1.35] [3.360] [2.936]
AffRat 0.0452 0.033 0.0606* 0.0551**
[0.97] [0.98] [1.663] [2.150]
Log (L)P 0.0091 0.0074 0.003 0.0058
[0.85] [0.82] [0.340] [0.727]
(Pat)P 0.4469*** 0.2236** 0.5618*** 0.3466***
[2.80] [1.94] [4.495] [3.853]
Country 0.1505** 0.1306**
[2.135] [2.276]
(Pat)P * country -0.2693*** -0.1726**
[2.682] [2.099]
-0.302*** -0.279***
[6.73] [7.92]
Fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Observations 1179 1179 1179 1179
Adj./Pseudo R2 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.03
Dependent variable: Integration
R2 = 0.64R2 = 0.44First-stage results
Notes: 2SLS estimations with a constant (not shown), robust t-statistic in brackets.
The dependent variable is equal to one if the direct ownership share is larger
than 50(35)percent, otherwise zero. For a detailed definition of the variables, see
the descriptive Section 2.4.2. Fixed effects are defined as a set of industry- and
firm-specific dummies. Fixed effects also include a country dummy controlling
for the corresponding countries in Eastern Europe and Germany. Patents are
instrumented by copy, a variable that is equal to zero if parent firm goods can be
easily copied and one if imitation is not possible or only with extraordinary efforts.
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, 1 percent level, respectively.
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ical prediction about the difference between domestic and foreign investments
on the organizational structure. The results provide empirical evidence for
the theoretical predictions. A larger pool of inventiveness increases the prob-
ability of integration. However, outsourcing holds longer when the parent
firm invests abroad. This is suggested by the negative coefficient on the
interaction term, which is significant.66
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter studies the determinants of the organizational structure of Ger-
man firms investing in Eastern Europe. Following Acemoglu et al. (2004),
the theoretical framework predicts that a larger pool of parental knowledge
increases the probability of integration. This holds in both the national and
international contexts. However, in the foreign case, the decision to out-
source holds longer. In more detail, there are three key predictions within
the theoretical framework. First, the larger the domestic pool of knowledge
at the parent firm’s level, the more likely is integration. Second, this finding
holds in the national as well as in the international context. Along with Ace-
moglu et al. (2004), the carrier with the higher capacity for inventiveness
has to be incentivized by his preferred organizational form. Third, territorial
protected knowledge also increases the likelihood of international outsourc-
ing. That is, the outcome of outsourcing holds “longer” with an increasing
parental pool of innovations in the international context compared with the
territorially protected national case. Moreover, the framework suggests that
(i) the larger the number of potential partners for the supplier, the more
likely is non-integration, which is also in line with McLaren (2000); (ii) the
66 As stated by Acemoglu et al. (2004, p.23), some problems may occur because of
treating both the patent variable and the concerning interaction simultaneously as en-
dogenous.
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larger the parent firm’s possibility of keeping knowledge of the supplier, the
more likely is outsourcing.
The empirical analysis provides evidence for the theoretical predictions
using (i) the European micro database Amadeus(Bureau van Dijk 2005)
matched with (ii) data from the German Patent and Trade Mark Office
(2008) and (iii) a unique data set from German firms investing in Eastern
Europe. The results indicate that, for German parent firms investing in Ger-
many and Central and Eastern Europe, integration is more likely the larger
their pool of knowledge. This holds for both measures given by intangibles
and the number of patents. Beside that, productivity is positively related
to the change from outsourcing to offshoring (Antras and Helpman 2004).
Because of an obvious existence of specification problems, robustness checks
are run to confirm the obtained empirical findings. An instrumental variable
regression also suggests that the results are consistent with the theoretical
predictions. It confirms the existence of a gap in the outsourcing decision
between home and abroad. Because the empirical findings are based on the
definition of innovation, different measures are conceivable. Therefore these
provide the further proceeding in future research, especially in the interna-
tional context of the drivers of the decision on the organizational structure.
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Appendix to Chapter 2
I. Proof
Proof of the outside market due to the international case
The first derivative of θ
′
with respect to δ
′
is
∂θ
′
∂δ′ =
( 1
4
− 1
4
δ
′
)( 1
8
+ 1
4
δ
′2−)−(+ 1
4
δ
′− 1
8
δ
′2) 1
2
δ
′
( 1
8
+ 1
4
δ′2−)2
∂θ
′
∂δ′ =
1
32
− 1
16
δ
′2 − 1
4
− 1
4
δ
′
− 1
32
δ
′
with  = 1
4
α
′
+ 1
8
α
′2
iff α
′ → 0⇔ → 0 ⇒ 1
32
− 1
16
δ
′2 − 1
32
δ
′
iff δ
′
< 1
2
⇒ ∂θ′
∂δ′ > 0
iff δ
′
> 1
2
⇒ ∂θ′
∂δ′ < 0
Therefore concerning to ∂θ
′
∂δ′ :
iff α
′ → 1⇒ δ′TR ↓
iff δ
′ ∈]0; δ′TR[→ ∂θ′
∂δ′ > 0
iff δ
′ ∈]δTR; 1[→ ∂θ′
∂δ′ < 0. q.e.d.
The intuition is given as follows. The larger the affiliate’s likelihood to find
an alternative partner outside the intended relationship, the larger her in-
vestments. However, the investments on the producer level are also larger
under non-integration than integration. This results from the production
function in the firms’ legally protected environment: the producer is able to
increase the supplier’s space for value-creating investments via reducing his
investments and therefore costs in the integration mode. Outside the rela-
tionship, the producer’s outside option is solely increasing his investments.
Therefore, to increase his output and to reduce the foreign supplier’s outside
option using parental innovation, the parent firm increases her investments
counteracting the supplier’s investment. Hence, the greater the incentives for
the supplier, the larger the producer’s efforts to limit the independent sup-
plier. These efforts are strengthened in the international context because the
foreign supplier is legally allowed to invest in the whole pool of innovations.
This restriction of the supplier increases the costs of investments and re-
duces the total surplus compared with integration. Therefore, the likelihood
of integration is increasing in a greater δ
′
.
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Appendix to Chapter 2
II. Tables and Figures
Table T2.1: Central and Eastern European countries
Albania Macedonia, FYR
Belarus Moldova
Bosnia and Herzigovina Poland
Bulgaria Romania
Croatia Russian Federation
Czech Republic Serbia and Montenegro
Estonia Slovak Republic
Hungary Slovenia
Latvia Ukraine
Lithuania
Source: Amadeus (Bureau van Dijk 2005) and Chair for International Eco-
nomics, University of Munich.
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Chapter 3
Tariff Rates, Offshoring and
Productivity: Evidence from
German and Austrian
Firm-Level Data
64
Tariff Rates, Offshoring and Productivity
3.1 Introduction
The ongoing process of trade liberalization has removed much protection-
ism. Worldwide it has gone so far that the Economist Intelligence Unit1 has
found that business executives’ fear of protectionism is relatively low com-
pared with, for example, worries about a recession (The Economist 2008).
The Economist ’s article (2008) reports that the Doha round and trade bar-
riers are seen as increasingly unimportant. On the one hand, it justifies the
question whether there is additional need to study the impact of liberalized
trade. On the other hand, trade liberalization is important. Conversely,
owing to a new threat of protectionism, The Economist (2008, p.30) also
argues that “multilateralism matters more than ever”: inter alia, it mentions
the “symbolic importance” (The Economist 2008, p.30) of Doha, restricted
investments (Marchick and Slaughter 2008), as well as raised food demand,
oil production quotas and relative scarcity (Mattoo and Subramanian 2008).
Moreover, a recent study by Amiti and Konings (2007) focus on the impor-
tance of tariffs and the firm’s international value chain, analyzing the impact
of liberalized trade on intermediate inputs and productivity. Marin (2008)
points out the importance of international trade through a rise in intra-firm
trade and the development of international value chains. There is continuing
importance of trade liberalization and its broad impact on micro as well as
macro perspectives.
Trade liberalization and its impact on firm productivity are studied in
different ways and for a wide span of countries. On this note there are
different definitions of liberalized trade and its link to productivity. As stated
by Amiti and Konings (2007), however, only a few papers study the effect on
productivity of liberalized trade in terms of both output and input tariffs.
Moreover, there is, to the best of my knowledge, no study about German and
1 A sister company to The Economist ; see The Economist (2008).
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Austrian trade liberalization with regard to Eastern Europe. That is, there
is no empirical evidence about liberalized offshoring via tariff cuts which
distinguishes between different kinds of tariff rates and their impact on total
factor productivity.
Particularly in the case of Germany and Austria, however, this topic is
of paramount interest. First, because of the German unification in 1990
there are significant productivity differences among regions and firms, espe-
cially between the services and manufacturing sectors (Temouri et al. 2008).
Second, as argued by Marin (2008), a fact of increased global competition is
that Germany and Austria are the countries most affected by Eastern enlarge-
ment. They are the most important investors in Eastern European countries.
Up to two-thirds of total imports within the European Union (EU27) can be
ascribed to intra-firm imports between old and new EU member states. The
German Federal Statistical Office (2008b) indicates that 60 percent of Ger-
man companies undertaking offshoring decide in favor of the new EU member
states. Within this group of firms more than 60 percent relocate their core
functions and auxiliary functions, respectively. Third, within these offshoring
activities firms reorganize their structure towards flatter hierarchies resulting
in easier communication, greater responsibility and greater firm productiv-
ity (Marin 2008, Marin and Verdier 2008). Fourth, Germany and Austria
are internationally the most integrated countries within the European Union
(Marin 2008). For instance, Germany’s medium-sized firms are the great-
est exporters compared with other European countries like France or Italy
(Mayer and Ottaviano 2007a). Moreover, Marin (2008) shows that trade
openness with new member states - measured in imports plus exports over
GDP - increased from 1994 to 2006 in Austria by 7.2 percentage points and
in Germany by 5.4 percentage points. Fifth, there are considerable effects of
trade liberalization in terms of tariff cuts the firms may respond to.2 This
2 More details on this follow in Section 3.4.3.
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promotes intra-industry competition which in turn boosts productivity and
therefore GDP growth (Mayer and Ottaviano 2007a).
This study deals with the analysis of tariff reductions and their impact
on German and Austrian productivity. Motivated by theoretical papers like
those of Grossman and Helpman (1991), Feenstra et al. (1992), Acemoglu
and Zilibotti (2001), Melitz (2003), and Luong (2008), the findings are in
favor of supporting trade liberalization. That is, as argued by Melitz (2003),
liberalized trade exposes domestic firms to increased competition which forces
inefficient establishments to exit the market. This in turn shifts the average
productivity up. The described selection effect (Melitz 2003), however, does
not raise within-firm productivity. Productivity growth within each firm is
provided by improved access to cheaper inputs, higher quality, foreign tech-
nology (Grossman and Helpman 1991) and a greater variety of intermediates
(Dixit and Stiglitz 1977, Feenstra et al. 1992, Acemoglu and Zilibotti 2001).
As argued by Luong (2008) the impact of improved access to foreign inputs
via tariff cuts depends on both the affected tariff rate (output vs. input tar-
iffs) and the elasticity of substitution between existing and newly available
intermediate inputs. The effects of tariff cuts on productivity gains are esti-
mated by Amiti and Konings (2007). Section 3.2 gives an extensive overview
of existing empirical studies and their main differences.
Following Amiti and Konings (2007), the results of this chapter are pre-
sented in two steps. In the first step I estimate the firm-specific TFP for
each two-digit ISIC sector using different dependent variables and regression
methods for Austria and Germany separately. The second stage presents the
estimation results of productivity on tariff rates. In contrast with Amiti and
Konings (2007), intra-firm tariffs are included that capture the offshoring
relationship between parent firms and their Eastern European affiliates. The
results of this step are obtained at plant level. The underlying sources are
the Amadeus database provided by the Bureau van Dijk (Bureau van Dijk,
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Electronic Publishing 2005), the WITS database (World Bank and UNC-
TAD 2008) and a unique set of German and Austrian investments in Eastern
Europe matched for the years 1994 to 2003.3
The study finds empirical evidence for a significant negative impact of
tariffs on firm-level total factor productivity. In line with the small amount
of existing literature which distinguishes between different kinds of tariffs,
the effect of input tariffs exceeds that of intra-firm as well as output tariffs.
The impact for a ten percentage point decrease in the tariff rates raises firm
productivity between 0.3 and 2.0 percent depending on the type of tariff and
country. Reducing tariffs on output goods by ten percentage points can lead
to productivity gains at firm-level of 0.4 percent, whereas reducing tariffs
on intermediate inputs by ten percentage points can lead to productivity
gains of up to 1.6 percent. The results of reducing intra-firm tariffs by ten
percentage points suggests productivity gains of 0.7 percent. The effect of
liberalized trade is greater for Austria than for Germany. Moreover, foreign-
owned firms located in Germany and Austria seem to benefit more from
tariff cuts compared with domestic firms. Their total factor productivity
gains are greater by 0.2 to 0.5 percentage points. The results also suggest
that a fraction of the positive impact of offshoring on productivity is induced
by reduced tariff rates. Comparison of the results with the existing literature
about Brazil or Indonesia shows that the effect of Eastern European trade
liberalization for Germany and Austria is much smaller. This can be traced
back to some quite intuitive facts. First, Indonesia is a developing country far
from the technological frontier, suggesting larger marginal effects. Second,
liberalized trade with Eastern Europe explains only part of German and
Austrian trade activities.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 gives a review, by no
means exhaustive, of the related empirical literature to which the chapter
3 A more detailed description of the underlying datasets follows in Section 3.3.
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refers. In particular, this section emphasizes the study and underlying esti-
mation method of Amiti and Konings (2007), which provides the main moti-
vation for this analysis. Section 3.3 gives an overview of the data. Section 3.4
describes the underlying estimation methodology, illustrates the construction
of the total factor productivity and tariff variables in more detail, and gives
some descriptive facts about tariff rates and the firms’ productivity. Section
3.5 presents the estimation results of liberalized trade in terms of reduced
tariffs on TFP. Section 3.6 gives evidence for the robustness of the empirical
findings. Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Literature Review
This section summarizes the existing literature on the relationship between
liberalized trade and firm productivity. More precisely, it cites empirical
studies about the impact of trade liberalization on firms’ total factor pro-
ductivity. After considering this set of empirical literature arranged by coun-
try and underlying samples, the section focuses on the Indonesian study by
Amiti and Konings (2007).
3.2.1 Related Literature
Beside the theoretical papers mentioned in the introduction a huge amount
of empirical literature has addressed, both directly and indirectly, the rela-
tionship between trade liberalization and productivity.
An important strand of literature studies empirically the relationship of
imports and exports with productivity. For Japanese firms, Tomiura (2007)
finds that corporations investing abroad are the most productive firms. Sim-
ilarly, Sjoholm (1999) argues that Indonesian firms in the manufacturing in-
dustry show increased productivities with an increasing amount of exports.
Moreover, Muuls and Pisu (2007) find that not only exports count. Their
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data for Belgium suggest that firms that export and import are the most
productive. The same evidence for Italian firms is provided by Castellani et
al. (2008). German plant level data studied by Wagner (2002) suggest that
exporting firms are associated with higher labor productivity.4 Moreover,
Vogel and Wagner (2008) also give evidence for an existing self-selection in
Germany. They find a positive impact of firms’ productivity on their im-
port activities.5 In terms of Eastern Europe, Hagemejer and Kolasa (2008)
find within their study on Polish data that internationalized firms are the
most productive. Halpern et al. (2005) study the contribution of imports to
Hungarian productivity. Their results on firm-level data show productivity
boosted through access to a larger variety and different qualities of imported
intermediate inputs as well as reallocation of output-determining input vari-
ables. Within the theoretical framework it is implied that the access to
foreign inputs, the relative quality, and the reallocation of capital and la-
bor can raise productivity. Using the Olley-Pakes approach (1996), Halpern
et al. (2005) enhance the unobserved productivity function by the number
of varieties imported. This circumvents the problem of zero investment re-
port.6 Halpern et al. (2005) find that from 1992 to 2001 a ten percentage
point increase in the share of imports raised TFP by 1.8 percent. Aggregat-
ing the firm-level data the authors find that imports explain 30 percent of
aggregated productivity growth. One half of the whole effect can be sepa-
rated into the reallocation of inputs, and the other half can be traced back
to import activities.
All these studies explain possible productivity boosts and related prob-
lems mainly in terms of an underlying self-selection problem. None of them,
however, takes account of potential triggers for rising import and export ac-
4 See also Bernard and Wagner (1997) and Bernard and Jensen (1999), p.2ff.
5 See also Altomonte and Bekes (2008), who find that self-selection holds for both
importing and exporting firms.
6 The authors point out that 25 percent of the firm data report zero investments.
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tivities. That is, none of them studies the effect of liberalized trade on total
factor productivity in terms of quotas, reduced tariffs or other trade policy
variables.
Kasahara and Lapham (2008) consider the link between trade liberaliza-
tion and intermediates, exports and productivity. Reduced trade restrictions
allow for a larger amount of imported intermediates. This in turn raises
productivity within the firm, which itself allows for exports. A greater de-
mand for labor forces the less efficient firms to exit the market. De Loecker
(2007a) finds that relaxing product-specific level and quota restrictions leads
to productivity gains in the Belgian textile industry. Using an enhanced
Olley-Pakes methodology (1996) for the production function estimations that
additionally controls for unobserved price variable biases (De Loecker 2007a,
p.22ff), the author finds productivity gains of 4 percent. Liberalized trade
forces the inefficient producers to exit, which leads to an increase in average
productivity (De Loecker 2007a, p.3ff). In Bernard et al. (2006) reduced
trade costs, measured by changes in tariff and freight costs, have a posi-
tive impact on productivity growth, a negative effect on plant death and are
positively associated with a switch from being a non-exporter to being an
exporter as well as export growth.
A positive effect of trade liberalization on productivity is also found by
Pavcnik (2002). Her data on Chilean plants in the manufacturing industries
yield an aggregated rise in total factor productivity of 19 percent. On the
plant level she argues that there is a difference between producers acting
in import-competing sectors and plants acting in non-traded goods sectors.
The effect of liberalized trade on non-traders and traders ranges between 3
and 10.4 percent, respectively, and is because of “reshuﬄing (of) resources
from the less to more efficient plants [...].” (Schor 2004, p.261). Plants with
inefficient production are forced to close down owing to foreign competition
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(Schor 2004, p.265).7 Another study on Chilean manufacturing is presented
by Alvarez and Crespi (2007). Their study does not give direct evidence of
liberalized trade effect on productivity. The authors study the determinants
of the convergence of low-productivity firms on the technological frontier
for Chilean plant-level data under (almost) free trade policy from 1979 to
1998 (Alvarez and Crespi 2007, p.3). Using the Levinsohn-Petrin technique
(2003) for the productivity estimations at the three-digit industry level shows
that the plant-specific productivity gap interacting with the share of foreign
firms has a significant positive effect on productivity growth. Therefore it
suggests that domestic firms benefit from access to foreign technology. This
positive effect of importing intermediate inputs in the Chilean manufacturing
industry is more precisely studied by Kasahara and Rodrigue (2008). Using
a wide range of estimation techniques their results suggest that importing
foreign inputs increases firm productivity by at least 2.6 percent.
Empirical results for trade liberalization in terms of a Free Trade Agree-
ment (FTA) and reduced tariffs on productivity are more precisely studied
by the following authors. Head and Ries (1999) study the impacts of FTA
on output. After introducing their theoretical part, which considers dif-
ferent models of imperfect competition, the authors test their predictions
on Canadian industry data. At industry level Canadian tariff reductions
of ten percentage points reduce output by at least 11.3 percent. In con-
trast, a reduction of the same amount in US tariff rates increases output
by 16 percent. Summarizing their findings, Head and Ries (1999, p.309ff)
show that both tariff reductions offset each other in their impact on outputs.
The impact of the Canadian-U.S. FTA on productivity is studied by Trefler
(2004). His study offsets the short-run costs with the long-run benefits of the
country-specific changes in FTA-mandated tariff concessions. Estimates of
tariff concession effect on employment growth and labor productivity shows
7 See also Luong (2008), p.2ff.
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an employment loss between 12 and 24 percent for Canada and a loss of 3
percent for the US in the short run. In contrast, tariff concessions show long-
run gains owing to increasing labor productivity ranging between 8 and 15
percent for Canada and between 4 and 14 percent for the US.8 The largest,
15 percent, rise in labor productivity can be ascribed to import competition
effects (Trefler 2008, p.880).
Tybout and Westbrook (1995) find that Mexican tariff rates are on the
one hand positively correlated with costs and on the other negatively cor-
related with productivity growth. Therefore liberalized trade shifts the av-
erage cost curve downward and raises sector-specific efficiency. Fernandes
(2007) explores the impact of nominal tariffs on Colombian plant produc-
tivity. Calculation of TFP in accordance with Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)
shows that a 10 percentage point tariff cut raises productivity between 0.8
and 2.9 percent. Because the effect is greater for firms with higher imports
of intermediate inputs, the author argues that one channel is the access to
foreign innovations (Fernandes 2007, p.68). All these studies present results
for the impact of output tariffs. The measurement and potential link of input
tariffs with productivity are still missing.9
Schor (2004) studies the impact of nominal output and input tariff rates
on TFP of 27 Brazilian sectors at the two-digit SIC level. Her estimates
for manufacturing firms from 1986 to 1998 show a significant negative effect
of both tariff measures on productivity. With the Olley-Pakes technique
(1996) adding input tariffs reduces the coefficient of nominal tariffs and yields
predicted impact of the input tariffs’ coefficient, which gives between 1.5 and
2.7 percent productivity gains for a ten percentage point tariff cut. Schor
(2004) argues that the results give evidence of two effects. The first one is the
import competition effect reflected by the estimates for nominal tariffs. The
8 The results depend on the estimation methods as well as on the underlying data
(industry versus plant-level data).
9 See also Luong (2008), p.2.
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second effect is the improved access to foreign technology derived from the
negative coefficient for input tariff rates (Schor 2004, p.390). These links for
the Brazilian manufacturing sectors are more precisely studied by Muendler
(2004). He finds that the effect of increasing foreign competition on the
product market raises firm productivity enormously. The impact of foreign
inputs is not, however, as large as expected; it is more the effect of inefficient
firms leaving the market which leaves the internal productivity untouched.
A famous example of trade liberalization effect on productivity is the
case of India. Beside the more recent studies by Goldberg et al. (2008)
and Topalova (2004), Krishna and Mitra (1998) find evidence that the trade
reform in India has a positive association with productivity growth. Their
dummy model of liberalized trade in 1991 shows between 3 and 6 percent
productivity growth. Topalova (2004) finds average productivity gains of 0.5
percent induced by a ten percentage point tariff cut. Similarly to Krishna
and Mitra (1998), apart from the mentioned outcome she also finds a faster
productivity growth rate using manufacturing industry and plant level data
from 1986 to 1993. Goldberg at al. (2008) put more emphasis on the role of
input tariffs. Their findings of a reduction in the input tariff rates in India
suggest that trade liberalization makes imported intermediates cheaper and
gives firms access to a greater variety of new inputs and foreign technology.
This in turn increases domestic variety. To sum up their findings, lower
tariff rates raise imported varieties in intermediate as well as in final good
sectors. Lowering input tariffs by ten percentage points increases, among
other things, total factor productivity by 4.5 percent.
Amiti and Konings (2007) find empirical evidence of plant productivity
gains for Indonesian firms because of trade liberalization. A cut in both
output and input tariffs raises productivity via increasing competition and
variety as well as quality effects. The particular role of the growth of input
tariffs is shown by the study. The productivity gains of tariff reductions on
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intermediate inputs is significantly negative and ranges from 3 percent for
non-importing firms to 12 percent for importing firms. These findings as well
as the underlying methodology are the subject of the following subsection.
Closely related is Luong’s (2008) study about Mexican data. Similarly to
Amiti and Konings (2007), Luong (2008) distinguishes between output and
input tariffs but additionally shows that there is a difference between high and
low differentiated products. There is a rise in firm total factor productivity
owing to lower input tariffs if inputs are highly differentiated. Productivity
also increases owing to lower output tariffs if intermediate inputs are not
highly differentiated. Therefore his results are driven by the elasticity of
substitution among inputs (Luong, 2008, p.11ff).
To the best of my knowledge, there is no study about the relationship be-
tween German or Austrian trade liberalization and Eastern European coun-
tries and firm-level total factor productivity. Temouri et al. (2008) estimate
German total factor productivity from 1995 to 2004. In their second step,
however, they show productivity differences owing to foreign affiliates and
parent multinationals. Unfortunately, they do not link this with trade liber-
alization. As stated in the introduction, however, for Germany and Austria
in particular it would seem to be very valuable to study the impacts.
3.2.2 Study by Amiti and Konings (2007)
Amiti and Konings (2007) give empirical evidence that Indonesian firms bene-
fit from trade liberalization. Their study provides information about Indone-
sian plants between 1991 and 2001 on, inter alia, revenue, labor, investments
and imported inputs. Information on intermediate inputs is available for each
firm in 1998. This measurement is used for creating input tariffs. It allows
the authors to distinguish between the impacts of both output tariff rates
and input tariff rates on firm productivity. Whereas the benefits of reduced
output tariffs are realized via import competition, the gains of input tariff
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cuts are realized by learning, variety effects and foreign technology.10 The
output tariff is measured by the average of all HS nine-digit product codes
for each five-digit ISIC sector. The input rate is constructed as a weighted
average of the output tariff. In this context the weights are given by the
sectoral cost shares of one input good over all imported intermediate inputs
per parental sector.11 The authors point out that the tariff rates are given at
the industry level to avoid endogeneity problems (Amiti and Konings, 2007,
p.1620). Importantly, Amiti and Konings (2007, p.1612) observe that the
input weights are only available for 1998 with the consequence of a constant
technology assumption over time.
To test the impact of trade liberalization on productivity, Amiti and
Konings (2007) run an OLS regression with fixed effects. Assuming a Cobb-
Douglas production function the authors estimate the total factor produc-
tivity for each three-digit ISIC sector via an enhanced Olley-Pakes technique
(1996) to avoid unobserved productivity impacts on the input coefficients.
The estimation method takes account of the problem of simultaneous causal-
ity between the error term, including the productivity shock and the depen-
dent variable within the firm’s decision on input factors. To control for the
correlation between the inputs and the error term a strict positive correla-
tion between investments and the unobserved productivity shock is assumed
(Olley and Pakes 1996). It controls for the simultaneity problem and pro-
vides a consistent coefficient for labor. Moreover, the method also takes
account of a selection bias resulting from firms leaving the market. The
semi-parametric estimation method also controls for this problem by esti-
mating survival probabilities (Yasar et al. 2008). It allows me to obtain in
a second step a consistent coefficient for capital.12 Besides controlling for
10 See Amiti and Konings (2007), p.1613ff.
11 See Amiti and Konings (2007), p.1619ff.
12 For a detailed discussion of the underlying estimation method see Amiti and Konings
(2007), p.1635, Olley and Pakes (1996) and Section 3.4.2 about the total factor produc-
tivity.
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unobserved productivity shocks and exits of firms, the authors modify the
Olley-Pakes (1996) technique by controlling for the firm’s import and export
decision (Amiti and Konings 2007, p.l635ff). The Olley-Pakes (1996) method
implies that investment function depends on trade, productivity shock and
capital. Hence, within the underlying data the existence of data on firm
investments and the import and export decision allows estimation of consis-
tent values for the input coefficients. In a further step the authors run a
fixed-effect regression to estimate how trade liberalization affects TFP.
Their estimation results show a negative impact of output tariffs on pro-
ductivity. The coefficient in terms of absolute values ranges from 0.7 percent
to 6.4 percent with a ten percentage point change in output tariffs. The value
as well as the significance depends strongly on the underlying specification.
A larger and significant negative effect is provided by the results for input
tariff rates. For a ten percentage point decrease the coefficient for input
tariffs ranges from 1.8 percent to 7.9 percent for non-importing plants and
from 4.1 to 11.8 percent for importing firms. Therefore the effect for firms
importing intermediate inputs is much larger than the gains for firms that
compete with foreign inputs (Amiti and Konings, 2007, p.l621ff). In this
context, Amiti and Konings (2007, p.1614) argue that trade liberalization
and therefore lower tariff rates can be thought of as lowering the price of
international outsourcing and therefore raising firm productivity.
The findings are robust owing to a large number of alternative speci-
fications and estimation methods. They show that in terms of a potential
omitted variable bias problem it is necessary to include input tariff rates when
estimating the effect of trade liberalization on firm productivity (Amiti and
Konings 2007, p.1621). Due to the coefficient’s value and significance the
impact of input tariffs is existent and even larger than the impact of import
competition itself.
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3.3 Dataset
The empirical analysis relies mainly on the matching of two datasets. The
first is a detailed cross-sectional dataset of 660 global corporations based
in Germany and Austria. The survey was conducted from 1990 to 2001
by the Chair of International Economics at the University of Munich. The
sample represents 80 percent of German total investments in Eastern Eu-
rope and 100 percent of total Austrian investments in Eastern Europe. As
a whole it consists of 2,123 German and Austrian investment projects. The
employed version provides firm-level information on the parent investors in
Austria and Germany, their corresponding affiliates in Eastern Europe and
the actual investment and the parties’ relationship. The survey reports, inter
alia, detailed information on parent and affiliate firm-specific measures like
capital stock, labor endowments, research and development investments and
skill endowments. It also includes detailed information on underlying rela-
tionships like ownership share, investments and imports. Out of the unique
data this study uses measures about intra-firm imports, more precisely, the
type and amount of intermediate inputs between the parent firm and her
corresponding Eastern European affiliate.13
The second dataset is the pan-European micro database Amadeus re-
leased by the Bureau van Dijk (Bureau van Dijk, Electronic Publishing 2005).
The version used includes firm-level data for more than 1.5 million national
and multinational establishments in 38 European countries for up to 13 years,
finishing in 2005. I use unconsolidated data provided on tangible assets, em-
ployees, material costs, and revenue as well as added value and the ultimate
owner for over 209,000 German and more than 30,000 Austrian firms.14 In
addition to that I match the cross-sectional dataset on Eastern European
13 See Marin (2004, 2008) for further description of the data.
14 For further information on the Amadeus dataset (Bureau van Dijk 2005) available
online see http://www.bvdep.com/en/Amadeus.html [September, 16th, 2009].
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investment projects with Amadeus (Bureau van Dijk 2005) to obtain an en-
hanced panel structure. It results in an unbalanced panel of 417 German
and Austrian firms covering a period of ten years from 1994 to 2003. Data
are collected until the end of 2003 to avoid potential bias by the eastern
enlargement from the beginning of 2004.
To answer the question how trade liberalization affects firm-level produc-
tivity I take the simple average of effectively applied tariff rates for each
three-digit Eastern European affiliate industry provided by the World Inte-
grated Trade Solution database (WITS ) (World Bank and UNCTAD 2008).15
In the period 1994 to 2003 these data are merged for each year with the out-
come of the first two matchings mentioned above. The new dataset allows
me to identify the impact of tariff rates on productivity between Eastern
Europe and the old European members Germany and Austria. A detailed
description of the variables and the procedure follows in the next section.
3.4 Estimation methodology
3.4.1 Basic Estimation Equation
The empirical analysis studies the question whether liberalized trade has a
significant positive impact on German and Austrian firm-level total factor
productivity. Considering the related literature, I expect different contribu-
tions owing to the kind and character of the observed tariff rates. Therefore
I expect a negative sign for all tariff rates raising firm-level productivity in
the following ascending order: a decrease in output tariff raising productivity
less than a cut in intra-firm tariffs; the largest contribution is expected from
a cut in input tariff rates. The reason behind this expectation is access to
15 WITS (World Bank and UNCTAD 2008) gives access to the major trade and tariff
data from the UN COMTRADE database, the TRAINS database, and the IDB and CTS
databases. For these and further information on WITS (World Bank and UNCTAD 2008)
see http://wits.worldbank.org/witsweb [September, 16th, 2009].
79
Tariff Rates, Offshoring and Productivity
foreign inputs as well as the mentioned competition effects. This should hold
for both Austria and Germany, whereas the impact of a tariff reduction for
Austrian firms is expected to be larger than for German corporations. More-
over, the study tries to answer whether foreign-owned and importing firms
benefit more than purely domestic and non-importing firms. I expect multi-
nationals that are more familiar with foreign environments to enjoy greater
productivity effects from tariff reductions than domestic firms (Temouri et
al. 2008, p.44ff). The estimation strategy also suggests that trade liberal-
ization makes offshoring cheaper and this in turn is positively linked with
productivity.16
Thus, the main estimation equation of interest is
TFP kit = β0 + β1(Outtr)
k
t + β2(Inttr)
k
t + β3(Inptr)
k
t
+ β4δ
k
t + ηi + ηj + ηt + it,
(3.1)
where (Outtr)kt is the average of the effectively-applied output tariffs with
which each parent firm’s three-digit ISIC sector level is confronted. (Inttr)kt
and (Inptr)kt are weighted averages of the sectoral output tariffs. (Inttr)
k
t
measures intra-firm tariffs, that is, nominal tariffs at the affiliates’ sectoral
product level weighted with intra-firm imports from industry j to the parent
industry k over all intra-firm imports of sector k. This measure contains all
kinds of offshored products. (Inptr)kt weights tariff rates with the amount of
each intermediate input imported from a three-digit affiliate sector j over all
imports of sector k. I also include a set of variables δkt containing the number
of shareholders, foreign ownership, a dummy for importing firms and their
related interaction terms with tariff rates. The number of shareholders and
the nationality of the owner are provided by the Amadeus dataset (Bureau
van Dijk 2005). In this context a foreign owner is defined as the firm’s global
ultimate owner who is not of German (or Austrian) nationality and holds
16 See Amiti and Konings (2007), p.1614.
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directly or indirectly at least 50.01 percent. The results are estimated by
ordinary least square (OLS) with robust standard errors. Firm, industry
and year fixed effects are included to avoid endogeneity problems owing to
time-invariant and time-variant effects given by ηi, ηj and ηt.
3.4.2 Total Factor Productivity
Following the methodology of Amiti and Konings (2007), in a first step I
estimate the firm’s total factor productivity. It is defined as the residual of
the production function, and hence the difference between the actual value
Yit and the estimated value Yˆit. Therefore I consider a simple Cobb-Douglas
production function in the following way:
Yit = Ait(τ)L
γl
itK
γk
it , (3.2)
where Yit is measured by the value added of firm i at time t, Lit is the number
of employees in i at time t and Kit is the capital endowment of firm i at time
t. Except for labor, all variables are deflated.17 I estimate the following
log-log specification,
yit = γ0 + γ1lit + γ2kit + uit, (3.3)
for each country and each sector separately. It allows identification of the
firm’s TFP as mentioned above. For comparison, I proceed with the same
specification with revenue as dependent variable. Thus, the specification is
yit = γ0 + γ1lit + γ2kit + γ3mit + vit, (3.4)
where mit measures applied materials. All variables are given in natural logs.
17 I deflate in two different ways. On the one hand manufacturing and service sectors
are deflated by the producer price index and the consumer price index, respectively. On
the other hand I include year dummies while estimating TFP. The methods result in
similar outcomes, especially in the second step when the impact of tariffs on productivity
is considered.
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To obtain unbiased coefficients for the input variables the ordinary least
square (OLS) procedure is not very reliable (Olley and Pakes 1996, Levin-
sohn and Petrin 2003, Ackerberg et al. 2005). Yasar et al. (2008) show
that an estimation technique not controlling for simultaneity and the men-
tioned selection bias provides upwards-biased coefficients for labor, capital,
and materials. That is, the residuals uit in Equation 3.3 and vit in Equation
3.4 contain an unobserved productivity shock which has an impact on the
firm’s decision on the input factors. Unfortunately, the impact is unobserved
by econometricians. Firms, however, take the shock within their productiv-
ity process into account. The so-called transmitted component results in a
simultaneous causality problem between the explained and the explanatory
variables. This in turn induces biased coefficients by OLS related to a corre-
lation, especially between capital and the error term as stated by Levinsohn
and Petrin (2003, p.319ff).18 Owing to this problem the coefficients γˆl, γˆk,
and, in the case of revenue as dependent variable, γˆm, are estimated for each
two-digit ISIC classification by use of the Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) approach.
This estimation method avoids the simultaneity problem via intermediate
inputs in order to control for the unobserved productivity shock. Hence,
contrary to Olley and Pakes (1996), the Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) technique
does not require any measurement of investments. This is important be-
cause the underlying data within this study report many zero investments or
provide insufficient data on firm-level investments. In addition, Levinsohn
and Petrin (2003) argue that investments do not entirely catch productivity
shocks owing to adjustment costs. Therefore the authors suggest interme-
diate inputs as proxy to circumvent data-specific problems and to solve the
endogeneity problems. Similarly to the investment proxy, by assuming a
strictly monotonous relationship between the proxy (intermediate inputs),
18 See also Olley and Pakes (1996), Ackerberg et al. (2005), and Alvarez and Crespi
(2007).
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capital accumulation and the unobserved shock, the approach controls for
the transmitted component which has an influence on the firm’s decision it-
self (Olley and Pakes 1996, Pakes 1996). Hence, it is part of the error term
in Equations 3.3 and 3.4, respectively. Thus, the transmitted component νit
is specified by νit = ft(kit,mit). It allows me to estimate a consistent γˆl by
approximating the relationship between materials, capital and productivity
shock via a fourth-order polynomial in kit and mit. Considering value added
as dependent variable the estimation equation can be written as:
yit = γ1lit + θt(kit,mit) + uit (3.5)
defining
θt(kit,mit) = γ0 + γ2kit + ft(kit,mit). (3.6)
In a first step the elasticity of labor is obtained by approximating θt(kit,mit)
by a fourth-order polynomial. The consistent results provided in the first
stage allow me estimating a consistent coefficient on capital in a second step
by again approximating an unknown function of lagged values of θt.
19 That
is, the following equation is estimated:
yit − γ1lit = γ2kit + g(θt−1 − γ2ki,t−1) + uit + τit. (3.7)
Following the described procedure I implement overall material costs as
proxy to estimate a reliable production function. I concentrate more on value
added as dependent variable than firm revenue. The reason is that value
added is expected to give more serious results owing to the fact that within
the value added specifications material costs are used as pure proxy compared
with the revenue estimates where an additional coefficient is estimated for
materials. This avoids the danger of collinearity problems.20 Tangible fixed
19 In the case of revenue as dependent variable the elasticity of material inputs mit is
also obtained in the second step.
20 See also Ackerberg et al. (2005).
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assets are used for capital measurement and labor is measured by the number
of employees. Owing to the fact that the number of observations per sector in
the underlying panel of the 417 German and Austrian firms is very low, I do
not expect to obtain reliable results on industry level. For this reason I run
the Levinsohn-Petrin technique (2003) in two different ways. First, I do not
distinguish between each industry, using the whole underlying sample of 417
firms in the period from 1994 to 2003 to estimate the designated elasticities.
This method relies on the assumption that there are no productivity differ-
ences between the sectors. Owing to this weakness I alternatively estimate
the TFP in each two-digit sector for each country separately for over 209,000
German and more than 30,000 Austrian firms from 1994 to 2003. These
results are obtained from the Amadeus dataset (Bureau van Dijk 2005). For
comparative reasons the coefficients are also estimated by simple OLS. Ta-
bles T3.2 and T3.3 in the Appendix report the results obtained by OLS and
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) with value added as dependent variable Yit for
Germany and Austria.21
3.4.3 Tariff Rates: Construction and Descriptives
The data on tariff rates between parent firms and their Eastern European
affiliates are provided by the WITS database (World Bank and UNCTAD
2008). As shown by Mattoo and Subramanian (2008) it is important to
consider applied tariff rates.22 Output tariff rates are translated from the
product level into the four-digit ISIC industry classification as a simple av-
erage for each parent sector. Following Amiti and Konings (2007), to obtain
21 Owing to the fact that a huge amount of literature exists which criticizes Olley
and Pakes (1996) as well as Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) (e.g. Ackerberg et al. 2005,
Wooldridge 2005) I have to point out that this discussion is beyond the scope of my
analysis.
22 Contrary to bounded tariff rates the by countries effectively applied tariff rates show
an significant decrease from 1986 to 2006. This accompanies with increasing trade in
goods. See Mattoo and Subramanian (2008) as well as The Economist (2008).
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intra-firm and input tariff rates the effectively applied tariffs are weighted as
follows. The sample of 417 firms provides information on intra-firm imports
as well as intermediate inputs directly imported mainly for one year in the
period from 1997 to 2001. Therefore the sector-specific intra-firm weights,
v
1997/2001
jk , are calculated by the ratio of industry k’s imported products from
industry j to all imported products by industry k.23 Similarly, input tariffs
are calculated by weighting nominal tariff rates with the aggregated ratio of
imported inputs between each parent-affiliate relationship. That is, the value
of imported inputs of industry j in the production of a good in the parent
sector k over all inputs imported by sector k. This procedure allows me to
estimate the relationship between trade liberalization in terms of tariff cuts
at industry level and firm productivity. Formally, the weights are:
(Inttr)kt =
∑
j
v
1997/2001
jk ∗ (Outtr)jt , (3.8)
(Inptr)kt =
∑
j
w
1997/2001
jk ∗ (Outtr)jt . (3.9)
The intuition is as follows. The most important import industry for a parent
firm in sector k over all existing affiliate industries is weighted the most.24
Following Amiti and Konings (2007), tariff rates are calculated at an aggre-
gated industry level. The larger the tariff rate on a core good the larger is
its importance in analyzing the impact of trade liberalization.
The underlying data show that there are significant tariff reductions be-
tween Germany, Austria and Central and Eastern European region.25 Signif-
icant reductions are important because firms may respond to the liberalized
environment and this could lead to a change in the productivity structure,
23 All values are aggregated from plant level up to industry level and measured in Euros.
24 See Amiti and Konings (2007), p.1620.
25 See Appendix, Table T3.4 for the whole list of Eastern European countries considered
in this study.
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outside the firm as well as within the firm boundaries. From 1994 to 2003
the maximum rates of nominal tariffs for all reported products between the
parent EU countries (Germany and Austria, respectively) and Eastern Eu-
rope fell from 74 percent to 25 percent, a reduction by roughly 50 percentage
points. Figure 3.1 shows how the maximum values of effectively-applied tariff
rates change over time.
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
73.9 94.2 66.9 58.6 47.5 43.8 35.4 32.0 18.8 25.1
Note: Values are applied tariff rates (AHS) in percent, given as maximum rates of all four-digit affiliate/product level for a
total of 144 industries. Source is the WITS database. Author's calculations.
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Notes: Values are maximum applied tariff rates (AHS) in percent, calculated as simple average
of each three-digit affiliate level for a total of 70 industries.
Source: WITS database (World Bank and UNCTAD 2008).
Figure 3.1: Change in output tariffs (1994 - 2003)
This general finding also holds for an additional range of descriptive sum-
maries. As presented in Figure 3.2, the median, the interquartile range, and
the maximum values are also decreasing over time. The firms may respond
to this variation over all products in terms of access to foreign technology
and greater variety, and therefore a change in their productivity. Owing to
liberalized trade, tariff variation is reduced over time.26 In this case partic-
26 See also Luong (2008), p.16ff.
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ularly, firms respond to these tariff cuts, when the parent industry imports
from more than one affiliate industry. In the underlying data a parent indus-
try at the three-digit classification imports on average from three different
three-digit affiliate sectors.
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Source: Wits database, author's calculations.
Source: WITS database (World Bank and UNCTAD 2008). Author’s calculations.
Figure 3.2: Output tariff variation over time (1994 - 2003)
Tariff rates with the largest initial level in 1994 incur the greatest cut from
trade liberalization compared with 2003. Figure F3.1 in the Appendix shows
the graph on all existing three-digit industry levels. There is a significant
negative correlation which affirms the large tariff reductions of initial tariff
rates. Moreover, all tariffs are close to the 45-degree line. This confirms
that almost all industries show considerable tariff cuts by at least 50 percent
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within the considered period.
Notes: The sources are the WITS database, the AMADEUS database, and the Chair for International Economics, University 
of Munich. The values are given on a 3-digit parent-industry level. Due to large outliers the upper 5%-quantile of the revenue 
summary is excluded in each year presented.
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Notes: Values are given on a three-digit parent-industry level. Owing to large outliers the upper
5th percentile firms related to the revenue variable is excluded.
Sources: WITS database (World Bank and UNCTAD 2008), Amadeus database (Bureau van
Dijk 2005), and Chair for International Economics, University of Munich. Author’s calculations.
Figure 3.3: Tariff rates and labor productivity
These findings suggest a relationship between tariff cuts and a productiv-
ity boost on the firm level. Figure 3.3 shows a negative link between tariffs
and productivity. In the sample period from 1994 to 2003 intra-firm tariff
rates decreased while labor productivity of German and Austrian firms in-
vesting in Eastern Europe mainly increased during these phases. The same
finding is obtained by considering tariff rates and productivity measured in
real value added per employee. Figure 3.4 presents the outcome.27
27 The findings hold also for both countries Germany and Austria separately. Values
are deflated by the corresponding producer price index provided by the German Federal
Statistical Office (2008c) and Austrian National Bank (OeNB 2008), respectively.
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Note: Sources are the Wits database, the Amadeus database, and the Chair for International Economics, University of
Munich. Values are given at a simple average over all parent firms per year. Owing to large outliers the upper 5%-quantile of
the value added summary is excluded. Author's calculations.
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Notes: Values are given at a simple average over all parent firms on a three-digit industry level
per year. Owing to large outliers the upper 5 percent quantile of the value added distribution
is excluded.
Sources: WITS database (World Bank and UNCTAD 2008), Amadeus database (Bureau van
Dijk 2005), and Chair for International Economics, University of Munich. Author’s calculations.
Figure 3.4: Tariff rates and real value added
Another aspect of the relationship between increasing productivity and
decreasing input tariffs is documented in Figure 3.5. Firms are ranked by
their labor productivity, whereby a low-level firm is in the lower 25th per-
centile, a medium firm ranges between 25 and 75th, and a high productivity
is in the upper 25th percentile. The figure shows that more productive cor-
porations are confronted with, on average, lower input tariff rates. Hence,
German and Austrian parent firms have liberalized access to foreign technol-
ogy, greater variety and lower-priced intermediate inputs which in turn may
boost their productivity.
Highly productive corporations are confronted with lower tariff rates com-
pared with low-productive firms. Whether this in turn incentivizes intra-firm
imports is shown in Figure 3.6. Low versus high productivity is determined
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Note: Productivity is measured by firms' revenue-employee ratio for all given parent firms in each three-digit
industry. Low productivity means firms in the lower 25%- percentile, high productivity firms in the upper
25% percentile. Tariffs on inputs are the weighted sum of the sectoral average tariff rates on imported inputs
from all corresponding Eastern European industries affiliated to the parent industry (three-digit ISIC
classification). Data sources are the WITS database, Amadeus and the Chair for International Economics,
University of Munich. Author's calculations.
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Notes: Productivity is measured by firms’ revenue-employee ratio for all given parent firms
in each hree-digit in ustry. Low productivity means firms in the lower 25 h perce tile, high
productivity firms in the upper 25th percentile. Tariffs on inputs are the weighted sum of
the sectoral average tariff rates on imported inputs from all corresponding Eastern European
industries affiliated to the parent industry (three-digit ISIC classification).
Sources: WITS database (World Bank and UNCTAD 2008), Amadeus database (Bureau van
Dijk 2005) nd Chair for International Economics, University of Munich. Author’s calculations.
Figure 3.5: Input tariffs and labor productivity
by the firm’s median labor productivity measured in real value added per
employee. The figure suggests that less productive corporations have lower
intra-firm imports in percent of parent sales compared with firms in the highly
productive segment. It suggests that corporations practicing offshoring via
significant tariff cuts play an important role in determining the impact of
trade liberalization on productivity. Therefore, liberalized trade in terms
of lower tariff rates lowers the price of offshoring and boosts productivity.28
These effects take place outside the firm boundaries and within the firm.
28 See Amiti and Konings (2007), p.1614ff.
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Note: Intra-firm imports are given at parent firm level in percent of parent sales. Productivity is low if the
firm's real value added per worker is equal or below the median firm and it is high if the firm’s real value
added per employee is equal or larger than the median corporation. Source is the WITS database and the
Chair for International Economics, University of Munich. Author's calculations.
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Notes: Intra-firm imports are given at parent firm level as a percentage of parent
sales. Productivity is low if the firm’s real value added per worker is equal or below
the median firm. Contrary, it is high if the firm’s real value added per employee is
equal or larger than the median corporation.
Sources: WITS database (World Bank and UNCTAD 2008) and Chair for Inter-
national Economics, University of Munich. Author’s calculations.
Figure 3.6: Tariff rates and offshoring
3.5 Empirical Results
This section analyzes the impact of trade liberalization on firm-level produc-
tivity. The total factor productivity having been obtained, Equation 3.1 is
estimated by simple OLS with fixed effects. The dependent variable is the
natural log of TFP calculated by using the firm’s real value added. In this
first set of calculations the productivity estimations are not run for each sec-
tor separately. That is, the coefficients for labor and capital are calculated
using the set of 417 firms. To produce valid statistical inferences, the errors
are corrected for heteroskedasticity.
Table 3.1 reports the results. Column (1) suggests that an increase in
the output tariff reduces the firm productivity. The sign of the coefficient for
tariffs is negative and significant. A decrease of ten percentage points in the
tariff rate improves productivity by 0.54 percent. Column (2) additionally
includes intra-firm tariffs. The coefficients for both tariff rates are negative
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and highly significant. The coefficient for output tariff falls, however, when
the intra-firm tariff is included. It seems that the productivity effect through
access to foreign technology has an important impact. Ignoring this variable
would lead to a biased coefficient for the output tariff measure. The out-
come suggests the existence of both effects: the competition effect described
by Melitz (2003) as well as productivity-improving effects of foreign qual-
ity (Grossman and Helpman 1991), greater variety (Feenstra et al. 1992)
and access to products at a reduced rate. The negative impact is larger for
foreign-owned firms as reported in column (3). The largest negative effect on
productivity is given by the coefficient for the input tariff rate. The positive
impact of trade liberalization on productivity is smaller in the final market
compared with intermediate inputs. The coefficient for input tariff is, how-
ever, not significant. Column (5) also reports an insignificant coefficient for
input tariff rates but the impact of input tariff and the interaction with im-
porting firms IM is as expected. In line with Amiti and Konings (2007), the
effect is greatest for importing German and Austrian parent firms.
Table 3.2 uses the more reliable natural log of the productivity mea-
sure TFP calculated separately for each industry over 209,000 and 30,000
firms located in Germany and Austria, respectively. The set of the first four
specifications shows an insignificant coefficient for the output tariff. This
insignificant impact is in line with Amiti and Konings (2007) and can be
explained by the framework described by Luong (2008). Inclusion of the
intra-firm tariff rate, however, shows a negative and significant impact. A
ten percentage point decline in the tariff rate raises productivity by 0.55
percent. Controlling for foreign-owned firms FO, column (4) suggests that
having easier access to foreign products increases productivity. This impact
is stronger for foreign-owned firms by 0.4 percent.29 It indicates that a ten
percentage point increase in the intra-firm tariff rate results in almost a 1
29 A ten percentage point increase in intra-firm tariff rate is assumed.
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Table 3.1: Tariff rates and TFP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
tariffsj -0.0540*** -0.0518*** -0.0513*** -0.0518*** -0.0544***
[0.0051] [0.0050] [0.0050] [0.0050] [0.0050]
intra-firm tariffj   -0.0537*** 0.0418 -0.0535*** -0.0666***
[0.0197] [0.0317] [0.0198] [0.0218]
input tariffj -0.0587 0.0047
[0.0744] [0.0880]
FO 0.2460*
[0.1265]
FO * intra-firm tariffj -0.0968***
[0.0299]
IM 0.0066
[0.0251]
IM * input tariffj -0.1244
[0.1357]
fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Adj. R2 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
Observations 2083 2079 2079 2079 1745
Dependent variable: tfp it (real value added)
Note: A constant term as well as year, country and firm fixed effects is included throughout all specifications.
Robust standard errors in brackets. The dependent variable is the total factor productivity at the plant level [i]
in industry [j] and year [t]. Tfp is obtained by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) with real value added as dependent
variable. A constant technology for all industries is assumed. Tariffs are sectoral tariff rates at the parent
industry level. Intra-firm tariff is the sum of sectoral average tariffs weighted with imported goods from an
affiliate industry for all imported goods. Input tariff is the sum of the secotoral average tariff rates weighted
with the industries' mean of imported inputs in percent of parents' sale. IM is a dummy equal to one if the
value of imported goods between the parent firm and its affiliate is greater than zero. FO is a dummy equal to
one if the global ultimate owner is a foreigner. The number of the corporate shareholders worldwide is
included as control throughout all specifications. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%-
levels, respectively.
s: A constant term as w ll as year, country, and firm fixed effects are included through-
out all the specifications. Robust stan ard e rors are in brackets. The dependent variab e is
the total factor productivity at the plant level i in industry j and year t. TFP i obtained
by Levinsoh a d Petrin (2003) with real value added as dependent variabl . A consta t
technology for all industries is a sumed. Tariffs are sectoral tariff ra es at the parent indus-
try level j. Intra-fir tariff is the s m o sec oral average tariffs w ighted with impor ed
goods from each r lated affiliate industry. I put tariff is the sum of the sectoral average
tariff rates weighte wi h the industries’ mean of imported inputs in percent of parents’ sale.
IM s a dummy equal to one if the value of imported goods between t e parent firm and
its affiliate is greater t an zero. FO s a dummy equal o one f th global ultimate owner
is a fo igner. The number of the corporate shareholders worldwide is included as control
throughout all the specifications. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent
level, respectively.
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percent boost in the firm productivity. At this time inclusion of the input
tariff rate shows a negative and significant coefficient. If input tariff rates are
reduced by ten percentage points the access to foreign intermediates raises
productivity by more than 1.2 percent. Column (7) reports a greater impact
of reducing input tariff rates compared with intra-firm tariffs. Although the
impact for importing firms is larger than for non-importing firms column (8)
reports only insignificant results. That is, contrary to Amiti and Konings
(2007), there is unfortunately no single evidence of productivity gains from
greater variety or learning effects controlled for by the interaction between
importing firms IM and the intra-firm tariff rate. An F-test showing that
all variables controlling for any type of tariff rates are different from zero is,
however, significant.
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Owing to the fact that the data consist of German and Austrian firms,
Table 3.3 reports the results for the country differences. The country dummy
is equal to one if the firm is located in Germany and zero if the observation
relates to Austria. All three specifications show that productivity gains from
liberalized trade are greater for Austria than for Germany. This holds for
all three types of tariff rates. Again, the impact of reducing intra-firm tariff
rates is greater compared with the output tariff coefficients.
Amiti and Konings (2007) give an additional interpretation for trade lib-
eralization. They argue that reduced tariff rates “lower the price of interna-
tional outsourcing” (Amiti and Konings 2007, p.1614, fn 11). In this context,
lower tariffs increase offshoring and this in turn boosts firm productivity.
Go¨rg et al. (2008) also study the impact of international outsourcing on pro-
ductivity.30 In order to investigate the effect the results obtained stepwise
for the offshoring channel are reported in Table 3.4.
In columns (1) to (3) offshoring measured as intra-firm imports in percent
of parent sales is regressed on tariffs. Including controls, column (3) of Ta-
ble 3.4 shows that a falling output tariff rate raises the offshoring activities.
Column (4) suggests that offshoring in turn is positively linked with firm
productivity. Increasing intra-firm imports significantly raises the firm’s real
value added. If increasing firm-level productivity is explained by greater off-
shoring and therefore by greater variety of and easier access to foreign goods,
the coefficient for tariff rates is expected to be insignificant or equal to zero.
Column (5) suggests that both offshoring and trade liberalization have a sig-
nificant impact. The sign of the coefficient for intra-firm imports is positive,
as expected. The impact, however, is reduced. That is, trade liberalization
incentivizes offshoring and this in turn raises productivity. Besides that, a
positive effect of reduced output tariffs on productivity remains. This is also
30 For a detailed discussion on the existence of further empirical studies, see Go¨rg et
al. (2008), p.671ff.
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Table 3.3: Country differences
(1) (2) (3)
tariffsj -0.2183*** -0.0837** -0.0838**
[0.0397] [0.0364] [0.0366]
tariffsj * country 0.1831*** 0.0800** 0.0803**
[0.0298] [0.0379] [0.0380]
intra-firm tariffj -0.1603*** -0.1602***
[0.0388] [0.0389]
intra-firm tariffj * country 0.1210*** 0.1215***
[0.0434] [0.0436]
input tariffj -0.1432
[0.1153]
input tariffj * country 0.0682
[0.1226]
country 0.3156*** 0.1349 0.2219**
[0.0680] [0.0902] [0.0971]
fixed effects yes yes yes
Adj. R2 0.8 0.8 0.8
Observations 1669 1665 1665
Dependent variable: sectoral tfp it  (real value added)
Note: A constant term as well as year, industry and firm fixed effects is included
throughout all specifications. Robust standard errors in brackets. The dependent variable is
the sectoral total factor productivity at the plant level [i] in industry [j] and year [t]. Tfp is 
obtained by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) for each sector separately with real value added
as dependent variable. Tariffs are sectoral tariff rates at the parent industry level. Intra-
firm tariff is the sum of sectoral average tariff rates weighted with imported goods from
one affiliate industry over all imported goods. Input-tariff is the sum of the sectoral
average tariff rates weighted with the intermediate inputs ratio imported from one Eastern
European affiliate industry over all corresponding intermediates. Country is a dummy
equal to one if the parent firm is German and equal to zero if the parent firm is Austrian. *,
**, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
Notes: A constant term as well as year, industry, and firm fixed effects is included through-
out all specifications. Robust standard errors are in brackets. The dependent variable is
the sectoral total factor productivity at the plant level i in industry j and year t. TFP is
obtained by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) for each sector separately with real value added as
dependent variable. Tariffs ar sectoral tariff rates at the parent industry l vel. Intra-firm
tariff is the sum of sectoral ave age tariff r tes weighted with imported goods from one
affiliate industry over all imported goods. Input-tariff is the sum of the sectoral average
tariff rates weighted with the intermediate inputs ratio imported from one Eastern Euro-
pean affiliate industry over all corresponding intermediates. Country is a dummy equal to
one if the parent firm is German and, contrary, equal to zero if the parent fir is Austrian.
*, **, *** ind cat significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.
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Table 3.5: Contribution of trade liberalization (in percent)
tariff rate β̂ β̂Austria β̂Germany
output tariff 0.3 - 0.4 0.3 - 0.8 0.03 - 0.4
intra-firm tariff 0.5 - 0.7 0.6 - 1.6 0.4 - 0.6
input tariff 0.6 - 1.6 1.4 - 2.1 0.8 - 1.2
Notes: The table summarizes the average effect of a ten percentage point
reduction of each mentioned tariff rate on firm-level productivity. Author’s
calculations.
affirmed by the following specifications (6) to (8). Inclusion of the intra-firm
tariff variable suggests that a reduced tariff rate incentivizes offshoring and
raises productivity. The impact of the intra-firm tariff itself is insignificant.
The coefficient for offshoring is positive and significant whereas the impact
of tariffs is reduced.
A summary of all findings for a ten percentage point reduction in the
studied types of tariffs is provided by Table 3.5. First, the contribution of
trade liberalization to productivity is smaller for Germany than for Austria
for all tariff types. Second, in both countries, Germany and Austria, the
contribution of a reduction in intra-firm and input tariffs is larger compared
with lowering output tariffs. This means that lowering the intra-firm tariff
rate by ten percentage points increases German productivity on average by
0.5 percent and Austrian productivity by more than 1 percent. Finally, the
effect is greater for multinationals in both countries.
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3.6 Robustness
Owing to robustness concerns of the empirical findings, several measurement
and specification issues can be presented in this section. The results reported
in Table 3.6 are estimated by use of the real value added per employee as
measurement for the firm’s productivity. Beside the impact of output tariffs
all coefficients for trade liberalization have the expected influence. Again,
the impact of input tariffs is greater compared with lowering intra-firm tariff
rates. Multinationals benefit more from lowering tariff rates than domestic
firms. However, inserting the input tariff rate to the specification including
output and intra-firm tariffs, show a statistically insignificant coefficient on
the input variable.
Changing the dependent variable through the firm’s operating revenue
suggests that lower tariff rates increase the firm’s revenue. Throughout all
specifications the capital-to-labor ratio, the firm size, and intermediate ma-
terials are included to analyze the impact on an alternative productivity
measure. The results suggest that trade liberalization has a positive impact.
The effect is largest for the input tariff rate, followed by intra-firm rates and
the output tariffs. Again, the coefficient for the input tariff rate itself is
insignificant. Table 3.7 presents the estimates.
Tables 3.8 and 3.9 affirm the finding that there are significant differences
between Germany and Austria. It holds for both measures real value added
per employee and real revenue per employee, respectively, that generally the
effect for Austria is larger. The exception in both tables, however, is given
by a larger impact of lower input tariffs in Germany than in Austria. The
F-test on all included tariff variables in both columns (3) suggests that the
impacts are significantly different from zero. Moreover, Table 3.9 reports
that the difference in lower intra-firm tariff rates is not as large as shown
before. Nevertheless, reducing the tariff rates increases labor productivity.
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Table 3.7: Robustness: Trade liberalization and operating revenue
(1) (2) (3) (4)
tariffsj -0.0379*** -0.0359*** -0.0378*** -0.0359***
[0.0053] [0.0052] [0.0053] [0.0052]
intra-firm tariffj -0.0677*** -0.0674***
[0.0218] [0.0220]
input tariffj -0.1054 -0.0647
[0.0763] [0.0794]
ln (K/L)i 0.4020*** 0.3914*** 0.4027*** 0.3920***
[0.0536] [0.0537] [0.0536] [0.0537]
ln (L)i 0.6345*** 0.6307*** 0.6357*** 0.6315***
[0.0530] [0.0526] [0.0531] [0.0527]
ln (materials)i 0.1723*** 0.1686*** 0.1712*** 0.1680***
[0.0340] [0.0344] [0.0341] [0.0345]
fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Adj. R2 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
Observations 1527 1523 1523 1523
Dependent variable: ln (revenue) it
Note: A constant term as well as year, country and firm fixed effects is included throughout all
specifications . Robust standard errors in brackets. The dependent variable is the natural log of
real revenue at the plant level [i] in industry [j] and year [t]. Tariffs are sectoral tariff rates at the
three-digit ISIC parent industry classification. Intra-firm tariff is the sum of sectoral average
tariff rates weighted with imported goods from one affiliate industry over all imported goods.
Input tariff is the sum of the sectoral average tariff rates weighted with intermediate inputs
imported from one Eastern European affiliate industry over all corresponding intermediates.
Ln(K/L) , is the log of capital over employees. Ln(L) i is the natural log of the number of
employees in the parent firm, ln(materials) is the log of imported goods in th euros. *, **, ***
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
s: A cons ant term as well as year, country, and firm fixed effects are incl ded
throughout all the pecifications. Robust standard rrors in b ack ts. The dependent
variabl is the natural log of real revenue at the plant level i in industry j and year t.
Tariffs are sectoral tariff rates at the three-digit ISIC parent industry classification.
Intra-firm tariff is the sum of sectoral average tariff rates weighted with imported
goods from one affiliate industry over all imported goods. Input tariff is the sum of
the sectoral average tariff rates weighted with intermediate inputs imported from one
Eastern European affiliate industry over all corresponding intermediates. Ln(K/L) is
the log of capital over employees. Ln(L) is the natural log of the number of employees
in the parent firm, and Ln(materials) is the log of imported goods in th euros. *, **,
*** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.
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In general the effect is lower compared with the results of Table 3.3.
The findings also hold when the data are separated into a manufactur-
ing and services classification. The results reported in Table T3.5 in the
Appendix show a significant and positive impact of falling tariffs on produc-
tivity in the manufacturing sector. A ten percentage point decrease raises
productivity by 0.34 percent. As shown before, the impact is greater for
intra-firm tariff rates. Trade liberalization increases firm productivity by
more than 0.6 percent. The coefficient for the input tariff is not significant.
Moreover, column (4) presents a negative link between the number of share-
holders and the firm’s productivity. Column (5) suggests that multinationals
benefit more from trade liberalization than purely domestic firms. This also
holds for the service sectors. The output tariff rate, however, is no longer sig-
nificant. The coefficients for the intra-firm tariff variable suggest that tariffs
falling by ten percentage points raise productivity by more than 2 percent.
Unfortunately, in the service sector subsample the number of observations
drops significantly.
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Table 3.8: Robustness: Country differences and value added
(1) (2) (3)
tariffsj -0.1267** -0.0361 -0.0361
[0.0529] [0.0540] [0.0540]
tariffsj * country 0.1078** 0.0222 0.0222
[0.0514] [0.0525] [0.0526]
intra-firm tariffj -0.1560** -0.1561**
[0.0629] [0.0630]
intra-firm tariffj * country 0.1008* 0.1025*
[0.0598] [0.0598]
input tariffj -0.2109*
[0.1133]
input tariffj * country -0.0247
[0.1567]
country -0.2237*** -0.3692** -0.3698**
[0.0765] [0.1660] [0.1661]
fixed effects yes yes yes
Adj. R2 0.8 0.8 0.8
Observations 1851 1847 1847
Dependent variable: ln(real value added/L) it
Note: A constant term as well as year, industry and firm fixed effects is included
throughout all specifications. Robust standard errors in brackets. The dependent variable is
the firm's real value added per employee. Tariffs are sectoral tariff rates at the parent
industry level. Intra-firm tariff is the sum of sectoral average tariff rates weighted with
imported goods from one affiliate industry over all imported goods. Input tariff is the sum
of the sectoral average tariff rates weighted with intermediate inputs imported from one
Eastern European affiliate industry over all corresponding intermediates. Country is a
dummy equal to one if the parent firm is German and equal to zero if the parent firm is
Austrian. Additionally, the natural log of turnover is included as a control variable in each
specification. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Notes: A co stant term as ell as year, industry, fir fixed effects are included
throughout all the specifications. Robust standard errors are in brackets. The dependent
variable is the firm’s real value added per employee. Tariffs are sectoral tariff rates at the
parent industry level. Intra-firm tariff is the sum of sectoral average tariff rates weighted
with imported goods fro one affiliate industry over all imported goods. Input tariff is the
sum of the sectoral average tariff rates weighted with intermediate inputs imported from
one Eastern European affiliate industry over all corresponding intermediates. Country is
a dummy equal to one if the parent firm is German and equal to zero if the parent firm is
Austrian. Additionally, the natural log of turnover is included as a control variable in each
specification. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.
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Table 3.9: Robustness: Country differences and operating revenue
(1) (2) (3)
tariffsj -0.1063*** -0.1019*** -0.1027***
[0.0223] [0.0304] [0.0303]
tariffsj * country 0.0738*** 0.0719** 0.0727**
[0.0219] [0.0305] [0.0304]
intra-firm tariffj -0.0635* -0.0636*
[0.0363] [0.0363]
intra-firm tariffj * country 0.0001 0.0007
[0.0397] [0.0398]
input tariffj -0.109
[0.0739]
input tariffj * country -0.0286
[0.1317]
ln (K/L) 0.2954*** 0.2907*** 0.2911***
[0.0432] [0.0432] [0.0432]
ln (L) -0.2664*** -0.2661*** -0.2655***
[0.0378] [0.0378] [0.0378]
country -0.6329*** -0.0243 -0.0285
[0.1503] [0.1820] [0.1811]
fixed effects yes yes yes
Adj. R2 0.8 0.8 0.8
Observations 2083 2079 2079
Dependent variable: ln(real revenue/L) it
Note: A constant term as well as year, industry and firm fixed effects is included
throughout all specifications. Robust standard errors in brackets. The dependent
variable is the natural log of real revenue over employees. Tariffs are sectoral tariff
rates at the parent industry level. Intra-firm-tariff is the sum of sectoral average tariff
rates weighted with imported goods from one affiliate industry over all imported goods.
Input-tariff is the sum of the sectoral average tariff rates weighted with intermediate
inputs imported from one Eastern European affiliate industry over all corresponding
intermediates. Country is a dummy equal to one if the parent firm is German and equal
to zero if the parent firm is Austrian. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels, respectively.
Notes: A constant term as well as year, industry and firm fixed effects are included
throughout all the specifications. Robust standard errors are in brackets. The dependent
variable is the natural log of real revenue over employees. Tariffs are sectoral tariff
rates at the parent industry level. Intra-firm-tariff is the sum of sectoral average tariff
rates weig ted with imported goods f om one ffiliate industry over all imported goods.
Input-tariff is the su of the sectoral average tariff rates weighted with intermediate
inputs imported from one Eastern European affiliate industry over all corresponding
intermediates. Country is a dummy equal to one if the parent firm is German and,
contrary, equal to zero if the parent firm is Austrian. *, **, *** indicate significance at
the 10, 5, nd 1 percent level, respectively.
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3.7 Conclusion
Even though there is a huge amount of literature on trade liberalization,
empirical studies on liberalized trade in terms of both output and input
tariffs in firm productivity are rare. Moreover, there is no detailed study
on the relationship between intra-firm tariffs and productivity in Germany
and Austria which considers the directly preceding periods of the Eastern
European enlargement. This chapter argues, however, that it is important,
especially for Germany and Austria as two of the countries most affected
by the eastern enlargement. Therefore, the underlying analysis tries to say
to what extent tariff reductions for Central and Eastern Europe lead to a
boost in German and Austrian firm-level productivity. More precisely, fol-
lowing Amiti and Konings (2007), the chapter considers the determinants
of firm-level total factor productivity. Obtaining productivity by using the
Levinsohn and Petrin technique (2003) that corrects for unobserved produc-
tivity shocks, a unique matching of intra-firm import data finds that tariff
reductions significantly increase total factor productivity. The size of the
coefficient depends strongly in both countries on the type of tariffs: input
tariff rates show the largest effects, followed by intra-firm and output tariff
rates. The impact of a ten percentage point tariff cut ranges between 0.3
and 2 percent. The effect for Austria is larger than for Germany. The results
also suggest that trade liberalization makes offshoring cheaper and this in
turn increases productivity. This channel, among others, is hypothesized by
Amiti and Konings (2007) for Indonesian firms. This study is the only one
using data relating to Germany, Austria and Eastern Europe. Moreover, it
is the only one which distinguishes between tariffs on intra-firm imports and
tariffs on intermediate inputs. The results are in line with findings for other
country studies and robust to a wide range of tests varying the dependent
variable and the underlying estimation specifications.
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Appendix to Chapter 3
Tables and Figures
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Figure F3.1: Change in initial tariff levels
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Table T3.2: German productivity estimations (industry level)
industry capital employees capital employees
14: Other mining and quarrying 0.242 0.766 0.591 0.201
15: Manufacturing - food products and beverages 0.281 0.709 0.275 0.608
17: Manufacturing - textiles 0.158 0.709 0.49 0.588
20: Manufacturing - wood and products of wood 0.095 0.931 0.056 0.591
21: Manufacturing - pulp, paper and paper products 0.232 0.72 0.469 0.41
22: Publishing, printing, reproduction of rec. media 0.182 0.734 0.179 0.701
24: Manufacturing - chemicals and chemical products 0.114 0.886 0.028 0.607
25: Manufacturing - rubber and plastic products 0.321 0.554 0.069 0.542
26: Manufacturing - non-metallic mineral products 0.248 0.625 0.281 0.596
27: Manufacturing - basic metals 0.27 0.685 0.342 0.527
28: Manufacturing - fabricated metal products 0.212 0.71 0.1 0.534
29: Manufacturing - machinery and equipment n.e.c. 0.161 0.776 0.382 0.695
31: Manufacturing - electrical machinery 0.151 0.815 0.402 0.685
32: Manufacturing - radio, television, communication 0.4 0.6 0.257 0.706
33: Manufacturing - medical, precision, optical instruments 0.204 0.758 0.065 0.733
34: Manufacturing - motor vehicles, trailers, semi-trailers 0.286 0.668 0.381 0.648
35: Manufacturing - transport equipment 0.188 0.745 0.404 0.593
36: Manufacturing - furniture, n.e.c. 0.182 0.753 0.242 0.751
40: Electricity, gas and water supply 0.308 0.571 0.395 0.367
45: Construction 0.223 0.733 0.186 0.738
50: Sale, repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 0.256 0.633 0.28 0.43
51: Wholesale trade and commission trade 0.155 0.672 0.165 0.669
52: Retail trade 0.201 0.731 0.068 0.705
60: Land transport, transport via pipelines 0.423 0.395 0.311 0.585
62: Air transport 0.09 0.973 0.444 0.011
64: Post and telecommunications 0.186 0.818 0.387 0.921
67: Activities auxiliary to financial intermediation 0.267 0.369 0.587 0.192
72: Computer and related activities 0.23 0.744 0.196 0.784
74: Other business activities                                                         0.23             0.424             0.135            0.608
90: Sewage and refuse disposal 0.175 0.54 0.004 0.6
Dependent variable: real added value it
OLS Levpet
Note: The dependent variable is the firm's real added value at plant level [i] in industry [j] and year [t]. All variables are given in
natural logs. A constant term as well as year dummies is included throughout all specifications. The coefficients for each industry
are obtained from simple OLS estimations and Levinsohn-Petrin estimations (2003), respectively. Calculations run at a two-digit
ISIC industry level.
te: The dependent variable is the firm’s real added value at plant level i in industry j and
year t. All variables are given in natural logs. A constant term as well as year dummies are
included throughout all the specifications. The coefficients for each industry are obtained from
simple OLS estimations and Levinsohn-Petrin estimations (2003), respectively. Calculations
run at a two-digit ISIC industry level. Source: Amadeus (Bureau van Dijk 2005). Author’s
calculations.
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Table T3.3: Austrian productivity estimations (industry level)
industry capital employees capital employees
15: Manufacturing - food products and beverages 0.438 0.638 0.215 0.702
17: Manufacturing - textiles 0.093 0.924 0.619 0.691
20: Manufacturing - wood and products of wood 0.01 0.393 0.456 0.609
26: Manufacturing - non-metallic mineral products 0.152 0.864 0.559 0.654
27: Manufacturing - basic metals 0.333 0.647 0.711 0.631
28: Manufacturing - fabricated metal products 0.116 0.903 0.51 0.724
29: Manufacturing - machinery and equipment n.e.c. 0.049 0.893 0.376 0.813
32: Manufacturing - radio, television, communication 0.236 0.665 0.585 0.809
36: Manufacturing - furniture, n.e.c. 0.19 0.864 0.657 0.322
40: Electricity, gas and water supply 0.688 0.268 0.49 0.597
45: Construction 0.26 0.699 0.206 0.502
50: Sale, repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 0.26 0.614 0.419 0.36
51: Wholesale trade and commission trade 0.179 0.671 0.423 0.113
52: Retail trade 0.15 0.806 0.309 0.886
60: Land transport, transport via pipelines 0.181 0.921 0.398 0.663
63: Supporting and auxiliary transport activities 0.146 0.797 0.607 0.028
67: Activities auxiliary to financial intermediation 0.442 0.27 0.502 0.123
74: Other business activities 0.165 0.476 0.504 0.425
Dependent variable: real added value it
OLS Levpet
Note: The dependent variable is the firm's real added value at plant level [i] in industry [j] and year [t]. All variables are given in
natural logs. A constant term as well as year dummies is included throughout all specifications. The coefficients for each
industry are obtained from simple OLS estimations and Levinsohn-Petrin estimations (2003), respectively. Calculations run at a
two-digit ISIC industry level.
ote: The d pendent variable is the firm’s real added value at pl nt level i in industry j and
year t. All variables are given in natural logs. A constant term as well as year dummies are
included throughout all the specifications. The coefficients for each industry are obtained from
simple OLS estimations and Levinsohn-Petrin estimations (2003), respectively. Calculations
run at a two-digit ISIC industry level.
Source: Amadeus (Bureau van Dijk 2005). Author’s calculations.
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Table T3.4: Baltic, Central and Eastern European countries
Albania Latvia
Armenia Lithuania
Azerbaijan Macedonia, FYR
Belarus Moldova
Bosnia and Herzigovina Poland
Bulgaria Romania
Croatia Russian Federation
Czech Republic Serbia and Montenegro
Estonia Slovak Republic
Georgia Slovenia
Hungary Tajikistan
Kazakhstan Ukraine
Kyrgyz Republic Uzbekistan
Latvia
Source: University of Munich, Chair for International Economics.
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Chapter 4
Exports and Productivity: An
Empirical Analysis of German
and Austrian Firm-Level
Performance
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4.1 Introduction
Investigating the causal relationship between exports and productivity is not
new. However, there is a crucial difference between past and more recent
studies. The early literature considers comovement between exporting and
productivity on the macro-level using aggregate data. For instance, Kunst
and Marin (1989) and Marin (1992) analyze for Germany and Austria, re-
spectively, whether exports Granger cause productivity or productivity has
an impact on exports. For Germany, Kunst and Marin (1989) find that ex-
port growth causes productivity gains, whereas for the Austrian analysis,
Marin (1992) has to reject the mentioned link.
More recent literature on the interaction between exporting and firm per-
formance argues that there is interdependence between the two of them on
the micro-level. That is, the literature reveals that only the most produc-
tive firms self-select themselves into the export market and that exporting
improves firm performance. From a theoretical point of view, Clerides et al.
(1998) argue that only the highly productive firms are able to cover their
sunk costs and this in turn allows them to export. This well-known relation-
ship between exporting and firm-level productivity is also modeled by Melitz
(2003). He shows that, due to fixed costs, only the most productive firms
start to export. This in turn raises productivity at the industry level because
less efficient firms have to leave the market. The results suggest that a higher
productivity increases the probability of exporting due to additional distri-
bution, marketing, or production costs (Wagner 2007). Therefore, causality
runs from productivity to exports.
However, exporting can also generate higher firm-level productivity via
learning-by-exporting (Clerides et al. 1998). For instance, derived from
the management and policy literature, Arnold and Hussinger (2005, p.223)
mention that technological and managerial inputs from foreign contacts boost
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firm performance. Closely related to this argument, Wagner (2007) states
that an international knowledge flow increases the exporter’s performance.
Involvement in export markets and therefore serving a larger market offers the
possibility to exploit additional economies of scale and to overcome domestic
reductions in demand (Wagner 2002). Further, intense competition may lead
exporters to faster improvements (Wagner 2002), force firms to keep costs
low (Kunst and Marin 1989), and give greater incentives to innovate (Holmes
and Schmitz 2001, Kunst and Marin 1989). In other words, exporting boosts
firm-level productivity.
This chapter tries to find empirical evidence of the association between
exporting and firm performance. That is, it deals with the question of an un-
derlying causality. It focuses on the causal effect that exporters become more
productive compared with non-exporters. For this study, a unique matching
of micro-level data for German and Austrian firms in the period from 1994 to
2003 is employed. The results suggest that German and Austrian exporters
are more productive by on average 40 percent compared with non-exporters.
Moreover, contrary to other prominent empirical findings in the literature,
the study reveals that exporting additionally raises the annual average pro-
ductivity growth by approximately 1 to 1.5 percent. The robustness of the
results relies, beside other techniques, mainly on an instrumental variable ap-
proach. This analysis suggests that exporting as well as the export intensity
(export-to-sales ratio) boost labor productivity and total factor productiv-
ity (TFP) significantly. In this context, estimating TFP follows Levinsohn
and Petrin (2003) to circumvent endogeneity problems as a result of unob-
served productivity shocks. Therefore, the results allow the conclusion that
both directions hold: more productive firms self-select themselves into export
markets and exporting to foreign markets boosts firm-level productivity.
The underlying methodology is based on empirical studies focusing on
the distinction between causality and a simple correlation of export status
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and productivity. The first to mention here is that of Bernard and Jensen
(1999). They use labor productivity as well as TFP to find differences be-
tween exporters and non-exporters. The underlying technique is based on a
feasible chronological dependency between exporting and productivity.1 The
authors argue that their results suggest that there is more evidence of self-
selection than of productivity growth by exports. A similar result is found
in another study by Bernard and Jensen (2004). They give indirect evidence
of the existence of sunk costs because of the greater importance of existing
exporters than new entrants for raising US exports between 1987 and 1992.
In this context, Roberts and Tybout (1997, p.559) quantify the presence of
sunk costs as exporting activities raise the probability of further exporting
by approximately 60 percentage points. Against these findings, De Loecker
(2007b) gives evidence for the learning-by-exporting hypothesis. Employ-
ing micro data for Slovenia from 1994 to 2000, the author uses a matching
technique comparing exporting firms with similar non-exporting firms. The
estimations show that the instantaneous impact of export starters on pro-
ductivity is 8.8 percent whereas the effect is larger for exports to high-income
regions than exports to low-income regions (De Loecker 2007b, p.86). The
study by Hahn (2004) provides evidence of both effects of the relationship
between exporting and, amongst others, TFP. Using annual plant level data
for Korean firms from 1990 to 1998, especially entry into the export market
raises TFP whereas exporters are more productive before they start export-
ing. As the author mentioned, this result is in contrast to the findings by
Aw, Chung, and Roberts (1998). Their results suggest that for South Korea
as well as for Taiwan self-selection is much more supported than learning-
by-exporting. Baldwin and Gu (2003) analyze the Canadian manufacturing
sector from 1974 to 1996. They find that both export starters are more
productive by around 21 percent and exporting improves annual labor pro-
1 See also Lachenmaier and Wo¨ßmann 2006, p.318ff.
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ductivity growth and TFP by 6 and 2 percent, respectively.2
The balance of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 gives a
short overview of German and Austrian export behavior within the con-
sidered period from 1994 to 2003. It emphasizes German and Austrian
trade openness and the potential link of exporters becoming more produc-
tive, which provides the main motivation for this analysis. Section 4.3 gives
an overview of the data and the underlying methodology, illustrating the
basic estimation equations. Following Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), it also
presents some data-related intuition about the simultaneity bias concerning
the input and output variables within the TFP calculations. Section 4.4
gives a more detailed descriptive analysis of the underlying data. Section
4.5 presents the empirical results of the causality analysis between exporting
and productivity. The following Section 4.6 provides robustness from an in-
strumental variable approach to give evidence of the existence of a causality
running from exports to productivity. Finally, Section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 Exports and Productivity in Germany and
Austria
As mentioned in the first section, Kunst and Marin (1989) find for Germany
a causal relationship running from exports to productivity. This finding does
not hold for Austria (Marin 1992). Considering more recent German firm-
level studies on the causal relationship between exporting and productivity
suggests that mainly one direction holds: firm performance determines the
2 A more extensive summary and evaluation of the literature on the causal relationship
between exports and productivity is given by Greenaway and Kneller (2007) and Wagner
(2007, 2008). Also closely related, another set of literature studies the relationship between
exports and innovation, e.g. Lachenmeier and Wo¨ßmann (2006). They show a causality
running from innovation to exports. Using an instrumental variable approach, the authors
conclude that innovation raises the export share by an additional 7 percentage points.
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export status (Arnold and Hussinger 2005, Bernard and Wagner 1997, 2001,
Wagner 2007). For instance, employing data of the Statistical Office of Lower
Saxony, Wagner (2002) uses a matching approach comparing export starters
with non-starters. Beside the well-known fact that exporters are better in a
range of different firm characteristics, the author finds only weak evidence
of the impact of exporting on labor productivity. Arnold and Hussinger
(2005) use 389 German firm-level data from the Mannheim Innovation Panel
between 1992 and 2000. Applying a propensity score matching approach,
the authors conclude that productivity causes exports and therefore self-
selection is existent; however, the other way round does not hold. The only
analysis that finds empirical evidence of causality running from exporting to
productivity in Germany is the study by Fryges and Wagner (2008). Allowing
for continuous treatment, the authors apply the generalized propensity score
methodology to German micro-level data in Lower Saxony from 1995 to 2005.
Their results show that only within different sub-intervals of the exports-to-
sales ratio does exporting raise labor productivity growth.
The existing literature on Germany finds empirical evidence that ex-
porters are more productive than non-exporters. However, empirical evi-
dence of the impact of German exporting on firm performance is weak. This
finding as well as the undoubted importance of trade liberalization and, in
the true sense, exports motivate this analysis.
Marin (2008) accounts for the importance of Germany and Austria. She
shows that the two countries are most integrated into the world economy
compared with other European countries (Marin 2008, p.3): from 1994 to
2006, exports plus imports as a percentage of GDP (trade openness) increased
in Germany from 37 to 69 percent and in Austria from 49 to 85 percent.
Figure 4.1 and 4.2 demonstrate in this context the increasing importance of
exports in Germany and Austria, separately. From 1994 to 2003, the total
exports almost doubled in both countries. Within this period, exports as
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a percentage of GDP increased by 14.9 percentage points in Austria, from
33.6 to 48.5 percent, and by 12.5 percentage points in Germany, from 23.1
to 35.6 percent. Moreover, this rise can be ascribed to a small number of top
firms. Mayer and Ottaviano (2007a, 2007b) show that in Germany the top
10 percent of exporters account for 90 percent of exports.3
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Figure 4.1: Total exports in Austria and Germany (1994 - 2003)
3 This fact also motivates the study of the potential relationship with a small number
of roughly 380 firms over 10 years. See Section 4.3 for more details.
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Moreover, Mayer and Ottaviano (2007a, 2007b) present that German
employment and wage premia are larger for exporters than purely domestic
firms. The authors conclude that exporters show a better firm performance
than non-exporters. These results are also supported by Figures 4.3 and
4.4. Both figures show, for Austria and Germany separately, movements
of the export ratio (as a percentage of sales) and the related firm’s labor
productivity from 1994 to 2003. In general, an increase in the export ratio is
associated with an increase in productivity. In more detail, an increase in the
export ratio in period t is linked with an increase in productivity in period
t + 1. In Austria, this holds true for five out of eight periods. The other
periods in Austria generally illustrate a comovement in the same period. In
Germany, the lagged relationship is more precise. For instance, a rise in the
export ratio in 1996 is linked with an increase in labor productivity one period
later. A decrease in the export ratio in 1997 is followed by a decrease in the
firm-level productivity in 1998. This relationship can be found from 1994 to
2002, that is, in seven out of eight possible periods. In addition, owing to the
Asian and Russian crises occurring in 1997 and 1998, respectively, and the
subsequent falling export ratios, the data seem to be reliable. These facts,
from German data more than from Austrian data, allow us to infer gently
that exporting may promote productivity.
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4.3 Data and Methodology
4.3.1 Dataset
The dataset is built on a matching for 660 German and Austrian firms in-
vesting in Central and Eastern European countries. That is, the sample of
the empirical study relies mainly on a survey between 1997 and 2001 by the
Chair of International Economics at the University of Munich. It provides
information on the micro-level for the investors as well as for the correspond-
ing affiliates covering firms of all size classes. For this period, the sample
represents 80 percent of the German total investments in Eastern Europe
and 100 percent of the total Austrian investments in Eastern Europe.4
To enhance the underlying data, the cross-sectional firm information is
matched with the pan-European micro database Amadeus released by the
Bureau van Dijk (Bureau van Dijk, Electronic Publishing 2005). The under-
lying version includes firm-level data for more than 1.5 million national and
multinational establishments in 38 European countries for up to 13 years,
finishing in 2005.5 This results in an unbalanced panel of 417 German and
Austrian firm-level data covering a period of 10 years from 1994 to 2003. Un-
fortunately, this database gives information on the export turnover neither
for Germany nor for Austria. However, it offers values for the peer group’s
export turnover. This group is defined as companies with information on
their export turnover, being active in the parent firm’s same first two-digit
industry classification (ISIC), and having a similar capital as well as labor
endowment. The obtained peers’ export turnover is the simple average per
employee over all comprised peers available for the sample period from 1997
to 2003.6 This variable is used for the instrumental regressions to circumvent
4 See Marin (2004, 2008) for a further description of the data.
5 For further information on the Amadeus dataset (Bureau van Dijk 2005) available
online see http://www.bvdep.com/en/Amadeus.html.
6 It contains firm information from Croatia, France, Hungary, United Kingdom, and
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the endogeneity problem prevailing and discussed in the literature.
The measure for German and Austrian export activities is provided by
Hoppenstedt (Hoppenstedt 2009) and Thomson ONE Banker data (Thom-
son Reuters 2009).7 It allows the matching out of a total of 417 firms of 367
German (65 percent) and Austrian (35 percent) corporations with informa-
tion on the global export status as well as exporting ratio as a percentage of
firm sales. Therefore, it results in an unbalanced panel on the micro-level for
each year from 1994 to 2003.
In a final step, effectively applied export tariff rates are merged for each
four-digit German and Austrian firm’s industry and year. The data are
provided by the World Integrated Trade Solution database (WITS) (World
Bank and UNCTAD 2008), which is fully available for the research period.8
Beside the peers’ export turnover mentioned above, this variable is also used
to avoid the underlying endogeneity problem via an instrumental approach.
4.3.2 Total Factor Productivity and Simultaneity Bias
To study the underlying relationship between exporting and productivity, in a
first step, I estimate the firm’s TFP. Owing to the low number of observations,
this approach is estimated for each 2-digit industry classification (ISIC) over
all 209,000 German and 30,000 Austrian firms available in Amadeus (Bureau
van Dijk 2005). TFP is defined as the difference between the natural log of
the actual value Yit and the natural log of the estimated value Yˆit considering
a Cobb-Douglas production function:
Switzerland.
7 I would like to thank the Economic Business and Data Center (EBDC) for giving me
access to this data. For further information on the EBDC and the mentioned datasets see
http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portal/ifoHome/ EBDC root/EBDC Intro/
EBDC 000 Intro, http://www.hoppenstedt.de and www.thomsonreuters.com/
products services/financial [August, 3rd 2009].
8 WITS (World Bank and UNCTAD 2008) gives access to the major trade and tariff
data from the UN COMTRADE database, the TRAINS database, and the IDB and CTS
databases. For these and further information on WITS (World Bank and UNCTAD 2008)
see http://wits.worldbank.org/witsweb
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Yit = Ait(E)L
γl
itK
γk
it , (4.1)
where Yit is the firm’s value added of firm i at time t, Lit is the number of
employees of firm i at time t, and Kit is the capital endowment of firm i at
time t. All the variables are deflated.9 Calculating TFP allows us to analyze
whether firm-level productivity Ait(E) is influenced by exports E. Beside
ordinary least square (OLS) with fixed effects, the estimation procedure fol-
lows Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). Due to a productivity shock unobserved
by econometricians, OLS is not very reliable (Ackerberg et al. 2005, Levin-
sohn and Petrin 2003, Olley and Pakes 1996). That is, the residuals in the
production function specification contain an unobserved shock that has an
impact on the firm’s input factors capital and labor. The so-called trans-
mitted component results in a simultaneous causality problem between the
explained and the explanatory variables, especially between capital and the
error term as stated by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003, p.319ff).10
Contrary to Olley and Pakes (1996), the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)
technique does not require a measurement of investments to proxy the un-
observed shock. Due to zero investment observations and insufficient data
on firm-level investments, Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) suggest intermediate
inputs mit as a proxy to solve the endogeneity problem. Assuming a strictly
monotonous relationship between the proxy, the capital accumulation, and
the unobserved shock allows me to estimate consistent beta coefficients on
the input variables specifying the transmitted component as part of the er-
ror term by ft(kit,mit) (Levinsohn and Petrin 2003, Olley and Pakes 1996,
9 The manufacturing and service sectors are deflated by the producer price index and
the consumer price index, respectively. Additionally, year dummies are included while
estimating total factor productivity. The measures are obtained by the Austrian National
Bank (OeNB 2008) and German Federal Statistical Office (2008c).
10 See also Ackerberg et al. (2005), Alvarez and Crespi (2007), and Olley and Pakes
(1996).
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Pakes 1996).11 Therefore, the following equations are estimated.12 First, the
elasticity of labor is obtained by
yit = γ1lit + θt(ki,t,mi,t) + uit, (4.2)
where
θt(kit,mit) = γ0 + γ2kit + ft(kit,mit). (4.3)
Second, the coefficient on capital is empirically calculated by
yit − γ1lit = γ2kit + g(θt−1 − γ2ki,t−1) + uit + it. (4.4)
The proxy variable is measured by material costs, labor is measured by the
number of employees, tangible fixed assets measure capital endowment, and
the dependent variable is the firm’s real value added. All the variables are
from the Amadeus database (Bureau van Dijk 2005). As already mentioned,
owing to the fact that the number of observations is restricted to 367 firms
per year, TFP is calculated in each 2-digit sector for Germany and Austria
separately over a total of more than 239,000 firms from 1994 to 2003.
A comparison of the TFP calculations following Levinsohn and Petrin
(2003) with TFP estimations by simple OLS for a two-input production
function allows the determination of the simultaneity bias (Levinsohn and
Petrin 2003, p.319). As argued by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003, p.319), one
of the most relevant cases is a positive correlation of labor and capital with
the unobserved productivity shock. However, labor is assumed to correlate
more than capital, resulting in an overestimation of the βˆ-coefficient on labor
and an underestimation of the βˆ-coefficient on capital. This is exactly what
the production function estimations applying OLS and Levinsohn and Petrin
11 The relationship between materials, capital, and productivity shock is approximated
by a fourth-order polynomial in kit and mit (Levinsohn and Petrin 2003).
12 See Levinsohn and Petrin (2003, p.321), Olley and Pakes 1996, Pakes 1996).
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(2003) to Germany and Austria report.13
4.3.3 Estimation methodology
The starting point of the empirical estimation procedure is based on the ap-
proach by Bernard and Jensen (1999). This methodology is widely employed
by various empirical studies as a common approach and beginning to investi-
gate the causal relationship between exports and productivity. 14 Therefore,
the basic estimation equation of interest is
Ln(Prod)it = β0 + β1Exportit + β2Ln(size)it
+β3Ln(K/L)it + β4Φ + it,
(4.5)
where Ln(Prod) is the natural log of labor productivity and TFP, respec-
tively, of firm i at period t. Export is either a dummy for the firm’s export
status equal to 1 if the firm is exporting in period t or it measures the firm’s
export-to-sales ratio in period t. All the specifications include the corpora-
tion’s turnover Ln(size), the firm’s capital-to-sales ratio Ln(K/L), as well
as industry, firm, and year dummies as controls (vector Φ) to avoid endo-
geneity problems owing to time-invariant and time-variant effects. Ignoring
these effects, estimations with simple OLS would lead to biased coefficients
owing to unobserved heterogeneity in the error term. To detect whether
exporting improves productivity or not, the initial specification is modified
by lagged values for the export variable estimating its impact on the next
period’s productivity level and average annual productivity growth rate, re-
spectively (Bernard and Jensen 1999, p.6ff and p.14ff). That is, the main
specification 4.5 gives the simple export premium for exporting compared
with non-exporting behavior whereas the modification reflects more a causal
13 See Tables T4.1 and T4.2 in the Appendix comparing OLS and Levinsohn and Petrin
(2003) with value added as the dependent variable Yit for Germany and Austria separately.
14 See Wagner (2007), p.61ff.
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relationship from the initial export activity on subsequent productivity levels
and growth rates in percentage points, respectively.15
Therefore, following Bernard and Jensen (1999, p.14) the impact of the
export status in year t− y with a period of y years has the following form:
%∆(Prod)it = 1/t [Ln(Prod)it − Ln(Prod)i,t−y)]
= β0 + β1Exporti,t−y + β2Ln(size)i,t−y
+β3Ln(K/L)i,t−y + β4Φi,t−y + it.
(4.6)
Equation 4.6 detects causality running from exporting to productivity
by indicating a chronological impact of export behavior on the performance
growth rate.16 Within this specification, the β-coefficient on the export vari-
able explains the annual average growth rate of firm productivity by a change
in the initial export status t− y.17
Furthermore, it is necessary to verify the robustness of the estimated
impact of exporting. To address the simultaneity problem between export-
ing and productivity, the regressions are re-estimated with an instrumental
variable approach (IV). For this procedure, exports are instrumented by the
peer group’s export ratio. A detailed description of this proceeding is given
in Section 4.6.18
4.4 Descriptive results
The following section documents a descriptive overview of the underlying
data, focusing on the association between exporting and firm-level produc-
tivity for Germany and Austria. It illustrates how rising global integration
15 See Bernard and Jensen (1999), p.14ff.
16 See Lachenmaier and Wo¨ßmann (2006), p.318ff.
17 See Bernard and Jensen (1999), p.14.
18 See Section 4.3 for the definition of the peer variable.
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and firm performance are linked. The question evolves from the fact that
increasing trade openness contributes to German and Austrian firms devel-
oping flatter firm hierarchies and a better performance in terms of, amongst
others, firm-level productivity (Marin 2008). As a result of the underlying
data matching, starting with the Figures F4.1 and F4.2 in the Appendix
suggests rather a comovement between the export ratio and TFP. Therefore,
both figures again indicate a relationship between those two variables. How-
ever, contrary to Figures 4.3 and 4.4 showing labor productivity, plotting
exporting and TFP does not present an unambiguous indication of causality
running from exporting to productivity.
Further evidence of a present relationship is given by Figures 4.5 and 4.6.
Both illustrate the association between the export ratio and productivity as a
simple average over all firms in both countries from 1994 to 2003. The export
ratio is split up into low and high values whereas a low export ratio is defined
as a value below or equal to the median’s export ratio and, controversially, a
high export ratio is on hand when the firm is above the median. The figures
show that export-intensive firms have a higher value added per employee
ratio (with a multiplier of 2.9) as well as a 1.2 times higher TFP. It seems
that those firms outperform low-level exporters. That is, firms with a higher
export ratio have a higher productivity level.
This monotonic relationship is also confirmed by the following Figure 4.7.
Export ratio is grouped into three equal percentiles, namely low, medium, and
high. The figures show the average productivity values from 1994 to 2003 over
all firms for each country separately. It illustrates that the differences are
stronger for Germany than for Austria: in Germany TFP varies on average
by 18 percent between all three groups of exporting firms whereas in Austria
the average difference between each group (low, medium, and high export
ratio) is only round about 3 percent. Both figures suggest that a rise in the
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Figure 4.5: Export behavior and labor productivity
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Figure 4.6: Export behavior and TFP
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export ratio is associated with an increase in the firm-level TFP.
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Figure 4.7: Export intensity and TFP
In addition, beside the results on the export ratio, a comparison of ex-
porters versus non-exporters (Figure 4.8) presents exporters as having a
higher productivity in both countries, Germany and Austria. Within this
consideration, the difference between exporting and non-exporting is larger
in Austria than in Germany. It indicates what 4.1 summarizes. The de-
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scriptive overview of exporters and non-exporters in both countries within
the sample shows that exporting firms are older, have an added value almost
twice as high, and are larger in terms of a 6 times greater intangible and 1.5
times greater tangible endowment. Furthermore, exporters show a higher
number of employees, a greater capital-to-labor ratio, and revenues that are
twice as large. That is, exporters show different characteristics compared
with their non-exporting counterparts (Arnold and Hussinger 2005, p.226ff,
De Loecker 2007b, p.73). It demonstrates that the results are similar to
other (German) studies in the literature suggesting an association between
exporting firms and their productivity.
Table 4.1: Summary of firm characteristics
Non-exporter Exporter
Age (years) 39 47
Added value (Eur th) 238,182 418,918
Intangibles (Eur th) 810 4,982
Tangibles (Eur th) 152,700 236,655
Employees (number) 2,007 4,824
Capital-to-labor (Eur th) 590 665
Revenue (Eur th) 479,740 939,046
Notes: Mean characteristics of German and Austrian firms in the period from
1994 to 2003. Due to outliers, the upper 2 percent of each considered variable is
dropped.
Sources: Hoppenstedt (Hoppenstedt 2009), Thomson ONE Banker (Thomson
Reuters 2009), Amadeus (Bureau van Dijk 2005), and Chair for International Eco-
nomics, University of Munich. Author’s calculations.
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4.5 Empirical results
The descriptive results suggest that exporting firms outperform non-exporting
firms. In line with the existing literature, German and Austrian exporters
show a higher performance over a wide range of firm characteristics. How-
ever, the causality between the interaction of the two variables has to be
verified by a clear econometric approach. This leads to the possibility of
quantifying the additional impact of exporting on firm-level productivity.
Table 4.2: Export status and productivity
Export status Ln(size) & Ln(K/L)
Fixed 
 effects R2 Observations
Firm characteristics Ln(X)
Y/L 0.8042*** yes yes 0.6 2150
[0.116]
VA/L 0.5483*** yes yes 0.5 1850
[0.074]
TFP (OLS) 0.4927*** yes yes 0.2 1805
[0.074]
TFP (Levpet) 0.4889*** yes yes 0.2 1589
[0.078]
Explanatory variables
Note: A constant term as well as year, industry and firm fixed effects is included throughout all
specifications. Clustered standard errors in brackets. Each dependent variable is at the plant level [i] in
industry [j] and year [t]. Y/L is the parent firm's turnover per employee. VA/L is the firm's value added per 
employee. TFP is obtained by OLS and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), respectively, both with real value
added as dependent variable. Export status is a dummy equal to one if the corporate global foreign sales
are greater than zero. Also included throughout all specifications is the parent firm's natural log of
turnover, namely Ln(size), the log of the parent firm's capital-to-labor ratio, namely Ln(K/L) and a
country dummy distinguishing between Germany and Austria. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1%- levels, respectively.
tes: A cons ant term as well s year, industry, and firm fixed effects are included
throughout all the specification . Clust red standar erro s are in bracke s. Each
dependent vari ble is at t la level i in industry j and year t. Y/L is th parent
firm’s turnover per employee. V A/L is t e firm’s value added per employee. TFP is
obtained by OLS nd Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), respectively, both with real valu
dded as dependent variable. Export status is a dummy equal to one if the corporate
global foreign sales are greater than zero. Also included throughout all specifications
is the parent firm’s natural log of tur over, namely Ln(size), the log of the parent
firm’s capital-to-labor ratio, namely Ln(K/L), and a country dummy distinguishing
between Germany and Austria. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1
percent level, respectively.
Table 4.2 starts with a fixed effects estimation using the explanatory vari-
able export status to predict values of different firm productivity measures.
All the specifications include the firm’s size and the firm’s capital-to-labor
ratio as controls. The variables are given for period t. The first two firm
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characteristics, Y/L and V A/L,, represent labor productivity. The last two
variables show the impact on the firm’s total factor productivity obtained
by OLS and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). The results show that all the
coefficients are highly statistically significant with a positive sign. In detail,
exporters’ labor productivity is larger by roughly 0.55 to 0.80 whereas TFP
is larger by 0.5 compared with non-exporters. Therefore, the average per-
centage difference of the productivity level ranges roughly between 60 and
70 percent.19 This confirms the existence of an export premium, suggesting
that exporting firms perform better than their non-exporting counterparts.
However, as mentioned in the existing literature, this specification following
Equation 4.5 can not be interpreted as a causality running from exports to
productivity.20
Table 4.3 presents the same set-up for the impact of the corporate’s ex-
port ratio as a percentage of sales as the explanatory variable on firm char-
acteristics. The outcome is similar to the results in Table 4.2. For all 4
productivity measures, the β-coefficient on export ratio is highly significant
and positive. It also shows the descending order from labor productivity to
TFP. An increase in the export ratio by 1 percentage point raises both labor
productivity measures Y/L and V A/L by roughly 1.23 percent. The same
increase in the export ratio variable boosts TFP obtained by OLS by 1.09
percent and TFP obtained by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) by 1 percent.
Again, those who export more show a better firm performance. Owing to
the fact of self-selection, at this point a causal interpretation is not plausible.
To gain further insight into whether exporting improves firm performance,
the following regressions focus on a chronological relationship between the
two variables. In more detail, Table 4.4 presents the results for a one- and
two-period lagged export status as the independent variable on firm perfor-
19 The differences in the productivity level are calculated by 100(expβ-1). See, amongst
others, Wagner (2007), p.62ff.
20 See, amongst others, Bernard and Jensen (1999), Hahn (2004), and Wagner (2007).
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Table 4.3: Export ratio and productivity
Export ratio Ln(size) & Ln(K/L)
Fixed 
 effects R2 Observations
Firm characteristics Ln(X)
Y/L 1.2266*** yes yes 0.6 2115
[0.142]
VA/L 1.2033*** yes yes 0.5 1840
[0.159]
TFP (OLS) 1.0880*** yes yes 0.2 1795
[0.152]
TFP (Levpet) 0.9920*** yes yes 0.2 1583
[0.155]
Explanatory variables
Note: A constant term as well as year, industry and firm fixed effects is included throughout all
specifications. Clustered standard errors in brackets. Each dependent variable is at the plant level [i] in
industry [j] and year [t]. Y/L is the parent firm's turnover per employee. VA/L is the firm's value added per
employee. TFP is obtained by OLS and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), respectively, both with real value
added as dependent variable. Export ratio is the value of corporate exports as percentage of sales. Also
included throughout all specifications is the parent firm's natural log of turnover, namely Ln(size), the log
of the parent firm's capital-to-labor ratio, namley Ln(K/L) and a country dummy distinguishing between
Germany and Austria. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%- levels, respectively.
s: A cons ant term as well s year, industry, and firm fixed effects are incl ded
throughout all the specifications. Clustered stan ard errors are in brackets. Each de-
pendent variable is at the plant level i in industry j and y ar t. Y/L is the par nt firm’s
turn v r per employe . V A/L is the firm’s value added per employ e. TFP is obtained
by OLS and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), respe tively, both with real value added as
dependent variable. Expor ratio is th value of corp rate expo ts as a percentag f
sales. Also included throughout all specifications is the parent firm’s natural log of
turnover, namely Ln(size), the log of the p rent firm’s capital-to-labor ra io, namely
Ln(K/L), and a country dummy distinguishing between Germany and Austria. *, **,
*** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.
mance. Moreover, it focuses on the most reliable productivity measures,
namely V A/L for labor productivity and TFP by Levinsohn and Petrin
(2003) as the dependent variables.
This comes from the fact that the present work aims to investigate the
learning-by-exporting hypothesis whereas knowledge flow or technology spillovers
will primarily show up in TFP (Hahn 2004, p.17). In addition, focusing on
V A/L allows the comparison of the results with other studies that analyze
only labor productivity due to missing data. Table 4.4 also reports results
with the firm’s labor endowment as the dependent variable. As Hahn (2004,
p.17) argues, employment captures improved resource allocation that can be
ascribed to exporting. In a chronological sense, Table 4.4 suggests that ex-
porting improves firm performance. All the β-coefficients on the past export
variables are statistically significant. In specifications (1) and (2), the lagged
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export variables yield on average a 60 percent higher labor endowment in
exporting firms in subsequent periods. Labor productivity as well as total
factor productivity are also larger for preceding exporting activities than non-
exporting. For instance, the coefficients in specifications (5) and (6) suggest
that preceding exports lead to on average a 22 percent higher TFP in period
t compared with non-exporting. Contrary to other mentioned studies about
exports and firm level productivity, the results suggest that German and
Austrian firms gain from exporting: exporters are more productive. More-
over, the productivity gap widens in the following years.21 That is, after 2
years of exporting, the productivity is around 24 percent higher compared
to non-exporting firms.
Taking these results as a basis, Arnold and Hussinger (2005, p.233) test
the causal relationship using the Granger causation method. That is, in
terms of exports and performance, lagged values of exporting predict TFP
significantly better than lagged values of TFP.22 Using the same underlying
method, Table T4.3 in the Appendix reports that TFP in period t is better
explained by the lagged export variables with a significance level of 5 percent.
On the contrary, lagged values of TFP do not have a statistically significant
impact on the export status. This indicates the existence of an impact of
exports on productivity.
Bernard and Jensen (1999, p.14) argue that the “cleanest” test for the
causality question is given by Equation 4.6. It estimates the impact of the
initial exports on the average annual growth rate of productivity. Table 4.5
reports the effects of the current as well as initial exporting behavior on the
annual average growth rate of labor productivity and TFP. For labor pro-
21 See De Loecker (2007b), p.80ff.
22 See Arnold and Hussinger (2005), p.233. They use a linear model to test the impact
of two lags of TFP and exports on TFP and another linear probability model to test
the impact of lagged TFP and exports on the current export status. Their results show
that firm performance determines export behavior. The reverse Granger causality can be
excluded.
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ductivity, the β-coefficients on export status are highly significant at the 1
percent level. The annual impact for exporting compared with non-exporting
ranges from 0.2 to 0.6 percent. Similarly, in the case of TFP, all the coeffi-
cients are statistically significant at least at the 5 percent level. The annual
impact of the export status ranges between 0.2 and 1 percent. Owing to
the fact that initial exports are statistically significant, it provides further
evidence that exports cause performance growth. Exporting leads to higher
productivity levels and growth rates. Therefore, German and Austrian ex-
porters gain additional benefits by growing faster than their counterparts.23
Moreover, these results confirm the findings of a larger productivity gap in
the Table before. The annual average growth rate is increasing in the years of
exporting.24 It suggests that continuous export behavior may lead to higher
productivity growth compared with non-exporting or an subsequent export
start.
Another approach to finding growth differences in productivity is to com-
pare continuous exporters and non-exporting firms (Bernard and Jensen
1999, p.19ff, Wagner 2007, p.62ff). In detail, this method estimates the
chronological impact of preceding exports on post-entry productivity growth.25
Therefore, following Bernard and Jensen (1999), the estimation strategy is
given by
%∆(Prod)it = β0 + β1Startit + β2Stopit + β3Contit
+β4Ln(size)it + β5Ln(K/L)it + β6Φit + it.
(4.7)
Startit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm exports in t but not
23 The same set of specifications is estimated for the firm’s export ratio. The results
remain qualitatively unchanged, suggesting annual growth rates between 0.3 and 1 percent.
The coefficient of the export ratio in t−2 becomes insignificant but close to the 10-percent
threshold.
24 See De Loecker (2007b), p.80ff.
25 See Wagner (2007), p.63.
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in the initial period t − 1 and t − 2, respectively. Its coefficient compares
export starters with firms that do not export at all. Stopit is a dummy
variable equal to 1 if the firm is exporting in t− 1 (t− 2) but not in period t.
That is, the β-coefficient subsequent productivity growth of export stoppers
with non-exporters. Finally, Contit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the
firm exports in t − 1 and t. Contrary to Bernard and Jensen (1999), if the
initial period is t − 2, the Contit-variable equal to 1 means that the firm
exports throughout all periods without a break. Therefore, it compares the
productivity growth of continuous exporting with non-exporting during the
considered period. Again, owing to the fact of a chronological changeover in
the firm’s export behavior, β3-coefficient in Equation 4.7 reveals an impact
of exporting on firm labor productivity and TFP growth.
Table 4.6 reports the results on annual average growth rates. As ex-
pected, the coefficient on the start variable is positive and highly significant
throughout all the specifications. This suggests that export starters expe-
rience an annual increase in their productivity growth rate of roughly 0.7
percent. As expected, negative but mainly insignificant is the β2-coefficient
on the stop measurement. The sign of the coefficient on Cont is positive
and, specification (3) excepted, highly significant. It indicates that annual
labor productivity grows between 1 and 1.5 percent. The result of the ef-
fect on the TFP growth rate in specification (4) is not very satisfying. It
reports an increase of 1 percent whereas specification (3) reports a negative
and insignificant coefficient. Moreover, these findings confirm an increas-
ing productivity gap between exporters and non-exporters. The earlier a
firm started to export and, additionally, if the firm shows continuous export
activities, the larger the firms productivity growth rates. However, consider-
ing productivity growth the estimates for Germany and Austria show lower
coefficients compared with transition economics.26 This may suggest that
26 Compare De Loecker (2007b).
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productivity in these countries is less driven by international knowledge flow
than solely influenced by the possibility to exploit additional economies of
scale.27 To summarize, beside the ambiguous results for continuous exporters
on TFP growth rate, there is empirical evidence of increasing labor produc-
tivity. Beside that, starting to export is associated with an improving firm
performance.
Table 4.6: Starter, stopper, and continuous export activities
length of interval (years)  1 years  2 years  1 years  2 years
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Startit 0.7288*** 0.7221*** 0.6253** 0.7147***
[0.207] [0.086] [0.278] [0.070]
Stopit -0.574 -0.214 -0.5069* -0.0984
[0.496] [0.156] [0.287] [0.103]
Contit 1.5435*** 1.0010*** -0.4034 0.5571***
[0.127] [0.049] [0.273] [0.040]
Ln(size) & Ln(K/L) yes yes yes yes
Fixed effects yes yes yes yes
R2 0.4 0.6 0.3 0.5
Observations 1138 842 995 740
Global Average Annu l Growth Rates %deltaXiT
VA/L TFP (Levpet)
Notes: A constant term as well as year, industry, and firm fixed effects are
included throughout all specifications. Clustered standard errors are in brackets.
Each dependent variable is the average annual growth rate calculated at firm
level i in industry j with a length of T years. V A/L is the firm’s value added-
per-employee ratio. TFP is obtained by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). It is
calculated with the real value added as dependent variable. Start is a dummy
equal to one if the firm exports in t but not in t− 1. Stop is a dummy variable
equal to one if the firm exports in t − 1 but not in t. Continuous is equal to
one if the firm shows exports greater than zero in t and the initial period t − 1
and t− 2, respectively. Also included throughout all specifications is the parent
firm’s natural log of turnover, namely Ln(size) , and the log of the parent firm’s
capital-to-labor ratio Ln(K/L), and a country dummy distinguishing between
Germany and Austria. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent
level, respectively.
27 See Section 4.1.
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4.6 Robustness: 2SLS Estimates
Owing to the simultaneous causality problem between exports and produc-
tivity, OLS provides inconsistent results. Beside the lagged value regressions
to verify further the chronological and causal impact of exporting on produc-
tivity, this section applies an instrumental variable approach. This requires
a valid instrument that is correlated to the export variable while at the same
time it is uncorrelated with the error term. It has to identify variation in
the observation’s export activity that is exogenous to the firm’s productiv-
ity. Therefore, it has to be checked whether the instrumental variable peer
group’s export ratio fulfills the relevance as well as the exogeneity condition.
The employed instrument is defined as the average export-to-sales ratio
of the firm’s related foreign peer group.28 Owing to the instrument’s rele-
vance, there is a negative correlation between the foreign peer group’s export
ratio and the firm’s export activity. The first-stage results show that the
lower the export ratio of the peer group, the higher is the firm’s exporting
activity. In detail, the first-stage regressions show highly significant coeffi-
cients suggesting the instrument’s relevance. As a result, the instrument is
related to the firm’s exports and the first condition is fulfilled. To be rea-
sonably exogenous, the instrument must affect the firm’s productivity level
only indirectly. In more detail, the firm’s individual total factor productivity
can be understood not to influence the other countries originated peer group
decision to export. That is, foreign export behavior is not directly motivated
by German or Austrian labor productivity or TFP. Moreover, owing to the
argument of potential spillover effects, a direct impact of the peer group’s
export behavior on domestic firm-level productivity can be excluded because
this effect can be primarily ascribed to domestic exporting peer group mem-
bers and is in the first instance caused by domestic industries. It circumvents
28 See Section 4.3 for a detailed description of the peer group variable.
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the endogeneity problem of reverse causation running from productivity to
exporting.
Table 4.7 presents the results for the 2SLS estimates, instrumenting ex-
ports by the peer group variable. The table illustrates the results for labor
productivity, TFP obtained by OLS, and TFP calculated with Levinsohn and
Petrin (2003). It suggests that the export status as well as the export ratio
have a positive and significant impact on productivity. The β-coefficients on
export status slightly increase from 0.27 to 0.3 and 0.28 using TFP calcula-
tions by OLS and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), respectively.
This confirms the findings presented previously in the tables: export-
ing firms are roughly 30 percent more productive than their non-exporting
counterparts. In addition, an increase in the export ratio by 1 percentage
point raises labor productivity by 1.7 percent, TFP (OLS) by 1.6 percent,
and TFP using Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) by 1.5 percent. Also, the co-
efficients on the control variables size and K/L show the expected positive
and statistically significant signs. Therefore, they indicate a causal relation-
ship of exports on firm productivity. To summarize, if the exogeneity of the
instrument is accepted, the results confirm the findings of additional pro-
ductivity gains by German and Austrian exporting activities compared with
their non-exporting counterparts.
Beside the peer group instrumental approach, I have also used the annual
change of global export tariffs as an instrument, expecting an increase in tariff
rates to have a negative impact on exporting. In addition, the dependent
variable is changed from the level into the growth rate variable. The results
are quite similar to the annual growth rate estimations, confirming a causality
running from exports to performance. In the case of labor productivity, the
annual growth rate is roughly 0.4 percent and in the case of TFP the average
annual growth rate is approximately 1.4 percent. However, in spite of the
good results, one has to accept the instrument’s exogeneity. This is debatable
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because of an (indirect) impact of tariffs on productivity.29
4.7 Conclusion
This chapter is a contribution to the huge amount of empirical studies on
the relationship between exports and firm performance. Following the ap-
proach by Bernard and Jensen (1999), it studies the relationship between
German and Austrian export activities and the related firm-level productiv-
ity. Therefore, the underlying analysis tries to say that an interdependency
of the considered variables exists in both directions: more productive firms
self-select themselves into the export market as well as exports raising firm
performance. In more detail, the chapter shows, on the one hand, that ex-
porters are more productive and, on the other hand, the extent to which ex-
porting behavior leads to a rise in productivity levels and growth rates. The
empirical results of a unique data matching suggest that exporters compared
with non-exporters are more productive by roughly 40 percent. Moreover,
exporting yields an additional annual average productivity growth rate by
roughly 1 percent compared with non-exporting. These results are robust to
different productivity measurements, estimation specifications, and regres-
sion techniques like an instrumental variable approach. Contrary to German
findings by e.g. Arnold and Hussinger (2005) and Wagner (2002), firms ben-
efit from exporting. Moreover, contrary to the annual productivity gains of
exporting firms in transition economies like Slovenia (De Loecker 2007), my
results for Germany and Austria indicate significant but lower productivity
growth rates. It implies that the learning-by-exporting hypothesis in terms
of new knowledge might be even more true when exporting of firms in less
developed countries is analyzed. In the case of Germany and Austria the
results indicate that exporters rather experience a productivity boost owing
29 For instance, see Amiti and Konings (2007) and Chapter 2 of this thesis.
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to economies of scale and further investment incentives than through gaining
additional technical knowledge.
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Appendix to Chapter 4
Tables and Figures
Table T4.1: Production function estimates: German industries
industry capital employees capital employees
14: Other mining and quarrying 0.242 0.766 0.591 0.201
15: Manufacturing - food products and beverages 0.281 0.709 0.275 0.608
17: Manufacturing - textiles 0.158 0.709 0.49 0.588
20: Manufacturing - wood and products of wood 0.095 0.931 0.056 0.591
21: Manufacturing - pulp, paper and paper products 0.232 0.72 0.469 0.41
22: Publishing, printing, reproduction of rec. media 0.182 0.734 0.179 0.701
24: Manufacturing - chemicals and chemical products 0.114 0.886 0.028 0.607
25: Manufacturing - rubber and plastic products 0.321 0.554 0.069 0.542
26: Manufacturing - non-metallic mineral products 0.248 0.625 0.281 0.596
27: Manufacturing - basic metals 0.27 0.685 0.342 0.527
28: Manufacturing - fabricated metal products 0.212 0.71 0.1 0.534
29: Manufacturing - machinery and equipment n.e.c. 0.161 0.776 0.382 0.695
31: Manufacturing - electrical machinery 0.151 0.815 0.402 0.685
32: Manufacturing - radio, television, communication 0.4 0.6 0.257 0.706
33: Manufacturing - medical, precision, optical instruments 0.204 0.758 0.065 0.733
34: Manufacturing - motor vehicles, trailers, semi-trailers 0.286 0.668 0.381 0.648
35: Manufacturing - transport equipment 0.188 0.745 0.404 0.593
36: Manufacturing - furniture, n.e.c. 0.182 0.753 0.242 0.751
40: Electricity, gas and water supply 0.308 0.571 0.395 0.367
45: Construction 0.223 0.733 0.186 0.738
50: Sale, repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 0.256 0.633 0.28 0.43
51: Wholesale trade and commission trade 0.155 0.672 0.165 0.669
52: Retail trade 0.201 0.731 0.068 0.705
60: Land transport, transport via pipelines 0.423 0.395 0.311 0.585
62: Air transport 0.09 0.973 0.444 0.011
64: Post and telecommunications 0.186 0.818 0.387 0.921
67: Activities auxiliary to financial intermediation 0.267 0.369 0.587 0.192
72: Computer and related activities 0.23 0.744 0.196 0.784
74: Other business activities                                                         0.23             0.424             0.135            0.608
90: Sewage and refuse disposal 0.175 0.54 0.004 0.6
Dependent variable: real added value it
OLS Levpet
Note: The dependent variable is the firm's real added value at plant level [i] in industry [j] and year [t]. All variables are given in
natural logs. A constant term as well as year dummies is included throughout all specifications. The coefficients for each industry
are obtained from simple OLS estimations and Levinsohn-Petrin estimations (2003), respectively. Calculations run at a two-digit
ISIC industry level.
s: The dependent variable i the firm’s r l added value at plant level i in industry j and y ar
t. All the variables a e given in n tural logs. A cons ant term a well as year dummies are inclu ed
throughout all the specifications. The coefficients for e ch industry are obtained from simple OLS
estimations and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) estimations, respectively. The calculations run at a
two-digit ISIC industry level.
Source: Amadeus (Bureau van Dijk 2005). Author’s calculations.
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Table T4.2: Production function estimates: Austrian industries
industry capital employees capital employees
15: Manufacturing - food products and beverages 0.438 0.638 0.215 0.702
17: Manufacturing - textiles 0.093 0.924 0.619 0.691
20: Manufacturing - wood and products of wood 0.01 0.393 0.456 0.609
26: Manufacturing - non-metallic mineral products 0.152 0.864 0.559 0.654
27: Manufacturing - basic metals 0.333 0.647 0.711 0.631
28: Manufacturing - fabricated metal products 0.116 0.903 0.51 0.724
29: Manufacturing - machinery and equipment n.e.c. 0.049 0.893 0.376 0.813
32: Manufacturing - radio, television, communication 0.236 0.665 0.585 0.809
36: Manufacturing - furniture, n.e.c. 0.19 0.864 0.657 0.322
40: Electricity, gas and water supply 0.688 0.268 0.49 0.597
45: Construction 0.26 0.699 0.206 0.502
50: Sale, repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 0.26 0.614 0.419 0.36
51: Wholesale trade and commission trade 0.179 0.671 0.423 0.113
52: Retail trade 0.15 0.806 0.309 0.886
60: Land transport, transport via pipelines 0.181 0.921 0.398 0.663
63: Supporting and auxiliary transport activities 0.146 0.797 0.607 0.028
67: Activities auxiliary to financial intermediation 0.442 0.27 0.502 0.123
74: Other business activities 0.165 0.476 0.504 0.425
Dependent variable: real added value it
OLS Levpet
Nots: The dependent variable is the firm's real added value at plant level [i] in industry [j] and year [t]. All variables are given in
natural logs. A constant term as well as year dummies is included throughout all specifications. The coefficients for each
industry are obtained from simple OLS estimations and Levinsohn-Petrin estimations (2003), respectively. Calculations run at a
two-digit ISIC industry level.
otes: The dependent variable is the firm’s real added value at plant level i in industry
j and year t. All the variables are given in natural logs. A constant term as well as
year dummies are included throughout all the specifications. The coefficients for each
industry are obtained from simple OLS estimations and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)
estimations, respectively. The calculations run at a two-digit ISIC industry level.
Source: Amadeus (Bureau van Dijk 2005). Author’s calculations.
Table T4.3: Granger causality
Dependent variable
TFPt (Levpet)
Export statust-1 = 0, 
Export statust-2 = 0
F(2,547)=2.96 
Prob>F=0.05
Export statust
TFPt-1 = 0, 
TFPt-2 = 0
F(2,596)=1.2 
Prob>F=0.3
F-statistic
Note: A constant term as well as year, industry and firm fixed effects is included
throughout all specifications. Robust errors in brackets. Each dependent variable is
at the plant level [i] in industry [j] and current year [t]. TFP is obtained by
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) with real value added as dependent variable. Export 
status is a dummy equal to 1 if firms' global foreign sales is greater than zero.
Beside that, also included throughout all specifications is the parent firm's natural
log of turnover Ln(size) as well as the log of the parent firm's capital-to-labor ratio
Ln(K/L) and a country dummy distinguishing between Germany and Austria. The F-
statistic tests the joint significance of the lagged values of exports and productivity,
respectively.
Testing for ranger Causation
s: A constant term as year, industr , fir fixed effects are included
throughout all the specifications. Robust errors are in brackets. Each dependent
variable is at the plant level i in industry j and current year t. TFP is obtained by
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) with real value added as dependent variable. Export
status is a dummy equal to one if corporate global foreign sales are greater than
zero. Beside that, also included throughout all specifications is the parent firm’s
natural log of tur over Ln(size) as well as the log of the parent firm’s capital-
to-labor ratio Ln(K/L), and a country dummy distinguishing between Germany
and Austria. The F-statistic tests the joint significance of the lagged values of
exports and productivity, respectively.
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Chapter 5
Concluding Remarks
This thesis focused on the relationship between innovation, trade liberaliza-
tion and firm performance. The analysis concentrated especially on German
and Austrian firms investing in Eastern Europe. I found that trade liberal-
ization with Eastern Europe and the ongoing process in eastern enlargement
has a decisive influence on the firm’s decision about the international orga-
nization and the corporation’s performance.
Chapter 2 studied the impact of innovation on the organizational struc-
ture. Following Acemoglu et al. (2004) the theoretical framework predicts
that a larger parental pool of knowledge raises the probability of offshoring.
I identified that this holds true in a national as well as an international con-
text. However, when the producer loses territorial protection, the changeover
from non-integration to integration is delayed along with an increasing pool
of innovations. That is, the decision to outsource holds longer. Employing
data for 2005 on German firms investing in Eastern Europe, the empirical
study gives evidence for the theoretical predictions. Besides my findings
about the impact of the firm productivity and the outside option of the firm
on the organizational structure, which are in line with other prominent lit-
erature, the results indicate the existence of a gap between outsourcing and
154
Concluding Remarks
offshoring comparing home and abroad in favor of a longer decision for an
arm’s-length relationship. Therefore, the results indicate that an increasing
pool of innovations encourages international outsourcing.
Chapter 3 dealed with the impact of trade liberalization on German and
Austrian firm productivity. In more detail, I considered different types of tar-
iff cuts analyzing the preceding periods of the eastern enlargement. Unique
matching of data from 1994 to 2003 suggests that tariff reductions raise par-
ent firm productivity significantly. A ten percentage point decrease in tariff
rates can lead to total factor productivity gains of up to 2 percent. The data
allow distinction between three types of tariffs: output, intra-firm and input
tariff rates. The size of the results strongly depends on the type of tariff and
country analyzed. That is, the empirical study suggests that for different
productivity measures input tariff rates show the largest effects, followed by
intra-firm and output tariff rates. The impact of a ten percentage point tariff
cut ranges between 0.3 and 2 percent. The effect for Austria is larger than for
Germany. The results also suggest that trade liberalization makes offshoring
cheaper and this in turn increases productivity. The chapter contributes in
this way that it is the only study using data from Germany, Austria and the
firm’s corresponding Eastern European affiliates. Moreover, it is the only
one which explores tariffs on intra-firm imports and distinguishes between
intra-firm tariffs and tariffs on intermediate inputs.
Chapter 4 shifted the perspective from imports to exports. It considered
the relationship between export activities and firm-level productivity. Unique
matching of German and Austrian micro data from 1994 to 2003 suggests
that exporters are more productive by around 40 percent compared with non-
exporters. Moreover, besides other analysis techniques, instrumental variable
estimations suggest that exporting causes a rise in firm-level productivity.
The estimation methodology started with following the approach by Bernard
and Jensen (1999). I found that exporting yields an additional annual average
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productivity growth rate by roughly 1 percent compared with non-exporting
firms. It allows the conclusion that, against other findings of existing studies,
both directions hold: more productive firms self-select themselves into export
markets and being active in foreign markets boosts firm-level productivity.
Summarizing, the chapter showed, on the one hand, that exporters are more
productive and, on the other hand, the extent to which exporting behavior
leads to a rise in productivity levels and growth rates. Moreover, my findings
presented that the impact of exporting on productivity growth is smaller for
German and Austrian firms compared to transition economics. It suggests
that exporters rather experience a productivity boost owing to economies of
scale and investment incentives than through additional knowledge.
156
Bibliography
Abraham, K.G., and Taylor, S.K. (1996). “Firm’s Use of Outside
Contractors: Theory and Evidence”, Journal of Labor Economics, 14(3),
pp. 394-424.
Acemoglu, D., Aghion, P. and Zilibotti, F. (2002). “Vertical
Integration and Distance to Frontier”, National Bureau of Economic
Research, NBER Working Paper, No. 9191.
Acemoglu, D., Aghion, P., Griffith, R. and Zilibotti, F. (2004).
“Vertical Integration and Technology: Theory and Evidence”, National
Bureau of Economic Research, NBER Working Paper, No. 10997.
Acemoglu, D. and Zilibotti, F. (2001). “Productivity Differences”,
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(2), pp. 563-606.
Ackerberg, D., Caves, K. and Frazer, G. (2005). “Structural
Identification of Production Functions”, Working paper, Dec. 2006
submitted to Econometrica.
Aghion, P. and Griffith, R. (2005). “Competition and Growth:
Reconciling Theory and Evidence”, MIT Press, Cambridge MA.
Aghion, P. and Tirole, J. (1997). “Formal and Real Authority in
Organizations”, Journal of Political Economy, 105(1), pp. 1-29.
Altomonte, C. and Bekes, G. (2008). “Trading Activities, Firms and
Productivity”, Bocconi University and Hungarian Academy of Science,
mimeo, October.
Alvarez, R. and Crespi, G. (2007). “Multinational Firms and Produc-
tivity Catching-Up: The Case of Chilean Manufacturing”, Central Bank
of Chile, Working Paper, No. 429.
Amemiya, T. (1981). “Qualitative Response Models: A Survey”, Journal
of Economic Literature, 19(4), pp. 1483-1536.
157
Bibliography
Amiti, M. and Konings, J. (2007). “Trade Liberalization, Intermediate
Inputs, and Productivity: Evidence from Indonesia”, American Eco-
nomic Review, 97(5), pp. 1611-1638.
Antras, P. (2003). “Firms, Contracts, and Trade Structure”, Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 118(4), pp. 1375-1418.
Antras, P. and Helpman, E. (2004). “Global Sourcing”, Journal of
Political Economy, 112(3), pp. 552-580.
Arnold, J.M. and Hussinger, K. (2005). “Export Behavior and
Firm Productivity in German Manufacturing: A Firm-Level Analysis”,
Review of World Economics, Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 141(2), pp.
219-243.
Arora, A. and Fosfuri, A. (1998). “Licensing in the Chemical Indus-
try”, Conference paper, Intellectual Property and Industry Competitive
Standards, Stanford University.
Atallah, G. (2002). “Production Technology, Information Technology,
and Vertical Integration under Asymmetric Information”, CIRANO,
Working Paper, No. 2002s-32.
Austrian National Bank (OeNB) (2008). “Erzeugerpreis (Producer
prices)”, http://www.oenb.at [April, 21st, 2009].
Aw, B.Y, Chung, S., and Roberts, M.J. (1998). “Productivity and
the Decision to Export: Micro Evidence from Taiwan and South Korea”,
National Bureau of Economic Research, NBER Working Paper, No.
6558.
Baddeley, M.C. and Barrowclough, D.V. (2009). “Running
Regressions - A Practical Guide to Quantitative Research in Economics,
Finance and Development Studies”, Cambridge University Press, New
York.
Balakrishnan, S. and Wernerfelt, B. (1986). “Technical Change,
Competition and Vertical Integration”, Strategic Management Journal,
7(4), pp. 347-359.
158
Bibliography
Baldwin, J.R. and Gu, W. (2003). “Export-Market Participation and
Productivity Performance in Canadian Manufacturing”, The Canadian
Journal of Economics, 36(3), pp. 634-657.
Bartel, A., Lach, S. and Sicherman, N. (2005). “Outsourcing and
Technological Change”, National Bureau of Economic Research, NBER
Working Paper, No. 11158.
Baye, M.R. (2006). “Managerial Economics and Business Strategy”, The
McGraw Hill Companies (5th edition), New York.
Becker, W. and Dietz, J. (2002). “Innovation Effects of R&D Cooper-
ation in the German Manufacturing Industry”, University of Augsburg,
Institute for Economics, Discussion Paper Series, No. 222.
Belenzon, S. and Berkovitz, T. (2007). “Innovation in Business
Groups”, University of Oxford, Economic Series Working Papers, No.
368.
Bernard, A.B. and Jensen, J.B. (1999). “Exceptional Exporter Per-
formance: Cause, Effect, or Both?”, Journal of International Economics,
47(1), pp. 1-25.
Bernard, A.B. and Jensen, J.B. (2004). “Entry, Expansion and
Intensity in the U.S. Export Boom, 1987-1992”, Review of International
Economics, 12(4), pp. 662-675.
Bernard, A.B., Jensen, J.B., and Schott, P.K. (2006). “Trade
Costs, Firms and Productivity”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 53(5),
pp. 917-937.
Bernard, A.B. and Wagner, J. (1997). “Exports and Success in Ger-
man Manufacturing”, Review of World Economics, Weltwirtschaftliches
Archiv, 133(1), pp. 134-157.
Bernard, A.B. and Wagner, J. (2001). “Export Entry and Exit
by German Firms”, Review of World Economics, Weltwirtschaftliches
Archiv, 137(1), pp. 105-123.
Blau, J.R. and McKinley, W. (1979). “Ideas, Complexity and
Innovation”, Administrative Science Quarterly, 24(2), pp. 200-219.
159
Bibliography
Blind, K., Edler, J., Fritsch, R. and Schmoch, U. (2003).
“Erfindung kontra Patente”, Schwerpunktstudie zur technologischen
Leistungsfa¨higkeit Deutschlands Frauenhofer-Institut fu¨r Systemtechnik
und Innovationsforschung, Kalsruhe.
Blomstro¨m M. and F. Sjo¨holm (1999). “Technology, Transfer and
Spillovers: Does Local Participation With Multinationals Matter?”,
European Economic Review, 43(4-6), pp. 915-923.
Branstetter, L., Fisman, R. and Foley, C.F. (2005). “Do Stronger
Intellectual Propery Rights Increase International Technology Transfer?
Empirical Evidence from U.S. Firm Level Data”, National Bureau of
Economic Research, NBER Working Paper, No. 11516.
Brusoni, S., Prencipe, A. and Pavitt, K. (2001). “Knowledge
Specialization, Organizational Coupling, and the Boundaries of the
Firm: Why Do Firms Know More than They Make?”, Administrative
Science Quarterly, 46(4), pp. 597-621.
Bureau van Dijk, Electronic Publishing (2005). “Amadeus
database”, http://www.bvdep.com/de/Amadeus.html [April, 21st,
2009]. Frankfurt am Main.
Camron, C.A. and Trivedi, P.K. (2005). “Microeconometrics -
Methods and Applications”, Cambridge University Press, New York.
Castellani, D., Serti, F. and Tomais, C. (2008). “Firms in Inter-
national Trade: Importers and Exporters Heterogeneity in the Italian
Manufacturing Industry”, The World Economy, forthcoming.
Clerides, S., Lach, S., and Tybout, J. (1998). “Is Learning by
Exporting Important? Micro-dynamic evidence from Columbia, Mexico
and Morocco”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113(3), pp. 903-948.
Commission of the European Communities (1991). “Four Motors
for Europe: An Analysis of Cross-regional Cooperation,”, FOP241, DG
XII, Vol 17.
160
Bibliography
Crepon, B., Duguet, E. and Mairesse, J. (1998). “Research,
Innovation, and Productivity: An Econometric Analysis at the Firm
Level”, National Bureau of Economic Research, NBER Working Paper,
No. 6696.
Damanpour, F. (1991). “Organizational Innovation: A Meta-Analysis
of Effects of Determinants and Moderators”, Academy of Management
Journal, 34(3), pp. 555-590.
De Loecker, J. (2007a). “Product Differentiation, Multi-Product Firms
and Estimating the Impact of Trade Liberalization on Productivity”,
National Bureau of Economic Research, NBER Working Paper, No.
13155.
De Loecker, J. (2007b). “Do Exports Generate Higher Productivity?
Evidence from Slovenia”, Journal of International Economics, 73(1), pp.
48-68.
Dixit, A.K. and Stiglitz, J.E. (1977). “Monopolistic Competition and
Optimum Product Diversity”, American Economic Review, 67(3), pp.
297-308.
Drazin, R. and Schoonhoven, C.B. (1996). “Community, Population,
and Organization Effects on Innovation: A Multilevel Perspective”,
Academy of Mangament Journal, 39(5), pp. 1065-1083.
Economist, The (2008). “Beyond Doha”, The Economist, print edition,
October 11th, 2008.
Empey, W.F. (1988). “Contracting Out of Services by Manufacturing
Industries”, Institute for Research and Public Policy, IRPP, Montreal,
Quebec.
European Patent Office (EPO) (2007a). “The Economic Im-
portance of Patents” http://www.epo.org/topics/innovation-and-
economy/economic-impact.html [May, 13th, 2009].
European Patent Office (EPO) (2007b). “Patents are the future”,
http://www.epo.org/focus/news/2007/070419.html [May, 13th, 2009].
Fattore, V. (1997). “Importance and Significance of Patents”, Catalysis
Today, 34, Chapter 8, pp. 379-392.
161
Bibliography
Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology (2007). “Shap-
ing Europe’s Economic Future”, Bundesministerium fu¨r Wirtschaft und
Tewchnologie (BMWi).
Federal Ministry of Education and Research (2006). “Igniting
Ideas! The High-Tech Strategy for Germany”, Bundesministerium fu¨r
Bildung und Forschung (BMBF).
Feenstra, R.C., Markusen, J.R., and Zeile, W. (1992). “Account-
ing for Growth with New Inputs: Theory and Evidence”, American
Economic Review, 82(2), pp. 415-421.
Fernandes, A.M. (2007). “Trade Policy, Trade Volumes and Plant-Level
Productivity in Colombian Manufacturing Industries”, Journal of
International Economics, 71(1), pp. 52-71.
Fryges, H. and Wagner, J. (2008). “Exports and Productivity Growth:
First Evidence from a Continuous Treatment Approach”, Review of
World Economics, Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 144(4), pp. 695-722.
German Federal Statistical Office (2008a). “Engagement
deutscher Unternehmen im Ausland”, Destatis, STATmagazin, April
2008, available at http://www.destatis.de [April, 21st, 2009].
German Federal Statistical Office (2008b). “Verlagerung
wirtschaftlicher Aktivita¨ten - Erste Ergebnisse”, Destatis, Berichtsjahr
2006, Wiesbaden.
German Federal Statistical Office (2008c). “Erzeugerpreisindizes
(Producer prices)”, http://www.destatis.de [April, 21st, 2009].
German Patent and Trade Mark Office (GPTO)
(2006). “Annual Reports 2002-2006 (Jahresberichte)”,
http://presse.dpma.de/presseservice/publikationen/jahresberichte/
index.html [April, 21st, 2009].
162
Bibliography
German Patent and Trade Mark Office (GPTO)
(2008a). “Patente - Eine Informationsbroschu¨re zum Patent”,
http://presse.dpma.de/docs/pdf/broschueren/1/patente dt.pdf [April,
21st, 2009].
German Patent and Trade Mark Office (GPTO) (2008b).
“Deutsches Patent und Markenamt”, http://www.dpma.de/index.htm
[April, 21st, 2009].
German Patent and Trade Mark Office (GPTO) (2008c). “DE-
PATISnet”, . http://depatisnet.dpma.de/DepatisNet/ [April, 21st, 2009]
Glass, A.J. and Saggi, K. (2001). “Innovation and Wage Effects of
International Outsourcing”, European Economic Review, 45(1), pp.
67-86.
Go¨rg, H., Hanley, A., and Strobl, E. (2008). “Productivity
effects of International Outsourcing: Evidence from Plant Level data”,
Canadian Journal of Economics, 41(2), pp. 670-688.
Goldberg, P.K., Khandelwal, A., Pavcnik, N., and Topalova, P.
(2008). “Imported Intermediate Inputs and Domestic Product Growth:
Evidence from India”, National Bureau of Economic Research, NBER
Working Paper, No. 14416.
Greenaway, D. and Kneller, R. (2007). “Firm Heterogeneity,
Exporting and Foreign Direct Investment”, The Economic Journal,.
117(February), pp. F134-F160
Greenhalgh, C. and Rogers, M. (2007). “The Value of Intellectual
Property Rights to Firms and Society”, Oxford Review of Economic
Policy, 23(4), pp. 541-567.
Greeve, H.R. (2003). “A Behavioral Theory of R&D Expenditures and
Innovations: Evidence from Shipbuilding”, Academy of Management
Journal, 46(6), pp. 685-702.
Griliches, Z. (1990). “Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: A
Survey.”, Journal of Economic Literature, 28(4), pp. 1661-1707.
Griliches, Z. (1992). “The Search for R&D Spillovers”, Scandinavian
Journal of Economics, 94 supplement, pp. S29-S47.
163
Bibliography
Grossman, S. and Hart, O. (1986). “The Costs and Benefits of
Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration”, Journal of
Political Economy, 94(4), pp. 691-719.
Grossman, G. and Helpman, E. (2002). “Integration versus Outsourc-
ing in Industry Equilibrium”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(1),
pp. 85-120.
Grossman, G. and Helpman, E. (1991). “Innovation and Growth in
the Global Economy”, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Grossman, G. and Helpman, E. (2003). “Outsourcing versus FDI in
Industry Equlibrium”, Journal of the European Economic Association,
1(2-3), pp. 317-327.
Grossman, G. and Helpman, E. (2004). “Managerial Incentives and
the International Organization of Production”, Journal of International
Economics, 63(2), pp. 237-262.
Hagemejer, J. and Kolasa, M. (2008). “Internationalization and
Economic Performance of Enterprises: Evidence from Firm-Level Data”,
Munich Personal RePEc Archive, MPRA Paper, No. 8720, unpublished.
Hahn, C.H. (2004). “Exporting and Performance of Plants: Evidence
from Korean Manufacturing”, National Bureau of Economic Research,
NBER Working Paper, No. 10208.
Hall, B.H. and Ziedonis, R.H. (2001). “The Patent Paradox Revisited:
An Empirical Study of Patenting in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry,
1979-1995”, RAND Journal of Economics, 32(1), pp. 101-128.
Halpern, L., Koren, M., and Szeidl, A. (2005). “Imports and
Productivity”, Centre for Economic Policy Research, CEPR Discussion
Paper, No. 5139.
Harrigan, K.R.(1984). “Formulating Vertical Integration Strategies”,
Academy of Management Review, 9(4), pp. 638-652.
Harrigan, K.R.(1985). “Vertical Integration and Corporate Strategy”,
Academy of Management Journal, 28(2), pp. 397-425.
164
Bibliography
Harrison, A. (1994). “Productivity, Imperfect Competition and Trade
Reform: Theory and Evidence”, Journal of International Economics,
36(1-2), pp. 53-73.
Hart, O. and Moore, J. (1990). “Property Rights and the Nature of
the Firm”, Journal of Political Economy, 98(6), pp. 1119-1158.
Head, K. and Ries, J. (1999). “Rationalization Effects of Tariff
Reductions”, Journal of International Economics, 47(2), pp. 295-320.
Holmes, T.J. and Schmitz, J.A. (2001). “A Gain from Trade: From
Unproductive to Productive Entrepreneurship”, Journal of Monetary
Economics, 47(2), pp. 417-446.
Hoppenstedt (2009). “Hoppenstedt firm database”,
http://www.firmendatenbank.de [August, 28th, 2009]. Darmstadt.
Jaffe, A.B. and Lerner, J. (2004). “Innovation and its Discontents:
How Our Broken Patent System is Endangering Innovation and Progress,
and What to Do about It”, Princton University Press, New Jersey.
Kasahara, H. and Lapham, B. (2008). “Productivity and the Decision
to Import and Export: Theory and Evidence”, CESifo, Working Paper
Series, No. 2240. CESifo GmbH.
Kasahara, H. and Rodrigue, J. (2008). “Does the Use of Imported
Intermediates Increase Productivity? Plant-Level Evidence”, Journal of
Development Economics, 87(1), pp. 106-118.
Knight, K.E. (1967). “A Descriptive Model of the Intra-Firm Innovation
Process”, Journal of Business, 40(4), pp. 478-496.
Krishna, P. and Mitra, D. (1998). “Trade Liberalization, Market
Discipline and Productivity Growth: New Evidence from India”, Journal
of Development Economics, 56(2), pp. 447-462.
165
Bibliography
Kunst, R.M. and Marin, D. (1989). “On Exports and Productivity: A
Causal Analysis”, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 71(4), pp.
699-703.
Lachenmaier, S. and Wo¨ßmann, L. (2006). “Does Innovation Cause
Exports? Evidence from Exogenous Innovation Impulses and Obstacles
using German Micro Data”, Oxford Economic Papers, 58(2), pp.
317-350.
Levin, R.C. (1988). “Appropriability, R&D Spending, and Technological
Performance”, American Economic Review, 78(2), pp. 424-428.
Levinsohn, J. and Petrin, A. (2003). “Estimating Production Func-
tions Using Inputs to Control for Unobservables”, Review of Economic
Studies, 70(2), pp. 317-341.
Louri, H., Loufir, R. and Papanastassiou, M. (2002). “Foreign In-
vestment and Ownership Structure: An Empirical Analysis”, Empirica,
29(1), pp. 31-45
Luong, T.A. (2008). “The Impact of Input and Output Tariffs on Firms’
Productivity: Theory and Evidence”, Princeton University, Working
Paper.
Marchick, D.M. and Slaughter, M.J. (2008). “Global FDI Policy
- Correcting a Protectionist Drift”, The Bernard and Irene Schwartz
Series on American Competitiveness, Council on Foreign Relations, CSR
No. 34.
Marin, D. (1992). “Is the Export-Led Growth Hypothesis Valid for
Industrialized Countries?”, The Review of Economics and Statistics,
74(4), pp. 678-688.
Marin, D. (2004). “A Nation of Poets and Thinkers: Less so with Eastern
Enlargement? Austria and Germany”, Centre for Economic Policy
Research, CEPR Discussion Paper, No. 4358.
Marin, D. (2006). “A New International Division of Labor in Europe:
Outsourcing and Offshoring to Eastern Europe”, Journal of the Euro-
pean Economic Association, April-May 2-3(4), pp. 612-622.
166
Bibliography
Marin, D. (2008). “The New Corporation in Europe”, Bruegel Policy
Brief, Issue 2008/07, Bruegel.
Marin, D., Lorentowicz, A. and Raubold, A. (2003). “Ownership,
Capital or Outsourcing: What Drives German Investment to Eastern
Europe?”, in: Hermann, Heinz and Robert Lipsey (eds), ”‘Foreign Direct
Investment in the Real and Financial Sector in Industrial Countries”’,
Springer Verlag, Berlin.
Marin, D. and Verdier, T. (2008). “The Corporate Hierarchies and
the Size of Nations: Theory and Evidence”, Centre for Economic Policy
Research, CEPR Discussion Paper, No. 6734.
Maskell, P., Pedersen, T., Petersen, B. and Dick-Nielsen,
J. (2005). “Learning Paths to Offshore Outsourcing - From Cost
Reduction to Knowledge Seeking”, Danish Research Unit for Industrial
Dynamics, Working Paper, No. 05-17.
Mattoo, A. and Subramanian, A. (2008). “Multilateralism beyond
Doha”, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Working Paper
Series, WP 08-8.
Mayer, T. and Ottaviano, G. (2007a). “The Happy Few: New Facts
on the Internationalisation of European Firms”, Centre for Economic
Policy Research, Policy Insight, No. 15.
Mayer, T. and Ottaviano, G. (2007b). “The Happy Few: The
Internationalisation of European Firms. New facts based on firm-level
evidence”, Bruegel Blueprint Series, Volume 3.
McLaren, J. (2000). “Globalization and Vertical Structure”, American
Economic Review, 90(5), pp. 1239-1254.
Melitz, M.J. (2003). “The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Realloca-
tions and Aggregate Industry Productivity”, Econometrica, 71(6), pp.
1695-1725.
Merges, R.P. (1997). “Patent Law and Policy: Cases and Materials”,
The Michie Company (2nd edition), Charlottesville, Va.
167
Bibliography
Mol, M.J. (2005). “Does being R&D Intensive still Discourage Outsourc-
ing? Evidence from Dutch Manufacturing”, Research Policy, 34(4), pp.
571-582. Brussels.
Mol, M.J., Pauwels, P., Matthyssens, P. and Quintens, L.
(2004). “A Technological Contingency Perspective on the Depth
and Scope of International Outsourcing”, Journal of International
Management, 10(2), pp. 287-305.
Monteverde, K. (1995). “Technical Dialog as an Incentive for Vertical
Integration in the Semiconductor Industry”, Management Science,
41(10), pp. 1624-1638.
Mugele, C. and Schnitzer, M. (2006). “Organization of Multinational
Activities and Ownership Structure”, University of Munich, Discussion
Paper, 2006-23.
Muendler, M. (2004). “Trade, Technology, and Productivity: A Study
of Brazilian Manufacturers, 1986-1998”, CESifo, Working Paper Series,
No. 1148. CESifo GmbH.
Muuls, M. and Pisu, M. (2007). “Imports and Exports at the Level of
the Firm: Evidence from Belgium”, GEP, Research Paper Series, No.
2007/28.
Nunn, N. and Trefler, D. (2007). “The Boundaries of the Multi-
national Firm: An Empirical Analysis”, in: E. Helpman, D. Marin,
T. Verdier (Eds.), The Organization of Firms in a Global Economy,
Harvard University Press, 2008.
Olley, G.S. and Pakes, A. (1996). “The Dynamics of Productivity
in the Telecommunications Equipment Industry”, Econometrica, 64(4),
pp. 1263-1297.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) (2005). “Oslo Manual - Guidlines for Collecting and
Interpreting Innovation Data”, The Measurement of Scientific and
Technological Activities, OECD Publishing (3rd edition), Paris.
168
Bibliography
Pakes, A. (1996). “Dynamic Structural Models, Problems and Prospects:
Mixed Continuous Discrete Controls and Market Interaction ”, in: C.
Sims (ed.) Advances in Econometrics, Sixth World Congress, Vol. II
(Cambridge University Press) pp. 171-259.
Pavcnik, N. (2002). “Trade Liberalization, Exit, and Productivity Im-
provements: Evidence from Chilean Plants”, The Review of Economic
Studies, 69(1), pp. 245-276.
Pro Inno Europe (European Commission) (2008). “European
Innovation Scoreboard 2007 - Comparativ Analysis of Innovation
Performance”, Directorate-General for Enterprise and Industry, PRO
INNO Europe paper, No. 6.
Quinn, J.B. (2000.) “Outsourcing innovation: The New Engine of
Growth”, Sloan Management Review, 41(4), pp. 13-29.
Rasmussen, B. (2004). “Innovation and Industry Structure in the
Biomedical Industry: Some Preliminary Results”, Victoria University
of Technology, Pharmaceutical Industry Project Working Paper Series,
Working Paper, No. 17. Cambridge.
Roberts, M.J. and Tybout, J.R. (1997). “The Decision to Export in
Colombia: An Emoirical Model of Entry with Sunk Costs”, American
Economic Review, 87(4), pp. 545-564.
Schor, A. (2004). “Heterogeneous Productivity Response to Tariff
Reduction. Evidence from Brazilian Manufacturing Firms”, Journal of
Developments Economics, 75(2), pp. 373-396.
Sjo¨holm, F. (1999). “Exports, Imports and Productivity: Results
from Indonesian Establishment Data”, World Development, 27(4), pp.
705-715.
Stifterverband fu¨r die Deutsche Wissenschaft (2004). “FuE-
Datenreport 03/04”, in: Wissenschaftsstatistik GmbH (Hrsg.),
Forschung und Entwicklung in der Wirtschaft, Bericht u¨ber die
FuE-Erhebung 2001 und 2002, Essen.
Stigler, G.J. (1951). “The Division of Labor is Limited by the Extent
of the Market”, Journal of Political Economy, 59(3), pp. 185-193.
169
Bibliography
Teece, D.J. (1986). “Profiting from Technological Innovation: Impli-
cations for Integration, Collaboration, Licensing and Public Policy”,
Research Policy, 15, pp. 285-305.
Temouri, Y., Driffield, N.L., and Higon, D.A. (2008). “Analysis of
Productivity Differences among Foreign and Domestic Firms: Evidence
from Germany”, Review of World Economics, 144(1), pp. 32-54.
Thompson, V.A. (1965). “Bureaucracy and Innovation”, Administrative
Science Quarterly, 10(1), pp. 1-20.
Thomson Reuters (2009). “Thomson ONE Banker”,
http://banker.thomsonib.com [August, 28th, 2009]
Tomiura, E. (2007). “Foreign Outsourcing, Exporting, and FDI: A
Productivity Comparison at the Firm Level”, Journal of International
Economics, 72(1), pp. 113-127.
Topalova, P. (2004). “Trade Liberalization and Firm Productivity:
The Case of India”, International Monetary Fund, Working Paper, 04/28.
Trefler, D. (2004). “The Long and Short of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement”, American Economic Review, 94(4), pp. 870-895.
Tybout, J.R. and Westbrook M.D. (1995). “Trade Liberalization
and the Dimension of Efficiency Change in Mexican Manufacturing
Industries”, Journal of International Economics, 39(1-2), pp. 53-78.
Vogel, A. and Wagner, J. (2008). “Higher Productivity in Importing
German Manufacturing Firms: Self-Selection, Learning from Importing,
or Both?”, IZA, Discussion Paper Series, No. 3854.
Wagner, J. (2002). “The Causal Effects of Exports on Firm Size and
Labor Productivity: First Evidence from a Matching Approach”,
Economic Letters, 77(2), pp. 287-292.
Wagner, J. (2007). “Exports and Productivity: A Survey of the Evidence
from Firm Level Data”, The World Economy, 30(1), pp. 60-82.
170
Bibliography
Wagner, J. (2008). “Exports, Imports and Productivity at the Firm
Level. An International Perspective: Introduction by Guest Editor”,
Review of World Economics, Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 144(4), pp.
591-594.
Williamson, O. (1975). “Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and An-
titrust Implications”, , Free Press, New York.
Williamson, O. (1985). “The Economic Institutions of Capitalism”,
Free Press, New York.
Wooldridge, J.M. (2005). “On Estimating Firm-Level Production
Functions Using Proxy Variables to Control for Unobservables”, Depart-
ment of Economics, Working Paper, Michigan State University, Mimeo.
World Bank and United Nations Conference on Trade and De-
velopment (UNCTAD) (2008). “World Integrated Trade Solution
(WITS)”, http://wits.worldbank.org/witsweb [April, 21st, 2009].
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) (2006).
“WIPO Patentreport 2006 - Statistics on Worldwide Patent Activities”,
http://www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/statistics/patents [May, 13th, 2008].
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)
(2008). “World Patent Report 2008: A Statistical Review”
and “Download Data”, Report availability and download data at
http://www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/statistics/patents/index.html [Septem-
ber, 9th, 2009].
Yasar, M., Raciborski, R., and Poi, B. (2008). “Production Function
Estimation in Stata Using the Olley and Pakes Method”, The Stata
Journal, 8(2), pp. 221-231.
Zhang, J., Baden-Fuller, C., Mangematin, V. and Nesta, L.
(2005). “How Technological Knowledge Base Influence Collaborative
Activities: Evidence from the Biotechnology Industry”, EBK, Evolution
of Business Knowledge, Working Paper, 2005/21.
171
Curriculum Vitae
Name Thorsten Hansen
Date of birth January, 17th 1982
Birthplace Munich
10/05 − 09/09 Doctoral student in economics, University of Munich,
Germany
08/05 − 12/09 Research and teaching assistant, University of Munich,
Germany
07/08 − 08/08 Internship with SwissLife,
Customer Service, Pension Fund,
Munich, Germany
08/07 − 09/07 Internship with DaimlerChrysler Insurance Services,
Center of Competence Automotive Insurance,
Berlin, Germany
06/04 − 06/05 Student research assistant, Institute for International
Economics, University of Munich, Germany
10/01 − 07/05 Diplom-Volkswirt, University of Munich, Germany
09/92 − 06/01 Abitur, Lise-Meitner-Gymnasium Unterhaching, Munich,
Germany
172
